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Abstract
During the American Revolution Patriots and Tories alike knew the Americans could not
win the war without foreign aid. In 1776 Benjamin Franklin had been sent to France to negotiate
a mutual defense treaty. In February 1778, the treaty was signed and Admiral d’Estaing and the
Toulon fleet were dispatched to help the Patriot’s. Plans were made for a campaign – comprised
of 10,000 Americans under the command of Major General John Sullivan along with d’Estaing’s
squadron and 4,000 French troops - to retake Newport, Rhode Island, a significant port held by
the British since 1776. It was the first joint military operation of the newly formed alliance.
Just as the allies took action, circumstances changed and a sudden and violent storm hit
the area. The hurricane battered and badly damaged the French fleet, which had left Newport
Harbor in pursuit of the British, causing d’Estaing to insist on retreating to Boston for repairs.
Positioned initially at the top of the Aquidneck Island, following the storm, the Americans had
marched to Middletown where both sides became entrenched in the Siege of Newport,
cannonading one another for several days from fortified positions on opposing hills. In the wake
of the French retreat, Sullivan chose to push on without help. Mired in with swampy terrain as a
result of the storm, and anticipating a British landing, Sullivan pulled back to Portsmouth. On
August 29 the two sides engaged in intense combat in the Battle of Rhode Island at the end of
which Sullivan was able to successfully withdraw his forces.
In the end, both sides sought to claim victory. The British boasted of a successful
defense and the Americans stressed their safe, orderly, withdrawal from the island. In reality,
Sullivan was furious with the French, blaming d’Estaing for ruining an engagement that could
have ended the war. This seriously strained on the Americans’ relationship with their new ally,
one Washington had to smooth over. However, the French were not solely responsible for the
loss. This study delves into the more technical, often forgotten, aspects of the conflict. It pairs
the historical record with scientific analysis of the artillery, fortifications, geography and
unforeseen circumstances that had an impact on the outcome of the battle. In the end, although
Sullivan wanted to lay blame on the French, there were many other elements that worked against
the Americans in this campaign.
While much of the original earthen defense-works used during the Siege have been lost to
progress, there are a small number of sites that still exist. This study also covers what sites
remain, their condition and what could be done to preserve and commemorate these significant
locations.
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Executive Summary
In August 1778, the Siege of Newport took place on opposing hills in Middletown,
Rhode Island. It involved Major General John Sullivan’s Continental Army units and regional
militias against Major General Robert Pigot’s British, Hessian and Loyalist forces. The two
sides bombarded each other for well over a week to no avail, causing the Americans to retreat
north to Portsmouth where they became entangled in the Battle of Rhode Island. Often
overshadowed by the battle in Portsmouth - listed on the National Register of Historic Places
(ID: 74002054) - little attention is paid to the finer details of the Siege, its battlefield in
Middletown, and its impact on the campaign as a whole.
The Siege was part of the larger Rhode Island Campaign, which was an effort to retake
the strategic port of Newport from its British occupiers. With help from America’s brand new
ally - France - American and French forces descended on Narragansett Bay in the hopes that a
large scale victory with a powerful ally would end the war. The campaign that ensued involved
an army of 10,000 Americans, including some of Washington’s top officers and aides, and the
Toulon Fleet lent by His Majesty King Louis XVI. The allies expected victory and their morale
was high but the operation was fraught with problems from the start. Changing circumstances, a
lack of coordination, an unexpected hurricane, and a near diplomatic disaster made an operation
with much promise completely unravel. Today, the campaign is at best considered a draw,
making it an easily forgotten chapter of the war. It was, however, American’s first joint military
operation with the French. Lessons were learned the hard way and diplomatic mistakes made
here would not be repeated later in the war. The British learned just how vulnerable their
position in Newport truly was and would abandon the city in the following year. This vacancy,
in turn, unintentionally made way for Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur,
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comte de Rochambeau to use Newport as a staging area for French forces in America before
heading south to Yorktown.
In 2015, the Middletown Historical Society (MHS) received a $67,000 grant from the
American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) to investigate the Siege of Newport and its
battlefield in Middletown. In the Siege of British Forces in Newport County by Colonial and
French in August of 1778, the MHS sought to not only highlight the town’s role in the larger
conflict but also to determine how much geography and the available technology affected the
campaign’s outcome. To accomplish this, an in-depth analysis was conducted of the artillery and
earthen fortifications used and their place within the battlefield landscape. In addition,
identifying the remaining defenses and their condition has provided meaningful insight for their
future preservation and commemoration, and a better understanding of the battlefield as a whole.
To carry out such a large scale, multi-disciplinary project, the Middletown Historical
Society Research Team was formed. It primarily involved a collaboration with Salve Regina
University, including faculty, students and alumni from both the History Department and the
Cultural and Historic Preservation Department. Students conducted research and Ground
Penetrating Radar (GPR) surveys, while faculty and alumni helped research and write portions of
the report. Additionally, engineers from Roger Williams University and the University of Rhode
Island were brought on to assist with the technical analysis.
The introductory sections of the report provide the proper historical context for the Siege,
detailing the lead up, major players, and troop movements prior to the engagement. It is in
Chapter One that the landscape of the battlefield and beginning of the Siege are discussed. It
provides an understanding of key terrain features, observations on both sides, cover and
concealment used, obstacles, dead spaces, and the avenues of approach. Chapter Two takes this
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further by delving into the evolution of the Siege, including fields of fire, elevation
considerations, and a detailed technical analysis of the artillery used during the engagement. It is
in these chapters that the impact of geography and technology on the outcome become apparant.
Chapters Three and Four provide more of a historical background on what happened
next, both for the troops and the battlefield. Chapter Three discusses the Americans’ decision to
abandon the Siege and move north to Portsmouth. Here, after an intense battle, they retreat
entirely off the island. The cover and concealment used during their abandonment of both the
Siege and the campaign, as well as their mobility corridor used during the retreat, are discussed.
Chapter Four builds on this by examining what happened to the landscape after the Americans
left. British activities post-August 1778 are detailed including the repair and destruction of their
own lines. The later restoration of and addition to the defense lines by the French are also
covered. Excerpts from numerous contemporary accounts (British, Hessian, American, and
French) have been included to provide depth on the subject. Additionally, the use of historic
maps from the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan and the Library of
Congress has provided visual evidence of the battlefield’s evolution from 1778 to 1780.
Following the Revolution, Middletown returned to the farming community it had been.
Like so many of the country’s other battlefields, the major changes and threats came in the 20th
century. Assessing the location and condition of remaining fortifications and other features
during this period was essential. In Chapter Five, the existence, preservation and integrity of the
battlefield and its sites were studied and evaluated in three specific time periods including the
turn of the 20th century, pre-WWII and the present day. Historic photographs, atlases, written
accounts, aerial photographs, and site visits were used to assess changes to the battlefield over
time and provide insight into what is left today. For convenience, Table ES.1 below lists all
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relevant features still present on the battlefield today, and Figure ES.1 shows a map of the
battlefield with important features and movements marked.
Table ES.1: Relevant features on the battlefield today.
FEATURE

TYPE

Card’s Redoubt

earthen fortification

Tonomy Hill Fort

earthen fortification

Little Tonomy Hill

site of earthen fortification

Bailey’s Brook

natural feature

Easton’s Pond

natural feature

Easton’s Beach

natural feature

Honeyman Hill

natural feature

Bliss Hill

natural feature

Green End

natural feature

West Main Road

street

East Main Road

street

Bliss Road

street

Green End Ave.

street

John Bliss House

Historic home used as British field
headquarters during the Siege.

Evidence beneath the surface was also analyzed in Chapter Five, including the existence
of a cannon ball recovered in a yard on Honeyman Hill and through the use of archeological
equipment. Ground Penetrating Radar surveys were conducted in three associated sites, each
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chosen based on the historical record and access to the property. These include a British outpost
located on the Aaron Lopez Farm site (NRHP ID: 80000082. listed as “Greenvale Farm” for a
later occupation of the site); the former site of Fort Fanning, and the Redoute de Saintonge
(constructed by the French in 1780 but frequently mislabeled as Green End Fort).
Chapter Six is the conclusion of the report, covering a summary of the project and
preservation recommendations. New insights on the history of the Siege, its outcome, and the
role geography and technology played are discussed in detail. Recommendations are provided
for the preservation of the battlefield’s remaining features, and a proposal is offered for a small
museum at the center of the battlefield.
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Battlefield Map

Figure ES.1 Map of the Battlefield of the Battle of Rhode Island. Important fortifications, troop
movements and the Siege of Newport core area are marked.
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Preface
In August 1778 the newly formed United States and France conducted their first joint
military operation of the American Revolution. Referred to as the Rhode Island Campaign, its
leaders, Major General John Sullivan1 of the Continental Army and Admiral Jean-BaptisteCharles-Henri-Hector, comte d’Estaing2 of the French Navy, were instructed by General George
Washington to descend upon Newport, in an effort to reclaim this strategic port. The fight that
ensued is known today as the Battle of Rhode Island. Ultimately a loss, the battle is largely
overlooked in most history books, in part due to its outcome. However, it is a significant
moment, as it marks the beginning of French military involvement. It also underscores the
turning point of the war, reached by the decisive American victory at Saratoga a year earlier.
With such momentum behind the patriot cause and a newly formed alliance, the war could
actually have been won in Newport had the outcome been different. Instead, the Campaign put a
severe strain on the new alliance as each side blamed the other for the loss. America would have
to wait two more years before another French force under Lieutenant General Jean-BaptisteDonatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau3 would come to their aid and ultimately lead them
to victory at Yorktown.

1

An attorney from New Hampshire, Sullivan joined the Continental Army as an officer in 1775 and took part in the
Siege of Boston the following March. After being promoted to major general, he was captured during the Battle of
Long Island in 1776 but was exchanged in time to lead Washington’s right column at the Battle of Trenton. After
commanding the Rhode Island campaign at the age of thirty-eight, he found success on the battlefield defeating the
Iroquois Indians in western New York, but ultimately resigned before the war’s end due to illness. He went on to
become a delegate to the Continental Congress, presided over his state’s ratification of the Constitution and later in
life became governor of New Hampshire.
2
A nobleman with many years in the French military, first in the army, then in the navy, d’Estaing was commander
of the Toulon fleet ordered by King Louis XVI to aid the American colonies in 1778. Years later, he was guillotined
in Paris during the Reign of Terror.
3
A French nobleman and the general in command of French forces in the later years of the American Revolution.
Rochambeau was stationed at Newport from July 1780-1781. He led the French Army to aid Washington in the
defeat of British forces under Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, VA, virtually ending the war. During the French
Revolution he was nearly guillotined but ultimately evaded execution and was later pensioned by Napoleon. (For
more on Rochambeau’s roll in Newport and the war see Chapter 4.)
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The Americans had started angling for French aid shortly after the Revolution began,
aware that they would need foreign help if they were going to have a chance of defeating the
British. In the fall of 1775 the Continental Congress sent Benjamin Franklin and three other
American diplomats to Canada in an effort to enlist support from their French neighbors to the
north. When the Canadians rejected the American overtures, Franklin was then sent to France in
December 1776.4 Franklin wanted to draw the French into another conflict with the British, who
had decisively defeated them in the French and Indian War5 in the previous decade. The French
were charmed by Franklin and sympathized with his cause, but they needed to be persuaded that
the Americans had a chance to win before they would commit resources to the effort. Franklin
would have to bide his time until the Americans proved themselves on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the British, having been forced out of Boston in March 1776, wanted to
maintain a foothold in New England and so they set their sights on Newport. A bustling,
cosmopolitan trading center, Newport at this time ranked with Boston, Philadelphia, New York
City and Charleston as one of the colonies’ leading cities. Its deep harbor was especially
attractive for the British fleet. Even the largest British ships would be able to enter the harbor
without fear of running aground. Additionally, Newport’s location at the southern end of an

4

Stacy Schiff, A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France and the Birth of America (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 135.
5
The American theater of the multi-continent conflict known as the Seven Years War.
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island - Aquidneck Island6 - at the mouth of Narragansett Bay7, would make it all the easier to
defend.
In December 1776 the British forces under Lieutenant General Henry Clinton8 landed in
Newport in full force: seventy-two ships—including fifteen warships—anchored in and around
Newport and 4,000 British troops and 3,100 Hessians occupied the island.9 Newport’s residents
made no effort to resist the invasion and many of the town’s Loyalists heartily welcomed the
British officers on their arrival. However, as much as half of Newport’s population had fled the
island, reducing their numbers to 5,300 by the time the British arrived.10 Among those who took
flight was the Reverend Ezra Stiles, a Congregational pastor, director of the Redwood Library
and outspoken patriot.11
Having taken Newport and nearby Jamestown without firing a shot, the top British
officers ensconced themselves in the town’s finest homes and waited for orders from their
commanders. In the summer of 1777, the British began an ambitious campaign to cut off
Boston—the epicenter of the Revolution—from the rest of the colonies. General John

6

Comprised of the towns of Portsmouth (to the north), Middletown (in the center) and Newport (to the south) it is
the largest island in Narragansett Bay in the State of Rhode Island. Originally called “Aquidneck” by the
Narragansett tribe, it was later renamed “Rhode Island” by early English settlers. Both the State of Rhode Island and
the Battle of Rhode Island are named for this geographic feature. Today it is widely referred to as Aquidneck Island,
although its official name remains Rhode Island. Throughout this report it is called Aquidneck Island to avoid
confusion with the state.
7
A large bay in the state of Rhode Island, fed by the Providence, Taunton, and Sakonnet Rivers. Its islands include,
Rhode (Aquidneck), Connanicut, and Prudence Islands.
8
British army officer whose forces first captured Newport in 1776. In 1778 Clinton became commander in chief of
British forces in America. Although his second in command, Lord Cornwallis, was responsible for the loss at
Yorktown, it was Clinton and not Cornwallis who received much of the blame upon returning to England, after the
war.
9
See Christian M. McBurney, The Rhode Island Campaign: The First French and American Operation in the
Revolutionary War (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2011), 2-3; Rockwell Stensrud, Newport: A Lively
Experiment, 1639-1969 (Newport, RI: Redwood Library, 2006), 196-197.
10
McBurney, 9.
11
Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, ed. Franklin Bowditch Dexter 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901);
1:661-662.
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Burgoyne12 would bring his forces south from Canada to Albany, New York, where he would
connect with General William Howe13 who would travel north from New York City. These two
armies would be met by a smaller force led by Colonel Barry St. Leger who would come from
the western region of New York. The plan was bungled from the start: Howe chose to take his
troops to Philadelphia and St. Leger was pinned down in western New York. By October,
Burgoyne, outmaneuvered by the American troops, surrendered his 5,900 British and Hessian
troops at Saratoga.14
At Saratoga, the Americans had scored a major victory. When the news of the American
success reached Franklin in Paris, he wasted no time in pressing his argument that the war could
be won if the Americans had the assistance of France’s powerful army and navy. By February
1778, King Louis XVI15 agreed to ally with the Americans and promised them that aid would be
forthcoming.16 Leading the French expedition would be the comte d’Estaing, a forty-eight year
old admiral who had begun his career in the army but had switched to the navy in the 1760s.
D’Estaing set off from France in April with sixteen ships and 4,000 troops and traveled at an
agonizingly slow pace through the Mediterranean and then across the Atlantic.17

12

British general largely remembered for the outcome of the Battle of Saratoga.
Commander and chief of British forces in America from 1776 to his retirement in 1778.
14
Richard M. Ketchum, Saratoga: The Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War (New York: Henry Holt,
1997), 428-440.
15
King of France in the late 18th century who supplied military aid to the American colonies during the
Revolutionary War. He was the last in the Bourbon line of monarchs before the French Revolution and was
ultimately guillotined in 1792.
16
Ketchum, 440-448; Schiff, 110-134.
17
John Hattendorf, Newport, the French Navy and American Independence (Newport, RI: Redwood Press, 2005), 38.
13

14

News of the French entry into the war alarmed the British in Rhode Island. In May one
of the British officers in Newport, Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie,18 noted in his diary that
“great rejoicings have been made of late all over the Country, on account of their Alliance with
France…I am of opinion that they really will attempt something soon, for as the spirits of the
people are now high…numbers of them will be found willing to engage for a short time in an
enterprize of that nature.”19
To thwart any potential attack on Aquidneck Island, the British engaged in harsh preemptive strikes against nearby towns. General Robert Pigot,20 who assumed command of
Newport in July 1777, ordered attacks on Bristol and Warren to destroy any boats and weapons
that the patriots might use in an invasion. In their raids, the British carried out what the historian
Christian McBurney calls a “campaign of burning and plunder,” taking dozens of prisoners,
torching a church in Bristol and numerous homes and storerooms in both towns.21 A few days
later, the British entered Fall River and burned a sawmill which had been producing planks for
the Patriots’ ships.
At long last, d’Estaing arrived off Sandy Hook,22 New Jersey in early July (Figure P.1).
He contemplated an attack on the British fleet guarding New York City but eventually decided
that the water might not be deep enough for some of his larger ships. Figuring that d’Estaing

18

British officer in the Royal Welch Fusiliers, who kept a detailed diary during the American Revolution, recording
his time stationed in Boston, Newport and New York. His diary provides enormous insight and is widely quoted and
cited throughout this report.
19
Diary of Frederick Mackenzie (DFM) 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), 1: 275-276.
20
Officer in command of the British land forces stationed at Newport, RI during the city’s occupation and the Battle
of Rhode Island.
21
McBurney, 58.
22
A barrier spit in northern New Jersey, protruding into and sheltering part of Lower New York Bay. Located just
south of New York City, ships headed for this port had to pass by Sandy Point en route. The British Navy stationed
at New York used the strategic geography and location of Sandy Hook to their advantage to protect both the city and
their fleet.
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might bypass New York City and sail on to Rhode Island, General Clinton, who was then in
command of British forces in New York, moved to bolster Pigot’s forces. In early July, he
dispatched 1,850 British and Hessian troops to Newport.

Figure P.1 Overview of French and American troop movements during the summer of 1778
(marked in blue). These include Sullivan’s forces moving from Providence to Tiverton and
eventually Middletown, Lafayette and the Continental Army troops on their way to join the
campaign, and d’Estaing’s route from France to Sandy Hook, NJ to Newport, RI. Cities held by
the British, such as Newport and New York are marked in red and the Patriot stronghold,
Boston, is marked in blue.23

23

Narragansett Bay to Nantucket, Maptech Chart Kit, 2nd edition, region 3.1, map 1. Reproduced from NOAA
(National Oceanic and Atomospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce) Chart No. 13003 Georges
Bank and Nantucket Shoals, 2011.
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Washington had the same idea as his British rival: he hoped that d’Estaing would sail
into Narragansett Bay and help the Patriots retake Aquidneck Island. Washington sent his
trusted aide Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton to meet the admiral on his flagship, the
Languedoc. The two men agreed on the wisdom of a Rhode Island campaign and Washington
then sent Major General Nathaniel Greene24 and another trusted aide, the Major General MarieJoseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette,25 to Rhode Island with two
brigades from the Continental Army. Greene and Lafayette would report to General Sullivan
who was in charge of a force of 8,000 militiamen in Providence. With these American troops
and d’Estaing’s French ships joining forces, Washington was optimistic that they would be able
to dislodge the British from Newport and thus provide a crucial follow up to the American
triumph at Saratoga.

24

Hailing from Rhode Island, Greene was manager of his family’s iron foundry before the war and became
commander of the State army in 1775. After joining the Continental Army, he was quickly promoted to Major
General and became one of Washington’s most skilled and trusted officers. He was assigned to help Sullivan retake
Newport, in the hope that his local knowledge could be of use. Greene is largely remembered for his strategic mind
and for his part in the war’s Southern theater. His actions proved crucial in the lead up to Yorktown, luring and
exhausting Lord Cornwallis’ army throughout the South. After the war, he settled in Georgia, where he died in 1786.
25
French aristocrat and army officer who volunteered for the American Continental Army prior to French
involvement in the war. Lafayette became a close friend and aide to Washington and participated in numerous
engagements throughout the war, most notably helping to blockade Lord Cornwallis in the lead up to the Siege of
Yorktown. He was also vital in America’s dealings with France, both during the Rhode Island Campaign and later
helping Benjamin Franklin to secure 6,000 French soldiers under the command of Rochambeau. Lafayette went on
to be a key figure in the French Revolution of 1789 and in the July Revolution of 1830.
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Project Background
The origins of this project, focusing on Middletown’s role in the Rhode Island Campaign,
center around a Revolutionary War era earthen fortification on Vernon Avenue in Middletown
wrongly associated with the British occupation and the Siege of Newport, and misidentified as
Green End Fort (Figure PB.1). The site was actually constructed as a French fort after the arrival
of comte de Rochambeau in 1780. Its proximity to another fortified position on the British front
lines, Card’s Redoubt, had led to confusion about its origins. The misidentification fueled
further historical research and scientific analysis in an effort to correct this mistake, which in turn
renewed interest in the battlefield as a whole.

Figure PB.1 The fort on Vernon Avenue as it appears today. Photo by author.

Situated amidst farmland, high on Bliss Hill, the site was acquired in 1894 by William
Watts Sherman, John Nicholas Brown, Harold Brown, Francis S. Barker and Stephen P. Barker
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in an effort to preserve it.26 Two years later, it was included in Edward Field’s Revolutionary
Defenses in Rhode Island, where it was identified as the fort at Green End and described as
having been built by British forces.27 It was eventually deeded to the Newport Historical Society
(NHS), which (following Field’s example) wrongly identified it, again as a British fort, on a
1919 map of Revolutionary War sites. After a celebration of the American use of the fort at
Butts Hill in Portsmouth in 1923, the NHS and its president, Roderick Terry, chose to hold a
similar ceremony for the opposing side, dedicating the site on Vernon Avenue with a stone
marker (Figure PB.2).

Figure PB.2 The marker placed in 1924 by the Newport Historical Society (NHS) at the fort on Vernon Avenue in
Middletown, RI. Today, the site is still owned by the NHS. Photo by author.

26
27

Roderick Terry, “The Story of Green End Fort,” Bulletin of Newport History No. 51 (October 1924); 13.
Edward Field, Revolutionary Defenses in Rhode Island (Providence: Preston and Rounds, 1896), 132.
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Terry went on to publish an article covering the day’s festivities and the history of the
fort in an October 1924 issue of the NHS’s Bulletin of Newport History.28 This article reinforced
the idea that the fort existed during the Siege of Newport, a belief that stood uncontested for over
fifty years.
In 1976, engineer and historian Kenneth Walsh, submitted a paper to Newport History,
the same bulletin Terry’s article had appeared in. In it he argued that the earthen fortification
was actually the Redoute de Saintonge, built by the French in 1780.29 He had uncovered the
mistake by accident but went on to support his theory using geometry, historic maps from the
time and the diary of a British officer, Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie, a source that had not
been available to Terry in 1924. He hoped something could be done to rectify this and as a result,
the Middletown Historical Society (MHS) came into being. A second article of Walsh’s ran in
1981 addressing concerns of the skeptics and further explaining how the truth had gone
unnoticed for so long.30
In the intervening years, several notable works have been published concerning the Battle
of Rhode Island and the State during the Revolutionary Era. Dr. D.K. Abbass of the Rhode
Island Marine Archaeology Project (RIMAP) has produced a massive and indispensable fourvolume report, Rhode Island in the Revolution: Big Happenings in the Smallest Colony. Another
vital work on the subject is Christian M. McBurney’s The Rhode Island Campaign: The First
French and American Operation in the Revolutionary War. The book covers the entire scope of
the “Americans” various campaigns and activities in their effort to reclaim Newport from the
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British but mainly focuses on the Battle of Rhode Island. McBurney is also the author of
Revolutionary Spies of Rhode Island and several articles on Rhode Island during the war. The
works of both Abbass and McBurney are essential reading to anyone looking to study the Battle
of Rhode Island in depth, and this study seeks to build upon their scholarship.
In 2008, the MHS received a parcel of land through a bequest of long time member Ray
Durfee. The property was situated at the corner of Green End Avenue and Valley Road, right at
the heart of the battlefield. Now with a sizable tract of land located in the valley between the
British and American lines, the MHS took a renewed interest in the Siege of Newport and what
remained of the battlefield. Hoping to tie the land, the area’s history and its existing historic
resources together, an attempt was made to create a historic district from the battlefield and
surviving sites. The bid was unsuccessful and so the MHS decided a new approach was needed.
It was determined that an in-depth study of the Siege of Newport battlefield was necessary and
would provide an opportunity to clear up any remaining questions concerning the fortifications.
As the Siege was examined more closely it became clear that the report should not only
identify the defenses but also address the accuracy of the cannons used against them and the
overall feasibility of the operation. As with the identification of the Redoute de Saintonge,
mathematical equations and scientific analysis have been paired with historic primary resources
to determine how effective the cannonading actually was on the defenses given the distance,
troops, materials and conditions. This paired with an analysis of a number of unfortunate events
suffered by the Americans and the resulting actions taken by them, will ultimately tell whether
they ever really had a chance to dislodge the British from Newport.
This project, the culmination of many earlier events and works, will be the first in-depth
analysis of the battlefield from the Siege of Newport, in Middletown, Rhode Island. Using
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historic resources and scientific analysis, the remnants of British and American defenses will be
identified, the effectiveness of the cannons (both in range and power) will be studied, and the
viability of the campaign will be analyzed. The aim is to create a resource for anyone going
forward who wants to better understand where and how this significant portion of the battle
played out, what physical evidence remains, and how likely victory would have been had
circumstances been different. It will answer any lingering questions over the origins of
remaining fortifications, give accurate context for any future discoveries, and provide a cannon
study model that can be applied to other existing battlefields.

22

Introduction
On July 29, d’Estaing’s formidable fleet, which included twelve ships of the line, four
frigates and several small crafts, was sighted off the Rhode Island coast.31 Forming a line of
battle in preparation to enter Narragansett Bay, d’Estaing anchored and awaited word from the
Americans. He had originally planned to act quickly and take the British by surprise but held off
at news that Sullivan’s force was still trickling into camp and his numbers small.32 Eventually,
Sullivan was taken out to the Languedoc to discuss plans for recapturing Newport.33 Their
original plan called for a pincer movement to divide British troops stationed at either end of the
island, with American troops landing on the east side and French from the west.34
Meanwhile Sullivan’s army, which would eventually include 10,000 men from
Continental Army units and various militias, had been gathering in Tiverton across the Sakonnet
River35 from Portsmouth where the British were positioned (See Appendix A for the full Order
of Battle). From there, the Americans had been easily able to observe the British and had
detailed information about the terrain and disposition of their forces. The closest point of transit
between the mainland and Aquidneck Island was Howland’s Ferry, a narrow passage of the
Sakonnet River between Tiverton and the eastern side of Portsmouth (Figure I.1). It was located
not far from Tiverton’s Nannaquaket Pond, which would serve as a good mustering place for the
large number of boats needed to invade the island.
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Figure I.1 Sketch by Lt. Frederick Mackenzie, as seen in his diary. The Americans gathered at Tiverton and would
36
eventually cross by flatboat to Portsmouth at Howland’s Ferry (circled in red).
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Figure I.2 Sketch of forts on the north end of Aquidneck Island by Lt. Frederick Mackenzie, as seen in his diary.
37
British fortification were built mainly on high ground, where they could monitor the Americans’ activities in Tiverton.
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Figure I.3: British forts on east side of Aquidneck Island as seen on the “Plan of Rhode Island” map by Fage.

With the arrival of the French in Rhode Island waters and Americans gathering across the
river from Portsmouth, the British needed a plan. General Pigot knew the terrain of the island
well. It had been mapped by Charles Blaskowitz and his team of surveyors in 1770 and
Lieutenant Edward Fage kept the General’s maps current. Pigot had men stationed at the
northern portion of the island with four strong earthen redoubts in Portsmouth (Figures I.2 and
I.3), and additional forces on Conanicut Island,39 but their main objective was to defend
Newport, not all of Aquidneck Island. Controlling the entire island helped to maintain their
foothold in Newport but Middletown and Portsmouth were mostly comprised of farmland, and
had few useful resources left to offer. The port was the reason the British were there and Pigot
grew concerned that with portions of his forces stationed to the north and elsewhere, his troops
could be split up and beaten. He sent to New York for help but the French fleet jeopardized his
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supply line. The decision was finally made that all outlying British forces must withdraw from
their positions and return to Newport should the French fleet enter the bay. The British objective
now was to hold the port at Newport until reinforcements could arrive.
With a new strategy in place, the British hastily began making preparations for battle.
More of an administrator than a campaigner, Pigot made his decisions in part based on
intelligence from men he had recently interrogated, including one who claimed Sullivan had
20,000 American troops en route to invade the island.40 This dwarfed Pigot’s force of roughly
5,500 regulars and some Loyalist troops. The British had also captured two Jamestown residents
that claimed Sullivan had 15,000 men, further fueling their belief that the American force was
larger than it actually was.41 As a result, the British troops were kept busy building an abbatis42
for their defensive line around Newport and clearing fields in anticipation of an American
attack.43 Pigot ordered two battalions of Hessian and Brown’s Regiment of Provincials to
evacuate their guns and positions from Conanicut Island and return. With a shortage of oxen to
move the artillery, the cannons were spiked and some pushed off the island into the water, rather
than let them fall into enemy hands.44 The 54th Regiment was recalled to Newport to thicken the
parapet45 of the harbor-facing North Battery. General Francis Smith, stationed in Portsmouth,
sent baggage and all guns back to Newport.46 To create further barriers for the French, the
British scuttled four of their own supply ships (the Cerberus, Orpheus, Lark, and Pigot Galley,
with more to be scuttled later) in the harbor by running them aground and setting them on fire.47
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The crews, organized into a battalion, would eventually be put to use in the gun batteries. By
August 6, Admiral Richard Howe48 was en route from Sandy Hook with thirty-five warships to
defend Newport.49
The French fleet sat off shore, awaiting direction and d’Estaing pressured Sullivan to act.
He had hoped to act quickly, before the British fleet could arrive, and was now growing
impatient. Sullivan, did not disagree but was stuck awaiting the arrival of more militia and the
construction of the boats needed to transport the Americans to the island.50 Until his force was
large enough and their transportation secured, he could not justify taking action. On August 3,
word came via dispatch that a British fleet was on its way to attack the French. American
officers were directed to prepare their men.51 A day later, 100 oarsmen with officers moved
boats to Tiverton.52
The next series of maneuvers, on both sides, set the stage for the battle to come. On
August 8, d’Estaing’s warships entered Narragansett Bay via the east passage and engaged in a
gun battle with British shore batteries.53 When the fleet advanced, Pigot gave the order for all
troops to withdraw from the north of the island and pull back to the British defensive line near
the Newport-Middletown border.54 The maneuver would take roughly three hours at standard
marching conditions (30 inch steps, 100 steps to the minute). Both the east and west roads could
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be used and the troops from the east defenses would evacuate via Bramans Lane to East Main
Road then down East Main Road to Newport.55
As the British troops pulled back to Newport on August 8, American troops moved to
occupy positions in Portsmouth. American scouts appeared near British lines and were fired
upon by cannon at Irish’s and Card’s Redoubts. At this point the area east of the British front
line, where Bailey’s Brook meets Easton’s Pond, was shallow and the north 400 feet were
fordable.
In the meantime, d’Estaing had disembarked his troops on Conanicut Island, and went
ashore to assess the situation.56 After receiving a report that the British fleet was approaching
the bay, he determined it was too dangerous to dismount his main artillery.57 Sullivan sent word
to d’Estaing of the shift in British forces and requested immediate support. Initially, he agreed
and urgently made plans to land on Aquidneck. Then on August 9, Admiral Howe’s fleet was
spotted anchored off Point Judith,58 leaving d’Estaing feeling vulnerable in the bay.59 On August
10, the course of the battle changed dramatically. As the Americans, now in Portsmouth,
prepared themselves for battle, d’Estaing made a fateful decision. Fearful of being
outmaneuvered and trapped in a foreign harbor, he left Newport to pursue Howe on the open
ocean.60
The Americans had largely been in good spirits since the arrival of their new ally, and
d’Estaing’s pursuit of Howe had not dampened Sullivan’s outlook much. He assumed the
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French fleet would defeat Howe and return to finish off the bombardment of Newport. So plans
were made to march closer and begin the Siege in Middletown, while they awaited d’Estaing’s
return.61 But on August 11, while the troops prepared to move out, rain started and over the
coming days grew to gale force winds. Sullivan’s army of 10,000 now took cover wherever they
could: some in abandoned British barracks, others in tents and some with no shelter at all.62
While the storm slowed Sullivan’s advance down the island, it would prove much more
damaging to d’Estaing’s fleet. On August 12, the powerful fleet was seriously damaged; the
Tonnant and the Marseillais each lost two of their masts, and the Languedoc, d’Estaing’s
flagship, lost all three as well as its rudder.63 “The skeleton of this beautiful vessel was drifting
in silence at the mercy of the storm and the waves,” reported a soldier on another French ship.64
D’Estaing’s fleet, now scattered and still under occasional enemy fire, limped back to
Narragansett Bay where he would consult with Sullivan and determine how to proceed.
Meanwhile, Sullivan’s army had weathered the storm and was now recovering in
Portsmouth. It had been a cold, violent, rain but luckily claimed few if any casualties.65 As
soggy soldiers attempted to dry themselves, fresh supplies of dry gunpowder began to arrive
from Providence, Boston, and Connecticut.66 Their plans to leave for Middletown on August 11
had been delayed by the gale but by the morning of August 14, the rain had stopped and soon
orders came down to prepare to march.
Scouting parties had gone ahead to provide Sullivan with information about his options
and he had decided on Honeyman Hill, which was east of and higher than the British position on
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Bliss Hill. The troops stepped off at 6 am, making their way down the island in three separate
columns (Figure I.4). Brigadier General James M. Varnum’s Brigade came down West Main
Road and Brigadier General John Glover’s Brigade on East Main, with Brigadier General
Ezekiel Cornell and Colonel Commandant Christopher Greene’s Brigades between them. The
lead units arrived at Honeyman Hill after roughly a 2.6 hour march at 8:36 am.67 Although the
French had not yet returned, Sullivan’s army began to dig in and prepare to lay siege to the
British on Bliss Hill.
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Figure I.4 Marching paths of Sullivan’s army from their camp in Portsmouth to Honeyman Hill.
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Fage, Plan of Rhode-Island, 1779. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Chapter 1 Detailed Description of the Battlefield at the Beginning of the Engagement
1.1 Position at the Start of the Siege
1.1.1 British Position
When the Americans were busy regrouping on the north end of the island, the British
wasted no time in better fortifying Newport. They completed two lines of defense along the
outskirts of town, to protect against attacks from the north (Figure 1.1). The first line was steep
and would make infantry attack difficult. It was built along high ground in Middletown, west of
Valley Road and Easton’s Pond, known as Bliss Hill. Among the defenses facing east, were
three redoubts,69 Card’s, Dudley’s and Bannister’s, and two sunken gun batteries (a 7-gun and a
10-gun battery) (Figure 1.2). From there, the line continued north toward Two Mile Corner,
turning west at Irish’s Redoubt and ending at Tonomy Hill (Figure 1.2). The dirt from the ditch,
which connected the defenses, was piled on top to make a wall four feet high and six feet thick
and an abbatis was constructed 40 yards in front of the line, providing an extra obstacle for
anyone who tried to storm the area. The second defense was the inner line, constructed closer to
town in Newport (Figure 1.1). It went from Easton’s Beach, north along Easton’s Pond, and to
the junction of Bliss Road and West Main Road. It then turned toward the harbor and ended at
the North Battery. The harbor also had additional protection from batteries at Brenton Point
(where today’s Fort Adams is located) and on Goat Island. (See Appendix B for additional maps
of the battlefield).
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Figure 1.1 Key terrain features and locations of the British 1 and 2 lines of defense built in 1778, for the defense of
Newport. The inner line was constructed in Newport and the majority of the outer line was in Middletown. Both lines
70
included redoubts, trenches, gun batteries and abbatis.
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Abraham D’Aubant, Plan of the town and environs of Newport, Rhode Island / Exhibiting its defenses, 1779,
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 1.2 Key defensive features of the outer line (circled in red), built by the British for the defense of Newport. The
outer line was the one primarily involved in the Siege of Newport. Note, this map details both works used during the
Siege and those completed afterwards. This includes Fort Fanning, which was completed in December 1778, and
71
was not in existence during the Siege but is visible here.
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1.1.2 American Position
Since the storm ended, Aquidneck Island had been trapped in a blanket of fog. Then, on
the morning of August 18, as the fog cleared, British lookouts spotted American forces in
Middletown. They were positioned on Honeyman Hill, east of Bailey’s Brook and across the
valley from the British on Bliss Hill, and were hard at work constructing a battery.72 At 176 feet
high, their position overlooked the British outer line giving them altitude advantage (Figure 1.3).
The Americans built their camp and a secondary line safely beyond the range of the British first
line batteries on the east side of Honeyman Hill (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.3 British (red) and American (blue) observation points at the start of the battle. The Americans’ view was
73
from the top of Honeyman Hill and the British observed from the rooftop a house on high ground behind their line.

At the beginning of the Siege, the Americans had few defenses constructed. Unlike the
British who had had time to fortify, the Americans’ position in Middletown developed over the
course of the Siege (Figure 1.5 shows what it would eventually look like, by August 26, 1778).
At the beginning, though, Americans and British were not close enough to one another to be
truly effective. Smoothbore cannon had a maximum range of about 2,000 yards but was only
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effective at ranges of less than 1,000 yards.74 The Americans would need to get closer to do any
real damage but this meant losing the altitude advantage. Any closer batteries they built would
also be in the range of the British, who would be able to engage the new, closer gun
emplacements.75

Figure 1.4 Positions of combatants during the Siege.

74

76

David McConnell, British Smooth-Bore Artillery: A Technological Study to Support Identification, Acquisition,
Restoration, Reproduction, and Interpretation of Artillery at National Historic Parks in Canada. (Ottawa: National
Historic Parks and Sites Environment Canada – Parks,1988).
75
A military installation consisting of a prepared position for sitting a weapon.
76
Capitaine Michel du Chesnoy, Plan de Rhode Islande, les differentes operations de la flotte françoise et des
trouppes Américaines commandeés par le major général Sullivan contre les forces de terre et de mer des Anglois
depuis le 9 Aout jusqu'a la nuit du 30 au 31 du même mois que les Américains ont fait leur retraite 1778. 1778.
Library of Congress.

37

77

Figure 1.5 Sketch of the British view of Honeyman Hill from Bliss Hill, as seen in Mackenzie’s Diary.

1.1.3 American Observations of the British Lines
The battlefield from the American viewpoint, which was on average about 83 feet higher
than the British positions, showed Card’s Redoubt (74 feet high as the closest British fort) at the
edge of the first rise above the pond at a range of 1,500 yards.78 The second feature was the line
of redoubt fronted by an abbatis at 1,700 yards, and at its southern end, a 10-gun battery (113
feet high) at a range of 1,800 yards.79 The terrain between them, normally passable where
Bailey’s Brook meets Easton’s Pond, was now overflowing with runoff from the storm.

77

DMF, 2: 372-373.
DFM, 2; Based on calculations as measured in Google Earth.
79
DFM, 2; Based on calculations as measured in Google Earth.
78

38

1.2 Terrain Related Obstacles
1.2.1 Effects of the Storm on the Terrain
A number of obstacles thwarted the Americans’ pursuit of the British. Between the
positions on Bliss and Honeyman Hill, runoff from the hurricane had created two major barriers.
The storm-swollen Easton’s Pond (stretching from Easton’s Beach to the crossing at Green End)
was now wider and deeper, and Bailey’s Brook had been transformed into a marshy wetland.
Before the storm, which lasted August 11 – 13, the pond and brook were low and would have
been easily passable (Figures 1.6, 1.7). After the rains, the valley was full beyond capacity,
making it a serious obstacle (Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.6 Easton’s Pond and Bailey's Brook under normal conditions, from a map by C. Blaskowitz, 1770.
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Figure 1.7 Bailey's Brook, at the top of Easton's Pond, in August 2015. Photo by author.
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Figure 1.8 Easton's Pond after the rains, when the valley between the hills became a swamp.

1.2.2 Other Approaches
There were two alternate routes as well but they were well defended and would not be
feasible. The west side of the approach to Newport, from Middletown, included a large expanse
of open space to the north of the British defense line. The position from Tonomy Hill (152 feet

81

Chesnoy, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

40

high) commanded this relatively flat terrain, where large formations could be engaged out to
2,000 yards, making an attack from this side nearly impossible. The Americans also controlled
the eastern end of Easton’s Beach but the west side proved formidable with a 1,300-yard stretch
of sand in front of a British redoubt with cannon and abbatis. These alternate routes were far too
dangerous, and so the swamped valley, although not ideal, would be their only option.

1.2.3 Decisive Terrain
The decisive terrains in this conflict were:
a. Howland’s Ferry and associated land in Portsmouth: This area was needed by the
Americans as a supply line and evacuation route. It was protected by the redoubts on the
north end of the island and French frigates in the Sakonnet River.
b. The road across the north end of Easton’s Pond: This path was needed by the Americans
as an avenue to attack if they were to go after the south end of the British defense line.
The British needed to control it and the area north along Bailey’s Brook to stop the
Americans from getting across the valley and attacking the defense line.
c. Easton’s Beach: The Americans held the east end of Easton’s Beach but if they could
control the west side, they could attack the south end of the inner British defense line.
d. The lower slope of Honeyman Hill: The Americans needed this area to get closer to the
British lines. Both so that their cannon could be in effective range, and to get American
troops in striking distance, should they disable the British artillery.

1.3 Cover and Concealment
1.3.1 American Position

41

As a position, Honeyman Hill was a double-edged sword, providing cover for the back
end of the operation but nothing else. The west side, facing the British lines, had very little
cover. Only a few trees remained from the hill’s pre-war use as an orchard and the British had
burned twenty houses to eliminate all other shelter. 82 The area around Easton’s Pond and
Bailey’s Brook was worse; it had been open farmland and had little to no cover. To remedy this
shortcoming, most of the movements, scouting and repairs, were done under cover of darkness.
Cannon, and the supplies needed for them, were moved in and out of their emplacements at
night. During the day, trenches and batteries being dug doubled as cover for those doing the
work. When there was a flash of British artillery the Americans dropped to the bottom of the
trench until the sound of the cannonball reached them and when all was clear, they returned to
their work.
Although their position on Honeyman Hill was not ideal, it is likely a decision made
based on French involvement. Historian Christian McBurney explains, “Sullivan probably
positioned his army as he did in order to accommodate d’Estaing’s troops, on whose return and
participation he still counted. He may have further expected the more experienced French to
make the initial assault on Pigot’s left, thereby eliminating the necessity of a more risky
American attack to the east.”83 Given that Sullivan began the Siege under the assumption that
the French would defeat Howe’s fleet and rejoin them in time, McBurney’s theory makes sense.
It also may help explain Sullivan’s frustration later when things did not go as planned.
What the Americans lacked in cover and concealment on the front lines, they made up for
on the north and east sides of the hill, which they used to their advantage. These areas were out
of sight of the British and out of range of their artillery, making it a strategically safe location for
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camp. The supply lines on East Main Road were also beyond the sight of the British, allowing
the Americans to move troops, cannon, and supplies in and out of camp without risking
observation.

1.3.2 British Position
Earlier, when the Americans were consolidating their forces at the north end of the island,
the British (already in Middletown) had built a revetment84 and a ditch that extended the entirety
of their outer line. This provided cover for cannon and small arms fire. The wall was made of
compacted dirt four feet high and six feet thick, and provided protection and concealment for
troop movements along the top of the hill to and from the various redoubts and batteries.

1.3.3 Evaluation of Potential Dead Spaces
There were no dead spaces on the American side of the valley but this was not the case
for the British. Positioned high atop a steep bank, there were several areas the British cannon
could not fire on (Figure 1.9). If American troops could move across the top of the pond after
dark to muster in the dead zone, they theoretically could have captured the 10-gun battery and
Card’s Redoubt. The cannon in the 10-gun battery could then have been turned to enfilade85 the
British line. This would open the line for a general attack. The Americans would have needed a
regiment of grenadiers or other specialized assault troops to carry out this type of mission, but
there is no indication they had any of these. This makes it less likely that such a maneuver
would have been successful and could be the reason one was not attempted.
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Figure 1.9 The 1778 Fage map has had topographic lines laid over it to show the hills and valley involved. To
demonstrate where the potential dead spaces would have been on the battlefield, the straight red lines show the
86
direction the cannons would have fired from each of the redoubts.
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Chapter 2 Evolution of the Siege & Cannon Analysis
2.1 Evolution of the Siege
2.1.1 American and British Objectives
Success for both sides was completely dependent on artillery as the battle unfolded. The
British had guns spread throughout their outer line but the Americans needed to specifically
disable those at Card’s Redoubt and the 7 and 10-gun batteries (Figure 2.1), which protected the
south end of the battlefield (Figure 2.2, left side). If this could be accomplished, they could
safely cross the swamped valley and turn the guns of the British southern flank against the rest of
the line. The British firing back needed to do everything in their power to prevent this. Despite
cannonading the enemy for days, the Americans failed to disable their three main targets.

Figure 2.1 The 7- and 10-gun batteries at Green End, as seen on the 1778 Fage map.
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Fage, Plan of the Works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 2.2 Location and elevation of British (left) and American (right) batteries and connecting trenches are seen
marked in red on this topographic map. British positions at Card’s Redoubt (70 ft.), the 10-gun battery (90 ft.), and the
7-gun battery (102 ft.) are the works to the left (west) of Easton’s Pond. The American batteries, # 1 (178 feet), #2
(160 ft.), #3 (126 ft.), and #4 (108 ft.) and the trench works connecting them on Honeyman Hill are to the right (east)
88
of the pond.
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Elevation Map of Middletown, Rhode Island, Town of Middletown, 2015.
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2.1.2 Establishment of American Gun Batteries
Unlike the British, who were afforded the time to fortify in advance, the Americans
developed their fortifications over the course of a week while conducting the Siege (Figure 2.2).
Batteries 1 and 2 (Figure 2.3 A and C) were constructed on August 17 and 18, just before their
operations in Middletown had been detected. By the 19th, both of these batteries were in
working order and firing 18 pound guns at the British.89 Despite their altitude advantage, the
Americans were still out of effective range (roughly 2,000 yards out) and needed to work their
way closer to the enemy lines. Over the following days, while ducking in and out of the trenches
to avoid cannon fire, a series of new batteries and trench works were built, creeping down the
western slope of Honeyman Hill (Figure 2.3). Batteries 3 and 4 (Figure 2.3, E and F) were
constructed within 1,000 yards of the British front lines and were firing by August 23. Even at
this closer range, the 18-pound cannon still failed to penetrate the six-foot-thick British
revetment (Figure 2.4). Simulations and analytical models were assessed to understand why the
British retained their revetment, and the details of these analyses are listed later in this chapter.
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Figure 2.3 American approach (top) down Honeyman Hill, toward British lines (bottom). The letters along the
90
American trenches show various works. Batteries A and C were constructed first, soon followed by E and F.
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D’Aubant, Plan of the town and environs of Newport, Rhode Island / Exhibiting its defenses, 1779, William L.
Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 2.4 Cross section of the British revetments on Bliss Hill. Drawn by author using figures from Mackenzie’s
Diary.

2.1.3 British Fields of Fire
The British had at least 44 cannon set up across the outer line, from the 10-gun battery to
Tonomy Hill. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of this artillery, which included two 6-pound,
two 8-pound, 28 12-pound, seven 18-pound, five 24-pound guns. These cannon were arranged
in interlocking fields of fire that would have been effective against an attack by the American
infantry across Bailey’s Brook. Figure 2.6 illustrates this coverage and the field of fire the
Americans would have faced if they had tried to storm across the swamped valley. The British
guns had an effective range of 1,000 yards and a maximum range of roughly 2,000. Since the
American batteries #3 and #4 were within 1,000 yards of the British line, Bailey’s Brook was
well within range, so the British interlocking fields of fire would have annihilated any force that
tried to storm across.
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Figure 2.5 Cannons throughout the British front lines labeled on the 1778 Fage map.
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Fage, Plan of the Works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 2.6 British interlocking fields of fire. The cannon were effective at a range of roughly 1,000 yards.
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D’Aubant, Plan of the town and environs of Newport, Rhode Island / Exhibiting its defenses, 1779, William L.
Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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To provide the coverage, the British redoubts were constructed with gun ports facing left,
center, and right. Card’s Redoubt was the one exception. Perched east of the connected batteries
and redoubts that made up the British outer line, on the steep Green End area of Bliss Hill, its
gun ports faced left and right only (north and south) (Figures 2.7). If the Americans did manage
to get across the valley and attempt to scale Green End, the cannon at Card’s Redoubt would
have a clear shot to to stop these assailants. Further, Card’s right (southeast) port (Figure 2.6,
green), covered the blind spot at the base of Green End Avenue.

Figure 2.7 Card’s Redoubt wooden gun decks and gun ports were about +/-30 degrees.
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2.1.4 Elevation Considerations
The British were using 12-pound field guns mounted on carriages so that they would
move smoothly back with the recoil. Both the British and American gun positions had wooden
decks to allow the guns to move easily and to be aimed roughly +/- 30 degrees from the direction
93

Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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of the axis of their gun port. The British had to elevate the cannon muzzle to 6 degrees to reach
the American batteries at #1 and #2 but could not deliver accurate fire (elevation shown in Figure
2.2). A lower elevation was used against #3 and #4. In all cases the British cannons were
ineffective against the American gun batteries. Likewise, the American 18-pound cannon
(Figure 2.8, Figure 2.9 shows a 6-pound gun) continued firing on the British to no avail. The
technical supplement provided in Appendix G asserts that properly adjusting the angle at which
the cannon is fired for the desired position downfield is crucial for hitting a target.
Inexperienced artillerymen or platform damage could cause a change in angle when firing,
leading to improper angle adjustment. Analytical models were used to simulate the cannon fire
for the geography at Honeyman Hill to reveal the exact nature of the inaccuracy caused by
inexperience and damage, discussed in detail in the technical supplement located in Appendix G.

Figure 2.8 British 18-pound field guns.
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Peterson, 44.
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Figure 2.9 British 6-pound Field guns.
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2.2 Cannon Analysis
The technical data used in this chapter pulls from a study and analysis on the artillery
used by the Americans, including its range, trajectory, power, accuracy, and the ability to
penetrate (or not) earthen fortifications. A full detailed technical report, including the
MATLAB96 simulation code and results, is available in Appendix G.

2.2.1 Analysis of Smooth Bore Cannon
Information pertaining to the performance of 18th century smooth bore cannons is very
limited and mostly anecdotal. The first works on cannon ballistics were completed by Benjamin
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Peterson, 39.
Engineering software produced by MathWorks in Cambridge, MA, used to solve engineering and scientific
problems. It integrates computation, visualization, and programming in an easy-to-use environment where problems
and solutions are expressed in familiar mathematical notation.
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Robins, an Engineer General to the East India Company.97 Robins’ work was revised and
published by Dr. A.R. Collins.98 This work, with minor corrections and adjustments, was used
as the principal reference for MATLAB programming thus used to generate the figures for this
report. A verification of the software came from the recovery of a 12-pound British cannonball
(Figures 2.10 and 2.11) recovered from a garden on Turner Road in Middletown, RI.

Figure 2.10 A Middletown resident holds the cannonball he recovered from his Turner Road property (right). He has
verified the location where it was found and has since donated the artifact to the Middletown Historical Society. It has
since been identified as a 12-pound British cannonball that was likely fired at the American’s positioned on
Honeyman Hill (left). Photo by author.
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Benjamin Robins, New Principles of Gunnery containing The determination of the Difference in the Force of
Gunpowder and The resisting power of air to swift and slow motions.1750, Republished in 1805 with corrections by
F. Wingrave in the Strand, London.
98
http://arc.id.au/Cannonballs.html downloaded 2/21/2016 and http://arc.id.au/CannonBalistics.html
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Figure 2.11: An American 18 lb. cannon ball recovered from Card’s Redoubt and donated to the Middletown
Historical Society. Photo by author.

This outcome provided confidence that the simulation, based on Robins and Collins, could be
used to analyze the performance of other cannons used in the battle. Results of the simulation
were also paired with a recovered cannonball fired from Bannister’s Redoubt mentioned in the
diary. Figure 2.12 shows a recovery distance of 1,890 yards. The simulation shows that firing at
about 5.5 degrees would result in a travel distance of about that length (Figure 2.13).
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Figure 2.12 The distance from Banister’s Redoubt to the recovery location is 1,890 yards.
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As measured by Google Maps (Yellow line)
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Figure 2.13 Angle of attack of a 12-pound cannonball over travel distance. Initial angle of attack was 5.5 degrees.
The cannonball impacted the farmland at an angle of -8 degrees.

Figure 2.14 shows tabulated results from the MATLAB simulation beyond just the angle
of attack. These results were used to assess variability in ballistics for cannonballs of varying
mass and initial parameters, such as gunpowder quality and firing angle, as well as penetration of
the cannonball into fortifications.
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Figure 2.14 Tabulated results from MATLAB simulation for a 12-pound cannonball. Results shown include mass,
diameter, area, soil index, % tangent ogives nose performance, % soft soil for weight < 60 pounds, velocity, range,
total kinetic energy, penetration of soil in feet, and penetration of soil in inches.

Figures 2.15 through 2.17 show the MACH number, velocity, and Reynolds number100
versus distance for the 12-pound cannonball.

100

A dimensionless number that gives a measure of the ratio of inertial forces to viscous forces for given flow
conditions. The Reynolds number is an important parameter that describes whether flow conditions lead to laminar
or turbulent flow.
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Figure 2.15 MACH number of a 12-pound cannonball versus distance traveled post firing. The cannonball exits the
muzzle at a velocity of 1,359 feet per second. That is a speed of MACH 1.26.

Figure 2.16 Velocity of a 12-pound cannonball versus distance traveled. The terminal velocity was about 560 ft./sec.
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Figure 2.17 Reynolds Number of a 12-pound cannonball in flight versus distance traveled. Note that the Reynolds
number is within the turbulent range throughout its flight. More detail found in the technical supplement.

2.2.2 Penetration and Range
The American cannons had to be able to disable the British artillery that were riveted on
the west side of the valley. To do this, the cannons would have to send a ball with enough
energy to penetrate six feet of dirt and have enough energy left to damage the British guns and
crews beyond the revetment. Figure 2.18 shows a cannonball penetrating into a revetment with
insufficient energy to break through the fortification. Alternatively, cannon fire would have to
repeatedly target the same area on the revetment101 as to cumulatively administer enough damage
to break through the defenses.

101

A barricade of earth or sandbags set up to provide protection from blast, protecting a rampart, wall, etc.
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Figure 2.18 Image of cannonball penetrating revetment. Insufficient penetration depth can be seen in the image.
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Penetration data for field guns of various sizes can be seen in figure 2.19, while common
cannonball sizes can be seen in figure 2.20.
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Figure 2.19 Penetration data from a French study used by the United States Army. Note the sizes are on the
104
French Valliere system.
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Dictionary of Fortification: Penetration, Solid Shot. Civil War Fortification Digital Research Library. Web.
(http://lly.org/~rcw/cwf/dictionary/xgp-015.html), 2004.
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As referenced in Dictionary of Fortification: Penetration, Solid Shot.
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Figure 2.20 Standard shot sizes for British artillery
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Note that the shot sizes in the penetration table do not match the British standard sizes.
In fact, the data was generated by the French. There was initial doubt as to the accuracy of the
data in Figure 2.19 and some way needed to be found to verify it.
In 1997 Sandia National Laboratories funded a study to define the equations necessary to
determine the best way to penetrate the various forms of bunkers.106 The equations were used by
Dr. Aaron Bradshaw to check the data in Figure 2.19. He produced a MATLAB script to predict
the penetration capability of the American cannon. Results from the simulation found in his
script can be seen in figures 2.21 and 2.22. “S” in these figures refers the penetrability of the soil.
Dr. Aaron Bradshaw denotes an index between 8 and 10 as being soil fill material. The degree to
which the soil is compacted causes the index to range between 8 and 10.
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Dictionary of Fortification: Penetration, Solid Shot, Web.
C. W. Young Penetration Equations SAND97-2426, October 1997.
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Figure 2.21 Penetration as a function of range for various degrees of soil compaction, S. Note that the historic data is
also plotted in the figure for comparison.

Figure 2.22 Penetrations as a function of impact velocity for various degrees of soil compaction, S. Note that the
historic data is also plotted in this figure for comparison.
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The historic data falls between the soil conditions shown in figures 2.21 and 2.22,
indicating agreement between the empirical data from 1750 and the empirical data from Sandia
Laboratory in 1997. Figure 2.22 displays a proportional relationship between impact velocity
and depth of penetration; a roughly linear relationship. Therefore, a higher impact velocity is
needed to penetrate farther into the revetment.
Table 2.1 shows the range between the different batteries and the British positions for
reference when approximating penetration.

Table 2.1 Ranges (kilo yards) from the American batteries to the British positions.107
Battery
#1
#2
#3
#4

Card's Redoubt
1.29
1.23
0.92
0.7625

7-Gun Battery
1.6
1.375
1.03
0.95

10-Gun Battery
1.526
1.305
0.97
0.92

From Figure 2.19, the range at which an eighteen-pound cannonball would penetrate six
feet of dirt (72 inches) would be 50 yards for a soil compaction index of 8, and 300 yards for a
soil compaction index of 10. The American cannon, even when fired from the most forward
batteries (#4 to Cards Redoubt, #3 to Cards Redoubt, and #4 to 10 Gun Battery) are not close
enough to the enemy revetments to achieve the necessary penetration of six feet to break through
to the artillery.

107

Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.; Based the map and its
distance scales.
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The French fleet abided by a 1732 ordinance, which standardized French cannons as 24-,
16-, 12-, 8-, and 4-pounders. The 24-pounder had a 5-2/3 inch bore, a 9-foot 6-inch long barrel,
and weighed 5,400 pounds. Admiral d’Estaing’s warships carried 24-pound and 36-pound
cannon. Table 2.2 below shows the quantity of guns Admiral d’Estaing carried on his warships.

Table 2.2 Guns aboard d’Estaing’s Languedoc, Tonnant and Cesar.108
Ship
Languedoc
Tonnant
Cesar

Guns
80
80
74

Draft
25
25
22

Number and Type of Gun
30 x 36-pound, 32 x 24-pound, 18 x 8-pound
28 x 30-pound, 30 x 18-pound, 18 x 8-pound

If the French 36-pound or 24-pound cannon could have been made available from the
Languedoc and used from Honeyman Hill positions #3 and #4, the damage to the British artillery
would have been increased. For the most compact soil (8) a:
36-pound cannon in Battery #4 would penetrate Card’s Redoubt to 92.95 inches
36-pound cannon in Battery #4 would penetrate 7-gun Battery to 83.8 inches.
24-pound in Battery #4 would penetrate Cards redoubt to 62 inches
24-pound gun in Battery #4 would penetrate 7-gun Battery to 60.9 inches
From this analysis, it can be concluded that the 24-pound gun would have been effective at
penetrating the defenses. The British hauled water to their earthworks to wet them down and
maintain their stopping power. To be effective against the British defenses that were 72 inches
thick, the Americans would need 36-pound cannon in the advanced gun batteries (#3, #4).

108

Hattendorf, 5-8
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Table 2.3 below shows the various altitudes and effective ranges for the different
batteries, forts and guns in the battles.

Table 2.3 Range of the American batteries to their British targets, with the altitude of each
position listed in parenthesis following its name.109
Batteries
#1 (176 ft.)
#2 (158 ft.)
#3 (132 ft.)
#4 (124 ft.)
#5 (120 ft.)

Card's Redoubt
(70 ft.)
1.288 kyd.
1.778 kyd.
0.891 kyd. (980) 110
0.760 kyd. (780)
0.847 kyd.

7-Gun Battery
(112 ft.)
1.527 kyd.
1.381 kyd.
1.094 kyd.
1.005 kyd.
1.111 kyd.

10-Gun Battery
(88 ft.)
1.583 kyd.
1.381 kyd. (1.350)
1.091 kyd. (960)
1.032 kyd (1150)
1.15 kyd.

2.2.3 Cannon Ball Placement Errors
There are a number of considerations that will influence the deviation of the cannonball
in flight, preventing it from accurately hitting a target. The cannons were mounted on a gun
carriage above the center of gravity of the combined structure, causing the firing of the cannon to
impart a torque on the cannon and carriage. The wheels of the gun carriage may not have the
same starting torque when the cannon is fired and it may change with time, causing the cannon
or structure to move after the resultant impulse from firing. Furthermore, this torque and impulse
may damage the carriage over time, leading to sway of the muzzle when firing, which would
lead to inaccurate aiming of the cannon. The gunner sighting the cannon may also introduce both
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Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan; Elevation Map of
Middletown, Rhode Island; Calculated distances as measured in Google Earth.
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Based on DFM 2: 385, values for Batteries 3 and 4 were interchanged. See red text.
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azimuth111 and elevation errors (Figure 2.23). Additionally, variations in gunpowder quality due
to moisture, manufacturing or other sources would cause variations in landing positions which
could lead to inaccuracy. Finally, if the ball makes contact with the barrel, there may be a spin
introduced that will cause the ball to take a curved trajectory. At low angles the effect is
minimum. A sensitivity analysis was completed and recorded in the technical supplement found
in Appendix G for each case mentioned above, as well as other parameters such as the presence
of a cross-wind. This analysis was used to determine which elements of firing a cannon when
varied would result in the most significant changes in ballistics.

Figure 2.23 Deviation as a function of elevation angle.
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112

The angle of horizontal deviation, measured clockwise, of a bearing from a standard direction, as from north or
south.
112
Stephen A. Jordon, Trajectory of a Cannonball, located in Appendix G.
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Below are various analytically-derived errors for the geometry of Cards Redoubt (Figure 2.24),
as well as results from the MATLAB sensitivity analysis.
Sighting errors are:
0.5 deg. = 8.73 yards at 1000 yards

0.79 inch off center at muzzle

1 deg. = 17.45 yards

1.58 inch off center at muzzle

2 deg. = 35.00 yards

3.17 inch off center at muzzle

Elevation angle errors produce the largest range errors:
0.8 deg = 904 yards (Delta of -95 yards)
0.9 deg = 936 yards (Delta of - 63 yards)
1.0 deg =967 yards (Delta of - 32 yards)
1.1 deg = 999.23 yards

Delta = 0)

1.2 deg = 1030 yards (Delta of 31 yards)
1.3 deg = 1061 yards (Delta of 62 yards)
1.4 deg = 1092 yards (Delta of 93 yards)
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Figure 2.24 Dimensions of Cards Redoubt, based on the 1778 Fage map.
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If one standard deviation (SD) of the aiming error is 0.5 degrees then the redoubt would
subtend +/- 4 SD of the cross range error. If the standard deviation of the vertical angle is 1.26
degrees there will be 10% hits on the redoubt, which is what Mackenzie noted in his diary.

2.2.4 Technical Conclusions
Given their position, distance from and depth of the British earthen works, artillery
available, and aiming errors, the Americans’ 18-pound cannon were not powerful enough to
penetrate the enemy fortifications, and also likely to miss due to the number of impactful
parameters (elevation, gunpowder quality, carriage damage, etc. More detail in the technical
supplement) on cannonball trajectory, as well as the sensitivity of that trajectory to those
parameters. If they had more substantial artillery, such as the 24-pound or preferably the 36pound guns on d’Estaing’s Languedoc, the Americans could possibly have disabled Card’s
Redoubt and the 7 and 10 gun batteries and changed the outcome of the battle.
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Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Chapter 3 The Disengagement
3.1 Lead up to the Withdrawal
3.1.1 D’Estaing Returns
On August 20, sails were spotted approaching the bay and word soon arrived that it was
d’Estaing’s beleaguered fleet.114 Much to the Americans’ dismay, the French had returned to
Rhode Island only as a courtesy and to communicate their plans. With severe damage
throughout the fleet, d’Estaing felt they were in no condition to fight and intended to retreat to
Boston for repairs.
Sullivan was horrified. The entire plan for retaking Newport, had been based on a joint
effort of American and French forces. Now with that prospect behind them and British
reinforcements en route, the outcome looked bleak. Additionally, d’Estaing wanted to withdraw
his frigates stationed in the Sakonnet River, evacuate the American troops and end the Siege
entirely.115 “To evacuate the island is death; to stay may be ruin” noted General Nathaniel
Greene in a letter to a friend. 116 Sullivan refused to end the Siege and in a last ditch effort to
salvage what was left of the joint campaign, sent Greene, Lafayette, and Colonel John Langdon
to the Languedoc to convince d’Estaing to stay or at the very least to provide additional
troops.117 D’Estaing seemed to sympathize and was considering providing assistance but
ultimately decided against it. Although the fleet was in his command, his fellow officers
(captains of the individual ships) were adamant and at their urging d’Estaing made the decision
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to sail on to Boston, leaving no aid to Sullivan’s army. In the end it seems d’Estaing couldn’t
help but agree with his men. The French felt it was their first duty to preserve the fleet to fight
another day.118 They also felt victory was not a mere few days away as Sullivan insisted.119
The Americans’ high hopes had grown higher at the sight of the French, only to be
dashed. This abandonment hit the troops’ morale exceedingly hard. The French had “…left us
in a most Rascally manner…” wrote Colonel Israel Angell of the Continental Army.120 Several
days later, in a letter to Washington, Greene recounted “…it struck such a panic among the
Militia and Volunteers that they began to desert by shoals. The fleet no sooner set sail than they
began to be alarm’d for their safety. This misfortune damp’d the hopes of our Army and gave
new Spirits to that of the Enemy.”121 Additionally, d’Estaing’s decision revived old prejudices
against their former enemy turned ally.122 The anti-French sentiments went all the way to the
top. Sullivan was furious and insinuated the French were traitors, nearly coming to blows with
Lafayette, who bore the brunt of the army’s bitterness.123 Sullivan went on to write a strongly
worded letter of protest to d’Estaing detailing why he should not quit the campaign, which
further fueled tensions between the allies.124 America’s new alliance was now turning into a
diplomatic disaster.
Under the circumstances at hand, and after calming down, Sullivan did his best to assure
the army to put their trust in him. An August 24 entry in the orders book shows that he
attempted to address the concerns of his men, acknowledging and sharing in their disappointment
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but also reminding them not to be discouraged and to stay the course. “The Superiority we Shall
maintain so long as the Spirit and desire of the Americans continues to be the Same that it was at
the Commencement of the Enterprise.”125 The orders went on to explain that the arrival of
British reinforcements was the only situation that would cause them to abandon the Siege, and
that in the event of this unfortunate circumstance they would still have plenty of time to execute
a safe retreat. It also emphasized that “…no Rash Steps should make a Sacrifice of them” and
that “he [Sullivan] wishes them to place a proper confidence in him as their Commander-InChief whose business it is to attend to their Safety.”126 Finally, Sullivan addressed the desertions
and ongoing plans, “it is with great grief and Astonishment the General finds a great number of
Volunteers are about to leave the Island at this time and to give to America lasting proof of their
wanting a firmness and bravery.”127
A few days later, thinking better of his intemperate remarks and the importance of the
alliance, Sullivan attempted to calm his troops’ animosity toward the French, by reminding them
not to forget the significance and value of their aid.128 D’Estaing appreciated the retraction and
even offered troops, to join the Americans by land but the damage was done.129 While the
British were thrilled with the infighting, the episode had shaken the Americans. Although it
would still go on for several more days, this spelled the end for the Siege. Now instead of trying
to reclaim Newport, which Sullivan still held out hope for, the American sought to damage
Pigot’s forces as best they could before making a safe retreat.
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3.1.2 Preparations for the Retreat
Before the battle even began, the Continental Army had laid the groundwork in
Portsmouth for a secure supply line and avenue of withdrawal. Although most of the French
fleet had left in pursuit of Admiral Howe, three French frigates had been stationed in the
Sakonnet River to protect this route, by way of Howland’s Ferry. They also adapted the former
British defense works at Fort Butts in Portsmouth, to oversee and protect these lines (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 The Americans’ defensive fallback position in Portsmouth, put in place at the beginning of the Siege to
130
ensure a safe retreat, if needed.
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By August 23, the Siege was already winding down and Sullivan began making
preparations for a safe retreat, sending all useless and heavy baggage to the north end of the
Island.131 Four batteries (16 cannon) had fired all day with no serious damage to the British
artillery. Two days later, shells for their mortars were found to be too short and therefore
defective, so the mortars had to be sent back to Tiverton as well.132 On August 27, all the militia
and non-essential troops were ordered to the north end of the island (Figure 3.2, dark blue).133
The Americans waited until nightfall to remove the cannon from batteries #3 and #4, which were
taken over Honeyman Hill to Portsmouth, via Green End Avenue and East Main Road.

3.2 The Withdrawal
3.2.1 Action in Portsmouth
On August 28, fearing that British reinforcements could be nearing Rhode Island waters,
the decision was made to pull back to the north end of the island. There they could await
whichever would come first, assistance from the French or the need to retreat. After dark, the
campfires were kept burning all night. The remaining troops on Honeyman Hill left camp in the
early morning and departed for Portsmouth (Figure 3.2). Later that morning as the mist
dissipated, the British observed an empty Honeyman Hill. General Pigot dispatched troops to
assess the situation and pursue the Americans. General Richard Prescott led the 38th and 54th
Regiments to Honeyman Hill via Easton’s Beach and found that it had indeed been completely
deserted.134
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With the abandonment of Honeyman Hill, the British snapped into action, immediately
sending men up the island in pursuit of Sullivan’s army. The British troops marched up East
Main Road and the Hessians up West Main, where they were ambushed en route, ultimately
engaging in fierce fighting with American forces in prepared positions throughout the north end
of the island.135 Colonel Angell recounted the day’s events in his diary,
…the enemy finding that we had left our ground pursued with all possible speed Come
up with our piquet about sunrise and a smart firing begun, the piquet repulsed the Brittish
troops 2 or 3 times but was finily obliged to retreat as the Enemy brought a number of
field pieces against them[.] the Enemy was soon check’t by our Cannon in coming up to
our main body and they formed on Quaker Hill and we took possession of Buttses Hill
the left wing of the brittish army was Compossed of hessians who Attackt our right wing
and a Sevear engagement Ensued in which the hessians was put to flight and beat of the
ground with a Considerable loss[.] our loss was not very great but I cannot ascertain the
number.136

As the two sides continued firing on and eventually cannonading one another,
Lafayette set out for Boston on horseback to secure French aid. He made the trip in
seven hours, and returned in six-and-a-half (a distance of 70 miles) with news that
d’Estaing would send troops by land.137 Unfortunately it was too late. Earlier that
morning word had come from Washington that the British fleet was on the move.138 It
was time to retreat.
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Figure 3.2 Routes taken by the Americans up the island to Portsmouth and eventually across the Sakonnet River to
Tiverton during their evacuation of the island. Note that the path to the north end cannot be observed from the British
139
lines.
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3.2.2 The Evacuation and Deception Methods
Similar to their withdrawal from Honeyman Hill, deception methods were used to safely
move Sullivan’s force off the island. With tents pitched to mislead the enemy, all non-essential
material and militia personnel were transported first. Meanwhile, in Portsmouth, Continentals
were positioned to provide a rear guard for the remaining militia as it departed via the boatlift at
Howland’s Ferry. The mobility corridor consisted of the same 100 rowboats that had transported
them to Portsmouth in the first place. The final withdrawal happened under cover of darkness,
when the remaining rear guard left camp for Tiverton by the boatlift. Initially, when the British
heard the boats crossing at Howland’s Ferry, they worried the Americans were going down river
to attack from the rear and trap them at the north end of the island, but General Pigot determined
they were actually retreating to Tiverton. By the early morning on August 31, all American
troops and equipment were off the island; the battle was over.

3.2.3 Aftermath
As it turns out, the retreat was just in time. Early the following morning, General Clinton
arrived off Narragansett Bay with a fleet of seventy ships to reinforce the British.140 Meanwhile,
at his headquarters in Tiverton, Sullivan wrote a lengthy report to the President of Congress,
detailing the events of the last week and explaining his actions. “Upon the Count d’Estaing’s
finding himself under a necessity of going to Boston to repair the loss he sustained in the late
gale of wind, I thought it best to carry on my approaches with as much vigor as possible against
Newport…” he explained.141 He went on to describe the army’s movements and intentions
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throughout the days of the Siege, their retreat up the island, and the battle that followed. “I have
the pleasure to inform Congress, that no troops could possibly show more spirit than those of
ours which were engaged,” he wrote of his men.142 He also sought to justify the retreat by
explaining how it was so thoughtfully planned and carefully executed.
To make a retreat in the face of an enemy, equal, if not superior in number, and
cross a river without loss, I knew was an arduous task, and seldom accomplished,
if attempted; As our [sentries] were within 200 yards of each other, I knew it
would require the greatest care and attention. To cover my design from the
enemy, I ordered a number of tents to be brought forward and pitched in sight of
the enemy, and almost the whole army to employ themselves in fortifying the
camp. The heavy baggage and stores were falling back and crossing through the
day; at dark, the tents were struck, the light baggage and troops passed dawn, and
before twelve o’clock the main army had crossed with the stores and
baggage….not a man was left behind not the smallest article lost.143
Despite Sullivan’s successful retreat, it was clear that his earlier outburst had endangered
America’s new alliance, as many blamed the French for the outcome. D’Estaing too thought
Sullivan and the Continental Army were an unprofessional lot and complained to Congress of his
treatment. On September 1, seeking to calm lingering tensions and salvage the relationship,
Washington wrote to the commanding officers involved. A diplomatic voice of reason, in three
separate letters, Washington reminded his generals of the greater cause. He encouraged Greene
to promote good relations with the French, sympathized with and lifted up the rightfully miffed
Lafayette, and reminded Sullivan of the high stakes, impact of his words, and importance of the
alliance. In a fourth letter he smoothed things over with d’Estaing, focusing on the the
unfortunate and unforeseen circumstances caused by the storm.144 Although Washington was
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privately disappointed in the outcome (and alarmed by the strain it put on the alliance) he joined
Congress in publicly commending Sullivan and his army for a valiant effort. Any errors made
by d’Estaing were downplayed and blamed on the weather. The British, expecting praise from
the newly arrived Clinton, were instead berated. Frustrated by the missed opportunity for glory,
he took his anger out on Pigot and Prescott, nit picking their actions. Ultimately, a campaign
where neither side had been overwhelmingly successful, ended in both parties pointing fingers
and claiming victory.
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Chapter 4: Actions that Impacted the Battlefield
The Battlefield saw much activity in the two years immediately following the Siege.
British forces destroyed the American trench works, and repaired and expanded their own outer
line only to destroy all defenses before evacuating in 1779. The French, who arrived in 1780,
then rebuilt the ruined fortifications and added their own. Since the defenses saw no action
under the French, they were in excellent condition at war’s end. These activities by both sides
ultimately determined what would be left for posterity.

4.1 Actions by the British
4.1.1 Destruction of the American Fortifications
When the battle ended, on August 31, the British wasted no time in dismantling the
American fortifications at Honeyman Hill. Mackenzie noted on September 3 that Brown’s
Regiment of Provincials had marched to the area “where the Rebels first broke ground” and that
they were to be “employed in levelling the Rebel Batteries, and filling up the Trenches there.”145
By early October, the task was complete and Brown’s Regiment moved on to another project.146
A British soldier, Thomas Hughes, also observed this work in his diary when he wrote on
October 6, “…[T]heir works though now fill’d up are still visible and were carried on with great
regularity.”147

4.1.2 Expansion and Repairs of British Fortifications
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With the American trenches leveled, the British turned their attention to altering and
expanding their own defenses, including the construction of a massive centrally located fort,
large enough for 200 men and eight cannon.148 Built by Colonel Fanning’s Regiment of
Provincials, the construction took over two months according to Mackenzie, from early October
to its completion in mid-December.149 Fort Fanning, as it was called, was located along West
Main Road about half way between One Mile Corner and Two Mile Corner150 and is visible in
several maps from the period, including the one by Lt. Edward Fage produced in the months
following the battle (Figure 4.1).151 Once the project was done, attention turned to strengthening
the remaining redoubts as well as the trenches and abbattis along the outer line.152

Figure 4.1 Fort Fanning as seen on the 1778 Fage map, which depicted both the defenses in use during the Siege
153
and those built or planned afterwards.
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4.1.3 The Withdrawal Approaches
Mackenzie’s diary shows the British remained on edge in the months immediately
following the battle. Although trenches were filled and redoubts strengthened, much of the
British forces’ time was spent keeping an eye on the Americans’ activities in Tiverton and
positioning themselves appropriately to defend the island if another attack should occur. It was
within this anxious atmosphere that Fort Fanning was built. As the months went by and colder
weather approached, Mackenzie’s entries show less interest in enemy activities and repairing of
lines, and instead reflect an increasing concern for the state of their supplies and barracks.
This Garrison is at present very ill supplied with Fuel, Candle and Provisions.
There not being more than for 14 days wood, Candles for about 7 days, and about
3 weeks flour. The troops have for a Considerable time past received Rice two
days in the week instead of flour. A fleet is now out for wood, but they will not
bring above 600 Cord, which is little more than two weeks consumption. Every
step is taking to supply fuel: all the timber trees on the Island are cutting down,
and the old wharfs will soon be broken up. Oil is to be delivered to the troops in
lieu of Candles. Provisions can only be furnished from New York.
Very little attention has been paid at headquarters, New York, to the supplying
this Garrison, with any of the above necessaries. 154
By mid-December the wharves had indeed been ripped up for firewood.155 The weather
had turned so cold by Christmas Eve that liquor froze indoors, “poultry died,” and soldiers were
found dead from exposure.156 Stephan Popp, a Hessian soldier, recorded similar circumstances.
It began to snow on Christmas night and continued until the 27th, the snow lay 3
to 4 feet deep, the cold was very severe, night men of one of our regiments were
frozen to death, twenty-three men had their hands and feet badly frost bitten, --a
woman with two little children was frozen to death in her house. Even the supply
of drinking water was frozen.157
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From their fears over further American attacks in September to their worries over
dwindling supplies and frigid temperatures in December, it was clear that the British felt uneasy
and vulnerable in Newport by the end of 1778. The New Year was not much better. Supplies of
food eventually arrived from New York but it was too little, too late. Both Popp and another
Hessian soldier, Johann Conrad Döhla, record a fatal outbreak of scurvy in March 1779, the
result of so many months of so little sustenance.158 This was not a winter the British wished to
repeat.
They had survived the battle and the harsh winter but by spring there were signs the
British priorities were shifting further south. Twice in 1779, the size of the garrison at Newport
was diminished, first in March when the 26th Infantry Regiment left port and again in June when
the Landgrave Regiment, British 54th Regiment, and Fanning’s Corps of Provincials were
transferred.159 Counting on support of loyal Southerners, the British hoped to gain a strong
foothold in the South and eventually work their way up the coast.160 The need for
reinforcements in the South, coupled with the deteriorating state of Newport’s resources and the
manpower needed to defend it, meant that it was time to move on. Newport as a garrison was
becoming obsolete and too hard to maintain, and the British and Hessian forces occupying it
were of better use in the Southern theater.161

4.1.4 British Abandon Newport
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The British occupied, and in turn decimated, Newport over the course of their three-year
stay. They had bled the island dry of all its resources and now their troops were needed
elsewhere. Orders arrived in October 1779 to evacuate the island. This meant all fortifications
on the island had to be destroyed before they embarked. “I went on work detail to destroy the
defenses. These were all destroyed,” Döhla recorded on October 21.162 A few days later on
October 25, they packed up, set fire to their barracks and sailed away.163 Döhla described the
evacuation as follows,
On our march out of Newport all the houses were locked, and it was on the
strictest orders of General Prescott that no inhabitants, and especially no females,
permitted themselves to be seen at any window or on the street, and should
anyone show themselves, those who were on patrol were ordered to fire at them
immediately. Therefore, in Newport it appeared as if the entire city had died.164
Early the next morning the Americans arrived, including Providence native Colonel Israel
Angell, who had fought in the Battle of Rhode Island and kept a detailed account of his time in
the Continental Army. On October 27 he noted, “I Spent this Day in Reconitering the Town, and
works which was destroyed by the Enemy.”165 And a day later, “I road with the General Round
all the Enemy Lines where I Saw Some of the Beautifullest works’ that I Ever Saw in my
life….”166 Although the Continental Army had a short stay in Newport, it seems they repaired at
least some of the fortifications before moving on. Soldier and native Newporter, Jeremiah
Greenman, was among those who came to town after the British withdrawal. In late October, he
recorded , “[C]ontinuing in Newport fixing the North battery on the point which the enemy had
layed almost level – ordered to hold our Selves in Readyness to march for the Grand army.”167
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4.2 Actions by the French
4.2.1 Arrival of Rochambeau
Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau was an experienced fifty-fiveyear-old commander and French noblemen who had spent decades in the army.168 In the spring
of 1780 he was given orders to take command of a French expeditionary force of 4,000 men
(later increased to 6,000 at Rochambeau’s request) to America.169 In March, his fleet set sail
from Brest bound for Newport, carrying the Bourbonnais, Saintonge, Soissonnais, and the Royal
Deux-Ponts regiments and the Lauzun Legion (a “proprietary” corps), with more to follow.170
On July 11, 1780, Rochambeau and the French Army arrived off Newport Harbor. “War
weary” and suspicious of outsiders, Newporters did not come out to greet the general. A day
later, when the French came ashore they received a rather cold reception.171 Luckily, this soon
changed. In a letter dated July 16, Rochambeau recounted their arrival and first impressions.
There was no one about in the streets; only a few sad and frightened faces in the
windows. I talked to some of the principal citizens, informing them that this was
but the vanguard of a much larger force on the way and that the King had decided
to uphold them with all his power and strength….this excellent news traveled fast,
and on the evening of the following day all the houses were illuminated. The
bells rang out, and there were fireworks.172
Once their initial greeting and impressions were smoothed over, the French set to work taking
care of their sick. A large portion of the men had become ill with scurvy during the crossing and
hospitals were set up to treat them, with some soldiers being sent as far away as Bristol,
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Providence, and even Boston.173 With a very limited number of able bodies, the French set to
work repairing what coastal fortifications they could.174 Word soon arrived that the British were
planning to attack, hoping to catch the French off guard before they could get settled. An attack
under such conditions would have proved disastrous, so Washington authorized Rochambeau “to
call up the militia of Boston and Rhode Island to aid his army build the works for the defense of
the island.”175
A large British fleet was soon spotted off Newport. At this time the French were still in
the process of disembarking their artillery.176 Sub lieutenant Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de Verger,
an officer of the Royal Deux-Ponts Regiment, recorded the episode in his journal,
On the 21st, 22 sails were sighted; they were all large ships, and we learned that
Clinton was embarked in them with 6,000 men. Our situation was such that we
had great cause to fear that we should be taken by storm. With no fort, with not a
gun unloaded, after the grenadiers and chasseurs of our brigade had been detached
to march to the Neck [Brenton’s Point], we had left only 400 men in condition to
face the enemy. The rest were absolutely tent bound, or else unable to stand up
for an hour. The brigade of the Soissonnais Regiment had fared better and still
had 1,000 men fit for service; but the artillery and Lauzun’s Legion were very
weak. Our sailors as well had suffered terribly from scurvy. The Conquérant
alone had 400 sick.
Had Clinton been more resolved to attack us it is certain he would have met with
but feeble resistance with three landing-points to guard, we owed our safety to his
irresolution alone. 177
Much like the American hesitation during the Battle of Rhode Island, inaction by the British
deprived them of an opportunity as well. Verger goes on to explain that by July 25, the French
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had all their artillery unloaded and ready, and “a fine battery set up for firing hot shot.”178 The
British observed the French for several days but never took action and ultimately left. Years
later General Clinton would lament that their failure to destroy the French before they had time
to settle in at Newport, gave the Americans the morale boost they had needed.179

4.2.2 Repairs and Additions to the Battlefield Defenses
The French, relieved by Clinton’s departure, now had plenty of time to rebuild the
defenses at their own pace. General William Heath and 4,000 militiamen had answered
Rochambeau’s call for assistance but with the crisis averted, half were sent home to bring in their
harvests. The remaining men were put to work under the command of Lafayette building and
repairing a series of redoubts throughout Newport and Middletown.180 They worked on
numerous forts along the coast, in defense of the harbor but also made major additions to the
outer line in Middletown, used by the British during the Siege. According to several French
maps, including the 1780 Plan de la position de l'armée françoise autour de Newport et du
mouillage de l'escadre dans la rade de cette ville,181 Card’s Redoubt, Dudley’s Redoubt,
Bannister’s Redoubt, and Irish’s Redoubt, along with the Tonomy Hill Fort, and Fort Fanning
were all repaired, strengthened and renamed (Figure 4.2, 4.3 red circles). Six additional forts
were added to this area (most named for the French regiments occupying them) including
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Lunette de Soissonnois, Lunette des Americains, Queue d’hyronde des chasseurs, Lunette de
Bourbonnois, Redoute de Saintonge, Redoute de la Queue des’tang (Figure 4.3, blue circles).182

Figure 4.2 A list of defensive works, built be the British but repaired and renamed by the French, from a 1780 French
183
map.
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Figure 4.3 Map of the position of French Army around Newport and the Squadron moored in the harbor of this City
(Plan de la position de L'armée françoise autour de Newport et du mouillage de l'escadre dans la rade de cette ville),
shows defenses throughout the outer line, as they appeared in 1780. Fortifications built by the British and repaired by
184
the French are circled in red. Defenses erected new by the French are circled in blue.

Among those listed as new works was a fort on “Little Tonomy” (also known as Sunset
Hill) a smaller summit just north of Tonomy Hill. Although this was a new fort, there had been a
British presence at the site previously. It had been used as a “fleche,”185 a very minor defensive
work built to assist the larger fort on Tonomy Hill. It was such a minor work however, that the
drastic enlargement was considered a new addition to the lines rather than a restoration.186 The
difference in shape and size of this work, from a fleche to a full redoubt, can be seen in Figure
4.4. Tonomy Hill Fort can also be seen here (to the right of Little Tonomy), and is a good
example of the difference in shape and style of the French forts verses the English.
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Figure 4.4 Top: The “fleche” on Little Tonomy (top left) and Tonomy Hill Fort (top right) as they appeared during the
187
Siege. Bottom: The same hills in 1780. Little Tonomy (bottom left) and Tonomy Hill Fort (bottom right) with their
188
newly built and restored works carried out by the French.

Work on the defenses would continue until the French moved into their winter quarters at
the end of September.189
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4.2.3 Impact of the French on the Battlefield and Beyond
Although the island was now properly fortified, the French never had to put their
defenses to the test, ultimately enjoying a rather peaceful stay from July 1780 to July 1781. The
threat of a British attack was always a real concern but they were prepared for it and with the
southern theater now the focus of the war, the British never attempted to retake Aquidneck
Island. Instead, Rochambeau and the French Army spent their time and money in the city until
they were needed elsewhere. During their stay, the French not only fortified the area, let their
sick troops rest and their healthy men drill but Rochambeau was also able to plan with and
eventually meet Washington. This would prove crucial to the final phase of the war.
The French also helped the city to recover. Unlike the British, the French paid for their
lodgings and other needs. Rochambeau even paid (with gold and silver coins) to repair existing
dwellings throughout the city to house his troops for winter, spending the modern day equivalent
of $80,000.190 This was the kind of aid that Newport’s devastated economy so desperately
needed.
Over the course of their year-long stay, Newport society had fallen in love with the
French, hosting balls and dinners in their honor, and even allowing a Roman Catholic funeral
mass and burial (for the recently deceased Admiral Charles-Louis d’Arsac, chevalier de
Ternay191) to be held at the Anglican Trinity Church.192 To the inhabitants of Newport, the
French were charming and polite, making them welcome guests of the city, compared to the
British who were now seen more as the occupiers they truly were.
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By summer 1781, it was finally time to act. Rochambeau had met with Washington three
times over the previous year (twice in Connecticut and once in Newport) and now the General
would lead his troops to join Washington in an effort to lay siege to the British in New York.193
Plans soon changed however when an additional French fleet, promised by the King and
commanded by Admiral Francois-Joseph-Paul, comte de Grasse, joined the war. De Grasse was
headed for the Chesapeake Bay, and so all French forces set off for Virginia, where they would
ultimately play an indispensable role in the surrender of British forces at Yorktown.194 Having
left Aquidneck Island with its newly repaired defenses intact, the battlefield in Middletown was
now in far better shape because of the French than it had been at the end of the Siege. This
impact on the landscape meant that the works used during the Siege, and repaired under
Rochambeau, could survive for posterity should the inhabitants not intervene.
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Chapter 5. Location and Condition of Battlefield
The Siege of Newport played out over approximately 1,351 acres on opposing hills in
Middletown, Rhode Island, not far from the Newport border.195 The battlefield was comprised
of the British outer line, in the Bliss Hill and Tonomy Hill areas, the American works on
Honeyman Hill, and the valley between them. Although the hills and valleys remain, few of the
defensive works still stand.

5.1 - Location of the Battlefield
The American defenses at Honeyman Hill were located around today’s intersections of
Green End Avenue, Aquidneck Avenue and Turner Road.196 The British outer line ran northeast
from a 10-gun battery at the intersection of Green End Avenue and Bliss Mine Road, and up the
crest of Bliss Hill, passing Card’s Redoubt, and including Bannister’s and Dudley’s Redoubts.
From Bliss Hill the line continued north, where it crossed West Main Road (just south of Two
Mile Corner), at Irish’s Redoubt, and then turned westward to Tonomy Hill.197
Largely developed today, the area was farmland and orchards when the British arrived in
1776. By the time of the Siege, the landscape had changed dramatically. “The country within a
mile of the works has the most desolate appearance that possibly can be imagin’d”, Thomas
Hughes noted in his diary. “The houses are all burnt for fear they should afford shelter to the
enemy, their fences are destry’d, and their orchards cut to the stumps either for opening the
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country or making the abbattis. In short this island, formerly the Garden of America, is now the
picture of war and rapine.”198

5.2 Surface Condition
5.2.1 Battlefield at the Turn of the Century
After the Revolution, Middletown remained a rural farming community and by the turn
of the 20th century, had become a mix of farmland and modest cottages on country estates. This
is reflected in the 1907 Atlas of Newport, Middletown and Portsmouth. Honeyman Hill and the
east side of Easton’s Pond appears to be comprised of working farms. In contrast, the west side
of the pond still had plenty of open space but also included a growing number of estates with
elegant names and landscaped paths. These appear mainly along the Newport border with
Middletown, in the Bliss Hill area, and are likely sprawl from rapidly growing Newport.199
The landscape seen in the 1907 Atlas is backed up by historic photographs from the
Middletown Historical Society archives, dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Images of Honeyman Hill (Figure 5.1) and the top of Easton’s Pond show a rural landscape of
farmhouses and fields ascending up the hill along Green End Avenue.200 A winding road along
the top of Easton’s Pond’s west bank also shows little development (Figure 5.2).201 The heavily
agricultural setting that was Middletown at the turn of the century made it likely that many of the
defenses could have survived.
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Figure 5.1 Green End Avenue sloping down Honeyman Hill, to the crossing at the top of Easton’s Pond, c. 1900.
202
Courtesy of the Collections of the Middletown Historical Society, Middletown, RI.

Figure 5.2 Green End Avenue on the west side of Easton’s Pond, at the base of Bliss Hill and the Green End area,
th
203
late 19 century. Courtesy of the Collections of the Middletown Historical Society, Middletown, RI.
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The first major interest in sites from the Siege in Middletown came in 1894, when a
group of partners came together to purchase and preserve the fort on Vernon Avenue. Thought
to be the remains of Card’s Redoubt because of its proximity to Green End, it was eventually
donated to the Newport Historical Society (who owns it to this day). Two years later, in 1896, a
new book Revolutionary Defenses of Rhode Island was published. Written by historian Edward
Field, the book references several fortifications that still existed at the time and even includes a
map of Rhode Island noting the locations of known fortifications (Figure 5.3). According to
Field, although filled decades earlier, some remnants of the works on Honeyman Hill were still
visible as late as the 1890s.204 Two forts, “Honeyman’s Hill Fort” and “Barkers Hill Fort” were
listed on his map of the state and may be all that remained in the late 19th century of the ruined
American defenses on Honeyman Hill.205

Figure 5.3 The 1896 map of existing fortifications on Aquidneck Island, seen in Field’s “Revolutionary Defenses in
206
Rhode Island.”
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Field, Map # 28.
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Field, Map # 28.
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Many of the works were also still visible in Field’s time. He reported, “…the line of
intrenchments ran northerly towards Coddington’s Point. Within the past dozen years all have
disappeared; portions of it in 1884 could be seen at Van Renssellaer place, Collin’s place, and
Bailey’s farm.”207 According to the 1907 Atlas, a Van Renssellaer was the owner of the property
where Card’s Redoubt was located.208 The existence of some lingering defenses on this property
were noted again in 1923, when H. W. H. Powel wrote an article for the Newport History
Bulletin, in which he referred to the visible works at “Old Fort Farm,” a common local nickname
for the property where Card’s Redoubt sits.209 Photographs taken from multiple positions on
Honeyman Hill, looking west, toward Card’s Redoubt and West Main Road, depict rolling hills
of farmland, along with a lush stretch of trees on Bliss Hill (likely the neighborhood of cottages)
(Figure 5.4).210 This same wooded area is visible from the other side of Bliss Hill in photos
taken looking south, back into Newport, from One Mile Corner, and likely provided privacy for
this more exclusive area (Figure 5. 5).211 The scene, looking north from the same spot and up
West Main Road into Middletown, is one of open fields and few structures (Figure 5.6). It is
possible the remnants of Dudley’s, Bannister’s and Irish’s Redoubts could have still existed in
this type of agricultural setting.212
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Figure 5.4 The turn-of-the-century view from Green End Avenue (in foreground) on Honeyman Hill, looking west
toward the tree-lined Bliss Hill. The Witherbee School (which stands today in the same location at the corner of Green
End Ave. and Valley Road and is owned by the Middletown Historical Society) can be seen in the lower left corner,
serving as a point of referense. Behind it, Miantonomi Avenue windes up Bliss Hill toward the area where Card’s
213
Redoubt is located.

Figure 5.5 The view from One Mile Corner at the town line, looking south into Newport. Bliss Hill is within the treed
214
area on the left.

213
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Historic Photograph PV-87, PV-123, Middletown Historical Society.
Historic Photograph PV-81, Middletown Historical Society.
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Figure 5.6 View from One Mile Corner looking north, toward the farm fields of Middletown.
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The remains of the fort at Tonomy Hill were also still visible in Field’s time. As the
highest spot in Newport and one of the highest on the island, Tonomy Hill had been a significant
landmark and lookout point for centuries. “In the centre of Tonomy Hill Fort there is an
observatory which replaces an old one blown down many years ago, from which an extensive
view of Newport and its harbor can be seen.”216 Field even includes a photograph labeled
“Tonomy Hill Fort and Observatory, Newport” where one can see what it looked like at the time
he was writing. In 1922 the City of Newport purchased a parcel of land that included Tonomy
Hill. Once the seat of power for the Narragansett sachem Miantonomi, the hill was incorporated
into a new public park created by the city and named for this historic figure.217 Later in 1929,
the city replaced the old observatory at the top of the hill with a stone lookout tower, built as a
World War I memorial. With sweeping views of Newport and Middletown, it is clear why it was
215

Historic Photograph PV-83, Middletown Historical Society.
Field, 133.
217
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chosen as the site of a lookout and a fortification. Built high atop a rocky outcropping, from here
the British could have safely observed their forces at work during the Siege and kept an eye on
West Main Road and the bay at the same time.218 While other defenses around the island could
have been disturbed by agriculture or development, Tonomy Hill Fort and the defense on Little
Tonomy, survived into the 20th century, more or less untouched, due to their elevation and rocky
terrain. This topography made the sites less useful for practical purposes and better suited for a
picturesque lookout and picnic area.219
In the early 1920s, the Newport Historical Society became interested in British forts from
the American Revolution. A map was drawn up showing what forts were visible on the farmland
in Middletown, on what had been the battlefield (Figure 5.7). When compared to contemporary
maps of the battlefield, it appears that the NHS map documented the 10-gun battery, Redoute de
Saintonge, Card’s Redoubt, Irish’s Redoubt, Tonomy Hill Fort, and several others defenses
constructed by the French near Coddington Point; but at the time, little documentation was
available to sort out British from French forts.220 It was assumed that all defenses were British
at their beginning, including the well preserved fort on Vernon Avenue. So in 1924, the
Newport Historical Society and its president, Roderick Terry, chose this location as a dedication
site to represent the British forts. A ceremony was held and a marker placed that read “Green
End Fort built 1777 by the English for the Defense of Newport.” The very detailed Diary of
Frederick Mackenzie had not yet been published (that would happen in 1930), leaving no reason
at the time to doubt the fort’s assumed origins.
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Figure 5.7 Images from Rockerick Terry’s 1924 article about the fort on Vernon Avenue. The fort is seen as it looked in the
1870s (upper left, caption on photograph reads: “Green End Fort 1876”) and shortly after its 1924 dedication (lower left). The
map produced by the Newport Historical Society (right) was also included in Terry’s article. 221

5.2.2 Battlefield Pre-WWII
A 1939 aerial map of Middletown shows the impact of time to the battlefield. Although
little has changed on the farm fields of Honeyman Hill, new neighborhoods cropped up across
Bliss Hill (Figure 5.8). The area is a mix of new, tightly laid out streets, older cottages and a few
remaining agricultural fields. Card’s Redoubt, still in existence, sat in the backyard vegetation of

221

Terry, 2, 15.
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a large residence at the corner of Miantonomi Avenue and Boulevard. Trees in the shape of the
redoubt can be seen in the aerial map (Figure 5.9). In 1778, the British line stretched northwest
from Bliss Hill towards Irish’s Redoubt, just south of Two Mile Corner. Following this route in
1939 would take one out of the developing Bliss Hill and back into farm fields south of East
Main Road. Although no written documentation has been found asserting the ruins of
Bannister’s, Dudley’s or Irish’s Redoubts existed into the late 1930s, the aerial photos suggests
Irish’s Redoubt may have survived. There is a suspicious shape visible in a farm field where it
would have been (Figure 5.9), a shape similar to the image of the same redoubt depicted in one
of the 1780 French maps.222
Having been purchased by the City of Newport in the 1920s and made the site of a park
and World War I memorial, little changed at Tonomy Hill in the intervening years. Aerial
photos from the late 1930s show the stone tower and paths peeking through trees and brush
(Figure 5.9). The park and Little Tonomy, surrounded mainly by farm fields but with residential
developments to its south, remained largely undisturbed.223

222
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Rochambeau Map Collection, Library of Congress.
Historic Aerial Photographs, Middletown, RI, 1939. Web. ProvPlan, (mapper.proplan.org/ha).
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Figure 5.8 Aerial photo from 1939 shows the use of land pre-WWII. The Honeyman Hill area (east of the pond) is
comprised of wide open farm fields, while the Bliss Hill area (west of the pond and closer to Newport) is much more
developed. All works that were visible at the time, including Card’s Redoubt, Redoute de Saintonge, Irish’s Redoubt,
Tonomy Hill Fort and Little Tonomy have been marked in red. No evidence has been found to suggest the works on
224
Honeyman Hill survived into the WWII era.

224

Historic Aerial Photographs, ProvPlan.
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Figure 5.9 Close up aerial photographs taken in 1939 showing the remains of Card’s Redoubt (top left), possibly
Irish’s Redoubt (bottom left) and the defenses at Tonomy Hill (right), Tonomy Hill Fort and “Little Tonomy.”225

225

Historic Aerial Photographs, ProvPlan.
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5.2.3 Battlefield Today
In the post-World War II era, America experienced a building boom as rural communities
became suburbs. Middletown was no different. As a result, the battlefield today is largely
developed. It is currently comprised of 58% private space, 28% public and 13% non-profit
owned land.226 Only 527 of its 1,351 acres remain unchanged.227 Much of the developed land is
residential but stretches of commercial properties can be found in the valley (on today’s Valley
Road), along Aquidneck Avenue, and on West Main Road. What little open land that remains is
mostly located within the valley and along Bailey’s Brook, leading toward Easton’s Pond228, the
area that had been impassable in 1778 due to flooding from the hurricane (the Middletown
Historical Society owns a 1.15 acre undeveloped parcel in this area). At least 300 acres of the
battlefield are threatened due to the ongoing trend of developing open land into residential
property.229
Although Field reported that remnants of the American works at Honeyman Hill were
still visible in the 1890s, it is highly unlikely they could still be seen today. The post war
suburban developments off of Green End Avenue and commercial landscape of Aquidneck
Avenue have left little if any terrain untouched. However, a Middletown resident recently
donated to the Middletown Historical Society a 12-pound cannonball that had been buried in his
yard on Turner Road. The artifact has since been identified (based on its weight) as a British
cannonball that was fired at American defenses during the Siege. Based on where it landed and
Mackenzie’s accounts, it is likely that the Turner Road cannonball was fired from the British gun
226

Based on calculations from measurements taken using Google Earth.
Based on calculations from measurements taken using Google Earth.
228
Today, Easton’s Pond is actually broken into two portions. Separated by an earthen embankment, the northern
section is now called Green End Pond and the southern remains Easton’s Pond. Since it was all one body of water
during the 18th century, this landmark will continue to be called Easton’s Pond and referred to as one body of water
thoughout this report.
229
Based on calculations from measurements taken using Google Earth.
227
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battery #1. Figure 5.10 shows the location of this gun battery on a contemporary map, where the
blue and yellow lines intersect. The blue line represents the location of the British defense line
and the yellow indicates the path of the cannonball towards Honeyman Hill, which landed south
of and a little beyond the American battery #1 (see Figure 5.11). The area is now built up but
there is space to look for the remains of the American trenches and gun batteries.

Figure 5.10 North end of the battlefield, as seen on a Google earth map. The blue line shows where the British
defense line was and the yellow indicates the path of the cannonball that was found on Turner Road. Note the wide
230
open land in the Bailey’s Brook valley.

230

Location calculated using Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 5.11 Honeyman Hill as seen on a Google earth map. The yellow line shows the path of the cannonball that
231
was found on Turner Road.

The Bliss Hill area is also heavily residential today. Several of the cottages still stand,
but the areas between them have been further filled in. The 10-gun battery, where the British
outer line began, was located at the top of Green End Avenue, near its intersection with Bliss
Mine Road and Boulevard but no remains exist (see Figure 5.12). The ruins of Card’s Redoubt,
still visible, sits in a pine grove behind 218 Boulevard, at the corner of Miantonomi Avenue, at
Green End (see Figure 5.13). Although not part of the Siege, the fort on Vernon Avenue is
nestled into this same neighborhood and sits in excellent condition among modest suburban
homes, a block away from Card’s Redoubt (see Figure 5.14).

231

Location on Google Map determined using Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan.
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Figure 5.12 The location of the 10-Gun Battery, where the British outer line began, at the top of Green End Ave.

Figure 5.13 The present day location of Card’s Redoubt in a pine grove behind 218 Boulevard.
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Location on Google Map determined using Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan.
233
Google Maps.
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Figure 5.14 The location of the fort on Vernon Avenue, the Redoute de Saintonge, as seen on Google earth.
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Studies conducted by Ken Walsh, a member of the Newport Historical Society and
founding member of the Middletown Historical Society, in the 1970s indicated that Green End
Fort was actually the Redoute de Saintonge, built by the French (with help from the American
militia) in 1780, when Rochambeau’s forces were stationed here (Figures 5.15 and 5.16, bottom,
circled in blue).235

234
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Google Maps.
Walsh, Memo on Location of “Green End Fort”, Newport History, 1976
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Figure 5.15 List of forts built new for the French, including the Redoute de Saintonge (see #6, abbreviated as
236
Redoute St. Onge).

236

Colbert, 1783. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 5.16 The outer line on Bliss Hill, built by the British in 1778 (top) and repaired and expanded by the French in
1780 (bottom). Redoute de Saintonge is not visible on this or any 1778 map but can be seen as #6 (circled in blue),
south of Card’s Redoubt (#28, circled in red) on the 1780 French map. On both maps Card’s is located north of
Green End Avenue’s crossing of Easton’s Pond, while Saintonge is in line with it, which was an early indicator that
237
they were not the same fort.

237

Fage, Plan of the Works, 1778 (top); Colbert, 1783 (bottom). William L. Clements Library, University of
Michigan.
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The crest of Bliss Hill running north is now home to a large postwar residential
development looking down on High Street and the valley below. Any remains of Dudley’s or
Bannister’s Redoubts were likely leveled during the neighborhood’s construction. There is also
nothing left of Irish’s Redoubt, since the area where it was located has also long since been
paved over and used as commercial space and parking.
The site of the Tonomy Hill Fort holds the distinct honor of being the least developed site
of all the defenses in use during the Siege, thanks in part to the continued existence of
Miantonomi Park (Figure 5.17). Its paths and World War I memorial tower are also still there.
Other than this monument, which is only open to the public a few days a year, Tonomy Hill Fort
sits empty and forgotten. The trees that have grown up around it now block the once spectacular
view, leaving little reason for the public to visit it. Some of this overgrowth is eroding away at
what had been the edges of the fort and there is no signage or marker indicating its former use.
Today, Little Tonomy is completely overgrown. For years, it had been owned by the Newport
Housing Authority and had survived perhaps due to its proximity to the Miantonomi Park but it
was not officially part of it and thus was in danger without the city’s protection.238 In 2006 the
Aquidneck Land Trust became involved and it was soon incorporated into the park. Today, both
hills are protected thanks to both their own topography and their inclusion in this public space.
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Figure 2.17 View from the top of the WWI memorial tower, at the top of Tonomy Hill Fort. The open area below was
once part of the fort’s interior. Photo by author.

5.2.4 Preservation Recommendations for Existing Sites
With the exception of Card’s Redoubt and Tonomy Hill Fort, most of the defenses
present during the battle have been leveled or covered with newer construction, though the
cannonball discovered on Turner Road is a good sign that evidence of the Siege may still exist
beneath the surface. Currently the only defensive work within the boundaries of the original
battlefield in excellent condition is the Redoute de Saintonge, which didn’t exist in 1778. Clear
of brush and looking as if it were built yesterday, it is carefully maintained by the Rhode Island
chapter of the Society of the Sons of the American Revolution. The “ruins” of Card’s Redoubt
and Tonomy Hill Fort, although still in existence, suffer from neglect with their integrity
threatened by the increasing growth of vegetation along their earthen walls. Care and routine
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upkeep preserved the Redoute de Saintonge, the same maintenance is lacking but essential for
the long-term preservation of Card’s Redoubt and Tonomy Hill Fort. Further still, since Tonomy
Hill Fort is accessible to the public, it would benefit from signage, placing the area into historical
context. Such signage would also benefit the Redoute de Saintonge. Today, the stone marker
that incorrectly states “Green End Fort built 1777 by the British for the defense of Newport”
remains the only information available at the site. A sign, detailing its history and addressing
this confusion, would provide a more accurate context for the casual visitor and prevent the
perpetuation of this misnomer.

5.3 Archaeological Evidence
The existence of modern day archeological equipment, such as Ground Penetrating Radar
(GPR),239 has allowed the search for the battlefield to go below the surface (Figure 5.18, 5.19).
Three sites associated with the Siege of Newport were selected for GPR surveys based on the
historical record and available access to the properties (Figure 5.20). The Redoubt de Saintonge,
located on Vernon Avenue, although not in existence during the Siege has been wrongly
identified as Green End Fort (a nickname for Card’s Redoubt) over the years. It is hoped that
evidence uncovered using GPR will further support the true, French, origins of the redoubt. The
Aaron Lopez Farm was the location of an outpost used by the British to monitor Patriot activities
in Tiverton and the Sakonnet River, in the lead up to the engagement. When the French entered
the bay, causing all British forces to pull back to Newport, the post was abandoned. Fort
Fanning was a centrally located fort constructed along the outer line (October – December 1778),
following the battle, as the British sought to strengthen their defense lines.

239

A device that uses radar pulses to image the subsurface without disturbing the soil.
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Figure 5.18. Procedure used to conduct a GPR study.

Figure 5.19 GPR Receive Pattern.
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Figure 20 The locations on Aquidneck Island of the three sites where GPR surveys were conducted, the Aaron Lopez
Farm, Redoute de Saintonge (abbreviated as St. Onge) and Fort Fanning.
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Dr. Jon Bernard Marcoux of Salve Regina University performed these GPR surveys
between July 16, 2015 and November 19, 2015, and was assisted by Dr. Kenneth Walsh and
Mersina Christopher of the Middletown Historical Society Research Team and students from
Salve Regina University’s Cultural and Historic Preservation program (Figure 5.21). The results
of the surveys were processed by Dr. Marcoux. His findings are discussed in the below
paragraphs but his full report can be seen in Appendix F.
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Figure 5.21 The GPR survey team at work. Top: Sweep markers, Mersina Christopher (MHS) and Eleni Soares
(volunteer from St. Micheal’s School,) acted as guides for the GPR survey. Bottom: A Salve Regina University
student and Dr. Marcoux scan the survey area at Linden Park, in search of Fort Fanning.

119

5.3.1 Aaron Lopez Farm
During the British occupation of Aquidneck Island, a number of farm houses along the
Island’s east coast were seized and fortified. One of these farms was the country estate of Aaron
Lopez, who in 1775 was Newport’s wealthiest man and was among the 2,000 people who fled
the Island at the outbreak of war. When the British fortified the island the Lopez Farm became an
outpost and barracks. 240 Located in Portsmouth, the Lopez farmhouse was 1,203 feet south of
the junction of Wapping Road and Bramans Lane and can be found in a number of contemporary
sources. The farm is visible in two Revolutionary War era maps, A Plan of Rhode Island, by
Charles Blaskowitz, 1770 and A Plan of Rhode Island, by Edward Fage, Captain Of Artillery,
1777-1779. It is also detailed in the Town of Portsmouth land records. An indicator of British
presence at the Lopez site is the changing footprint of Wapping Road on various historic maps.
When a modern map of the area (Figure 5.22) is overlaid on the 1770 Blaskowitz map (Figure
5.23), the path of the Wapping Loop (created by Wapping Road, Michells Lane and Bramans
Lane) is a good fit.241 When the Google Map overlay is placed on the Fage map, which was
created during the British occupation, it appears the British moved Wapping Road in Two places
(Figures 5.24 – 5.26).242
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DFM, 1: 180; “200 at Lopez’s house on the east side.”
Charles Blaskowitz, A Plan of Rhode Island with the country and islands adjacent including a plan of the Town
of Newport. 1770. Heritage Charts (heritagecharts.com).
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Fage, Plan of Rhode Island, 1779, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
241

120

243

Figure 5.22 Outline of the Wapping loop, as seen today on Google maps, used as a map reference.

Figure 23 Location of the Lopez farm as recorded on the 1770 Blaskowitz map (left) and the list of farms in the area
244
(right).

243

Google Maps.
Blaskowitz, A Plan of Rhode Island with the country and islands adjacent including a plan of the Town of
Newport. 1770.
244
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Figure 5.24 The British rerouted Wapping Road to the east of the Lopez house.

245

Figure 5.25 There appears to be a path from the corners of Bramans Lane and Wapping Road through the stone
walls and to the rear of the house that follows the British modifications.
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Fage, Plan of Rhode Island, 1779, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 5.26 The gap in the wall where the road was rerouted.

Today the site of the Lopez Farm is part of Greenvale Vineyards, leaving much of the
landscape open and accessible for study. To find further evidence of the British outpost, two
GPR surveys were conducted in an attempt to locate intact remains of 18th century outbuildings
associated with the farm. Survey areas were identified and set up with a 25m-x-12m grid and a
23m-x-27m grid (Figure 5.27). In the first area (Figure 5.28), multiple linear anomalies
intersecting to create a square-shaped feature is believed to be the possible remnants of a longfilled stone foundation. This is likely an outbuilding from the farm. The second area (Figure
5.29) revealed two filled pits, features common in surveys of 18th century archaeological sites.
Together, the existence of these features and their context within the site are promising. They
suggest that remnants of the Lopez Farm still exist, and thus evidence of the Revolutionary War
era outpost could too.
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Figure 5.27 The site of the Lopez Farm with the two survey grids labeled in red.
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Figure 5.28 GPR results from grid 1 of the Aaron Lopez site.
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Figure 5.29 Results from grid 2 of the Aaron Lopez site.
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5.3.2 Fort Fanning
In October 1778 the British began construction of Fort Fanning, along West Main Road
between One and Two Mile Corner, just south of Irish’s Redoubt (Figure 5.30). Based on a
comparison of Revolutionary War era and contemporary maps, an area was identified where
remnants of the southernmost point of the fort was suspected to exist. Once the site of a public
school, today the area is part of Linden Park, a public park featuring athletic fields and a
playground, owned by the Town of Middletown. Within this area, an 80m-x-20m grid was
established for a GPR survey, which was then scanned by Dr. Marcoux and a team of students
(Figure 5.31).

Figure 5.30 Fort Fanning, started October 1778, as it appears on the Fage map.
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Fage, Plan of the Works, 1778, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 5.31 survey area at Linden Park in Middletown, suspected site of Fort Fanning.

The GPR results returned several anomalies, but specifically a diamond shaped feature
reminiscent of what would be expected for Fort Fanning (Figure 5.32). However, it was too
small and its profile too uniform. Upon further analysis and research, including the study of a
1962 aerial photograph, it was determined that this feature was not the 18th century fort but
instead a 20th century baseball diamond from the time the school was in use (Figure 5.33). In the
end, no evidence of Fort Fanning was detected through this survey but further GPR testing to the
east and west of the survey grid should be conducted before ruling out the fort’s presence.
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Figure 3 GPR results from the Fort Fanning survey.
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Figure 5.33 The 1962 aerial photograph (bottom and center) showing the existence of a baseball diamond in the
same location as the feature (top).
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5.3.3 Redoute de Saintonge
Less than a year after the British abandoned Aquidneck Island in October 1779, the
French arrived and set to work restoring and expanding on Newport’s ruined defense lines,
including the addition of Redoute de Saintonge (see Figure 5.34). Dr. Marcoux and his students
established a 45m-x-19m grid within the current fortification for a GPR survey (Figure 5.35).

Figure 5.34 The GPR survey area of the Redoute de Saintonge on Vernon Avenue in Middletown.
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Figure 5.35 GPR scan the Redoute de Saintonge

The features detected during the survey provide evidence of the redoubt’s construction.
It indicated the original ground surface of the slope from which the redoubt was built, the
rammed earth used to level and extend the redoubt away from the natural slope of the land, and
the construction of the embankment that protected the soldiers within the redoubt (Figure 5.36).
The survey at Saintonge has also shown no evidence of cannonballs beneath the surface. This
suggests that it saw no action, further supporting that it was not in existence during the Siege.
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Figure 5.36 GPR results from the Redoute de Saintonge survey.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Summary
There are a host of reasons the Siege failed. The lack of deception, bad timing, a rocky
collaboration with the French, the unexpected hurricane, the geography, and the available
technology, led to a “perfect storm” of events. These, combined with the impending arrival of
British reinforcements, made for an insurmountable task and Sullivan knew it. Had some of
these circumstances been different, the Americans could have possibly won and ended the
Revolutionary War in Newport
There was a distinct lack of deception in the American approach to the attack. In the
beginning, American generals wrote a letter to the General Pigot saying that they were coming to
get him. This might have had some psychological impact on an unseasoned commander but in
this case, with a 6,000-man regular army including veteran officers, it only provided warning.
When the French arrived off Newport, the British had no trouble observing their position in
Narragansett Bay or the American camp in Tiverton. The result of this openness was that the
British were able to strategize and put a plan in place to avoid a pincer movement by the
Americans and French. Sullivan and d’Estaing had planned to attack Aquidneck Island from two
sides (east from Fogland and west from Dyer Island) to trap the British stationed in Portsmouth.
When the French fleet entered the bay, exchanging cannon fire with the shore batteries, their
plan was easily discernible and the British immediately withdrew from the north end and east
side of the island into Newport, leaving no one to trap.
The Americans also did not act fast enough. In the time that it took them to plan their
advance, the British had more than enough time to dig in and better fortify the outer line.
Sullivan himself had wanted to act quickly and take the British by storm but his colleagues

134

wanted a more methodical approach. Unlike the British, whose typical foot soldier was used as
cannon fodder, the Continental Army tended to err on the side of caution and avoided conflicts
that racked up too many casualties. This mentality and the urging of the other generals resulted
in wasted time and opportunity. If the Americans had made their way down the island before the
hurricane hit, they could have crossed the top of Easton’s Pond before it became flooded and
before the British had time to dig in. The rains soaked gunpowder and other supplies, further
delaying the Americans’ advance. By the time they reached Honeyman Hill, the valley was
nearly impenetrable, due to the overflowing brook, the defenses that looked down on it, and the
absence of specialized troops in the American ranks to handle such a situation.
Despite any planning that happened prior to the operation, the lack of proper coordination
and cooperation between the French and the Americans during it made the entire engagement a
messy affair. Although both were fighting for the same cause, they did not operate as a team,
which greatly weakened their strategies. Sullivan who initially wanted to act quickly, listened to
his officers rather than d’Estaing, and chose to take more time. D’Estaing, fearful of being
trapped by Admiral Howe’s fleet, abandoned any plan to blockade Newport harbor and instead
left to pursue the British on the open sea. Later when d’Estaing returned, battered from the
storm, he almost agreed to lend troops and artillery to the Americans but decided against it at the
behest of his adamant officers. For the Americans, this was cause for alarm. They were not only
counting on the French but had based all their plans on a joint operation and soon American
militiamen deserted in droves at the prospect of facing the British alone. This led to weakened
morale in the American camp. It seems both Sullivan and d’Estaing were more easily swayed by
their own officers than by each other. Despite all of the bad coordination between the two sides,
it was d’Estaing’s unavoidable abandonment of the operation, already in progress, that made the
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biggest difference. Once the French were out of commission, it was no longer a question of how
to win but of inflicting what damage they could and withdrawing unscathed.
Although the French often get the bulk of the blame for the campaign’s failure, perhaps
the single greatest hindrance the Americans faced on Rhode Island (whether they knew it or not)
was the technology available to them and the role geography played in this. Newport’s location
on an island meant that all equipment had to be transported by boat. Cannons over a certain
weight were too heavy to make the trip across the Sakonnet River (the eastern passage of
Narragansett Bay) in the army’s small boats. The cannons that did make the crossing (18
pounders) were not substantial enough to penetrate the earthen defenses of the British on Bliss
Hill. When the French returned, badly damaged by the storm, Greene had hoped to secure
cannons and men, at the very least but was turned down. Had the French agreed and delivered
larger artillery by frigate, the outcome could have been different; 24-pound cannon would have
been more useful and 36-pound cannon could have destroyed the British forts altogether.
The British were too dug in and fortified by the time the Americans arrived in
Middletown. Without more substantial firepower and with a swamp between them and the
enemy, the Americans did not stand a chance. They could not disarm the cannons because theirs
were inadequate. They also could not storm the lines because the swampy terrain would slow
them down too much, a deadly chance Sullivan was not willing to take. The French and their
artillery were the Americans’ only hope to turn things around but the hurricane and d’Estaing’s
choices forced a set of unforeseen circumstances on the operation that could not be avoided.
With the Americans’ morale shaken by French actions and with no hope of things changing, their
only option was to damage the British as they could before safely retreating. The following
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June, while reflecting on the battle, Major General Charles Grey of the British Army summed it
all up perfectly,

The Americans showed us they were soldiers and not just farmers. They
built redoubts all around us, except for the side facing the water, dug
trenches, drove us out of our camps with their cannon fire and had the will
to storm our lines. But, this was the one thing their volunteers wanted to
avoid, and just as well, for they would have lost many men without a fleet
to support them. Their retreat was well planned and executed orderly.247

6.2 Preservation Recommendations
By studying the battlefield, it has become clear that a number of features of the historic
landscape still exist and are worth preserving. Of the earthen fortifications, only Card’s Redoubt
and Tonomy Hill Fort still have visible remnants. Traces of the defenses on Little Tonomy may
also exist but the area is too overgrown to assess its condition properly. Card’s Redoubt rests in
a Middletown resident’s backyard and thus is not accessible to the public, but the removal of
brush and other overgrowth from its walls would greatly increase the chances of the fort’s
survival. Tonomy Hill Fort is part of a public park maintained in part by the Aquidneck Land
Trust. Although the park is well cared for, the walls of the fort are overgrown. Continued
maintenance at this site to reduce overgrowth is key. Additionally, the installation of appropriate
signage detailing the hill’s history and former use is highly recommended. This would place the
area into historical context and provide visitors with an appreciation for the site’s significance.
Further still, archaeological evidence may also remain at Card’s Redoubt and Tonomy Hill Fort
and the use of non-invasive testing (such as GPR surveys), would be worth conducting.

247

Grey, Bayreuther Zietungen, 1779, as quoted in Schroder, 166.
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The Elder John Bliss House, which was used as the British field headquarters during the
Siege, is not currently on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). It is located off Bliss
Road in Newport, set back between the British 1st and 2nd lines of defense. The house, which is
generally regarded as the oldest in Newport, was used by the British during the Siege, and is one
of few remaining examples of a uniquely-Rhode Island architectural style – the stone ender. The
Bliss House would easily be eligible for the NRHP as it meets both criteria A (associated with
events significant to the broad patterns of our history) and C (embodies distinctive characteristics
of a method of style, period or construction). No plans currently exist for this property to be
added to the NRHP but it is something the Middletown Historical Society Research Team highly
recommends and hopes will happen in the future.
At the center of the battlefield, the area encompassing Bliss Hill, Honeyman Hill, and the
valley and bodies of water between them is largely recognizable today. The hills are now
developed into suburban neighborhoods with some commercial buildings, and the road crossing
the top of Easton’s Pond experiences a high volume of traffic, but the overall topography and
geography is the same. Enough of the relevant features (both natural and man-made) exist, to
maintain the area’s historical integrity. Based on its condition and the signficiant events that
occurred there, the heart of the battlefield is eligible for the NRHP. Additionally, the remaining
features can be used to interpret the events of August 1778. The following section addresses this
area and the plans the Middletown Historical Society has to preserve and interpret a small
portion of the battlefield.
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6.3 Future Plans
This project has paired historical research with scientific analysis to better understand the
location, resources and outcome of the Battle of Rhode Island. It focused on the Siege of
Newport in Middletown, where days of cannonading took place across the valley between Bliss
Hill and Honeyman Hill, and where the Americans failed to penetrate the British lines. Through
this process the Middletown Historical Society Research Team has gained a better understanding
of the engagement, its setbacks, the sites associated with it, and the landscape of the battlefield.
It was through this understanding, commitment to the topic and certain other circumstances, that
a new a new project emerged.
Located at the heart of the battlefield between Bliss Hill and Honeyman Hill, and along
the banks of Easton’s Pond, sits an undeveloped parcel of land owned by the MHS. Bequeathed
to the organization in 2008, a plan had not yet been fully realized for the site. Now, with the
completion of this study, it is clear the site can be put to use to recover this forgotten history.
The installation of a small museum, signage and programming on these grounds would be an
opportunity to commemorate the past and educate the public while preserving a portion of the
battlefield. The site’s location, within the valley between the British and American lines and
along the pond, would give visitors a more complete understanding of the geography that so
greatly affected the operation. Visitors would learn of the importance of the French involvement
in the war effort, both this unsuccessful attempt and Rochambeau’s later presence on the island
and victories in the war. It would provide greater context as well for the many historic sites
tourists see on their visits to Newport. Most importantly, this project would preserve a portion of
the battlefield from further development and protect it for future generations.

139

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Almy, Mary. “Mrs. Mary Almy’s Journal: Siege of Newport, RI August 1778.” Newport
Historical Magazine 1 (1880-1881), 17-36.
Angell, Israel. Diary of Colonel Israel Angell, 1778-1781, ed. Edward Field. Providence: Preston
and Rounds, 1899.
Döhla, Johann Conrad. A Hessian Diary of the American Revolution By Johann Conrad Döhla,
ed. Bruce E. Burgoyne from the 1913 Bayreuth edition by W. Baron von Waldenfels.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990.
Field, Edward. Revolutionary Defenses in Rhode Island. Providence: Preston and Rounds, 1896.
Fletcher, Josiah. Order Book of the Revolution, Rhode Island 1778, ed. by Ralph C. Weiss.
Newport, RI: The Redwood Press, 2015.
Greene, Nathaniel, The Papers of General Nathaniel Greene, ed. Richard K. Showman, Robert
E. McCarthy and Margaret Cobb. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1980.
George Washington Papers: 1741-1799, Series 3: Letterbooks Varick Transcripts: Continental
Army Papers 1775-83. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Web.
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gwseries3.html
George Washington Papers: 1741-1799, Series 4: General Correspondence 1697-1799. Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division. Web.
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gwser4.html.
Greenman, Jeremiah, A Diary of a Common Solider in the American Revolution, 1775-1783. ed.
Robert C. Bray and Paul E. Bushnell. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press,
1978.
Hughes, Thomas. A Journal by Thos. Hughes: For his Amusement, & Designed Only for his
Perusal by the Time he Attains the Age of 50 if he Lives so Long, 1778-1789. Cambridge
University Press, 1947.
Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles. ed. Franklin Bowditch Dexter 3 vols. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1901.

140

Mackenzie, Frederick. Diary of Frederick Mackenzie: Giving A Daily Narrative of His Military
Service as an Officer of the Regiment of Royal Welch Fusiliers During the Years 17751781 in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New York. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1930.
Popp, Stephan, Popp’s Journal 1777-1783. ed. Joseph G. Rosengarten, Philadelphia:
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 26, 1902.
Robins, B. New Principles of Gunnery, 2nd Ed. London, 1805.
Stevens, John Austin. “The French in Rhode Island.” Magazine of American History 5 (1879): 37.

Historic Newspapers
Massachusetts Spy (Worcester, MA), 30 July - 3 September 1778. Web. America’s Historical
Newspapers, NewsBank.com.
Providence Gazette (Providence, RI), 20 June - 5 September 1778. Web. America’s Historical
Newspapers, NewsBank.com.
Royal Gazette (New York, NY), 22 July - 26 September 1778. Web. America’s Historical
Newspapers, NewsBank.com.

Historic Maps & Photographs
Atlas of the City of Newport, Town of Middletown and Town of Portsmouth, Plate 018
Middletown. L.J. Richards & Co., 1907. Web. HistoricMapWorks.com.
Blaskowitz, Charles. A Plan of Rhode Island with the country and islands adjacent including a
plan of the Town of Newport. 1770. Web. Heritage Charts (HeritageCharts.com).
Blaskowitz, Charles, and William Faden. A Plan of the Town of Newport In Rhode
Island. London: Willm. Faden, Charing Cross, 1777. William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan.

141

Blaskowitz, Charles. A topographical chart of the bay of Narraganset in the province of New
England, with all the isles contained therein, among which Rhode Island and Connonicut
have been particularly surveyed, shewing the true positions & bearings of the banks,
shoals, rocks &c. as likewise the soundings, to which have been added the several works
& batteries raised by the Americans : Taken by order of the principal farmers on Rhode
Island. London: Wm. Faden, Charing Cross, 1777. William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan.
Blaskowitz, Charles, Untitled map of Newport Harbor. Newport, RI, 1774. William L. Clements
Library, University of Michigan.
Du Chesnoy, Capitaine Michel. Plan de Rhode Islande, les differentes operations de la flotte
françoise et des trouppes Américaines commandeés par le major général Sullivan contre
les forces de terre et de mer des Anglois depuis le 9 Aout jusqu'a la nuit du 30 au 31 du
même mois que les Américains ont fait leur retraite 1778. 1778. Library of Congress
Geography and Map Division
Colbert, Edouard Charles Victurnien, Comte de Maulevrier. Plan de la ville, rade, et environs de
Newport en Rode Island, avec le campement de l'armée Françoise prés de cette place en
1780. la disposition des ouvrages qu'elle à excuté et le mouillage de l'escadre. 1783.
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
D’Aubant, Abraham. Plan of the town and environs of Newport, Rhode Island / Exhibiting its
defenses formed before the 8th of August 1778 when the French fleet engaged and passed
the batteries, the course of the French fleet up the harbor, the rebel attack and such
defensive works as were erected since that day untill the 29th of August when the siege
was raised; also the works proposed to be erected in the present year 1779. 1779.
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
Des Barres, Joseph F.W. A Chart of the harbor of Rhode Island and Narraganset Bay surveyed
in pursuance of directions from the Lords of Trade to his majesty’s surveyor general for
the northern district of North America: Published at the request of the right honourable
Lord Viscount Howe / by J.F.W. Des Barres esq. London: J.F.W. Des Barres, 1776.
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

142

Fage, Edward. Plan of Rhode-Island / Surveyed and drawn by Edw: Fage, captn. Royal Artillery,
in the years 1777, 78 & 79. 1779. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
Fage, Edward, Plan of the Town of Newport And the Adjacent Country, With a Project for Its
Defence, 1777. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
Fage, Edward. Plan of the works, which form the exterior line of defence, for the town of NewPort in Rhode Island: Also of the batteries and approaches made by the rebels on
Honeymans Hill during their attack in August 1778 / This plan surveyed and drawn by
Edward Fage, lieutt of artillery, November 1778. 1778. William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan.
Fage, Edward, [Newport County, Ca. 1779.] William L. Clements Library, University of
Michigan.
Historic Aerial Photographs, Middletown, RI, 1939 - 2015. Web. ProvPlan,
http://mapper.proplan.org/ha.
Historic Photographs of Middletown, Rhode Island. Collections of the Middletown Historical
Society, Middletown, RI.
Mielatz, Charles Frederick William. Map of the military operations in 1777-78 on Rhode Island.
1883. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
Plan de la position de l'armée françoise autour de Newport et du mouillage de l'escadre dans la
rade de cette ville. 1780. Rochambeau Collection. Library of Congress.
Plan de Rhode Island et les differentes operations de la flotte-françoises et des troupes
americaines commandées par le Major General Sullivan contre les forçes de terre et de
mer des Anglois depuis le 9 aoust jusqu'à la nuit du 30 au 31 du meme mois 1778 que les
Americains ont fait leur retraites. 1778. Library of Congress.
Plan of the position of his majesty’s troops at Rhode Island, after the defeat of the rebels [on] the
29th of August 1778. 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

Secondary Sources
Abbass, D. K. Rhode Island in the Revolution: Big Happenings in the Smallest Colony, Part 1: A
Chronology of the War in Rhode Island. Report for the National Park Service American
Battlefield Protection Program, 2006.

143

Abbass, D. K. Rhode Island in the Revolution: Big Happenings in the Smallest Colony, Part 3:
The Land Sites. Report for the National Park Service American Battlefield Protection
Program, 2006.
Allen, Helen Farrell. Embers Blaze Up Afresh: Rochambeau’s Campaign in the American
Revolution, Newport to Yorktown. Abstracted from Howard C. Rice and Anne S. K.
Brown’s 1972 translation of The Journal of Jean-Francois-Louis, Comte de ClermontCrèvecoeur, First Lieutenant, Auxonne Regiment, Royal Army of France, June 1780 September 1781. Wakefield, RI: Tempus Fugit, 2005.
Aspinall, A., C. Gaffney and A. Schmidt. Magnetometry for Archaeologists. New York:
Altamira Press, 2009.
Balch, Thomas. The French in America During the War of Independence of the United States,
1777-1783, trans. by Thomas Willing Balch. Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, 1891.
Boatner III, Mark M.. Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, Bicentennial Edition. New
York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1976.
Bonsal, Stephen. When the French Were Here. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, Inc.,
1945.
Bush, J. W. M. “The aerodynamics of the beautiful game” MIT, department of mathematics.
Web. Accessed May 21, 2016. http://math.mit.edu/~bush/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/Beautiful-Game2013.pdfhttp://math.mit.edu/~bush/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/BeautifulGame-2013.pdf, 2013.
Collins, A. R. n.d. “Smooth Bore Cannon Ballistics” Australian Research Council. Web.
Accessed May 21, 2016. http://arc.id.au/CannonBallistics.html
Conway, Stephen R. The British Isles and the War of American Independence. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Conyers, Lawrence B. “Ground-Penetrating Radar,” in Remote Sensing in Archaeology: An
Explicitly North American Perspective, ed. by J. K. Johnson. Tuscaloosa, AL: University
of Alabama Press, 2006. 131-160.

144

Cvikel, D., Mentovich, E.D., Ashkenazi, D. and Kahanov, Y., 2013, “Casting Techniques of
Cannonballs from the AKKO 1 Shipwreck: Archaeometallurgical Investigation,” Journal
of Mining and Metallurgy. Sect. B-Metallurgy. 49(1), 107.
Dearden, Paul F. Rhode Island Campaign of 1778. Providence: Rhode Island Bicentennial
Foundation, 1980.
Dictionary of Fortification: Penetration, Solid Shot. Web. Civil War Fortification Digital
Research Library, http://lly.org/~rcw/cwf/dictionary/xgp-015.html, 2004.
Dull, Jonathan. The Age of the Ship of the Line. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009.
Dull, Jonathan. The French Navy, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.
Ernenwein, Eileen G. and Michael L. Hargrave. Archaeological Geophysics for DoD Field Use:
a Guide for New and Novice Users. Center for Advanced Spatial Technologies,
Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas, 2009.
Forbes, Allan and Paul F. Cadman. France and New England, Vol. 1. Boston: State Street Trust
Company, 1925.
Gaffney, C. and J. Gater. Revealing the Buried Past, Geophysics for Archaeologists.
Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing, Ltd., 2003.
Garman, James E. A History of Portsmouth, Rhode Island, 1638-1978. Newport, RI: Franklin
Printing House, 1978.
Grice, Michael D. On Gunnery. Charleston S.C.: Booksurge Publishing, 2009.
Hattendorf, John, Newport, the French Navy and American Independence. Newport, RI:
Redwood Press, 2005.
Johnson, Jay K., ed. Remote Sensing in Archeology: An Explicitly North American Perspective.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006.
Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga: The Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War. New York:
Henry Holt, 1997.
Kray, T., J. Frank and W. Frank. “Magnus Effect on a Rotating Sphere at High Reynolds
Numbers,” J. Wind Engr. Ind. Aero, 2012. 110, 1-9.

145

Kray, T., J. Frank and W. Frank. “Magnus Effect on a Rotating Soccer Ball at High Reynolds
Numbers,” J. Wind Engr. Ind. Aero, 2014. 124, 45-53.
Kvamme, K. “Magnetometry: Nature's Gift to Archaeology,” in Remote Sensing in Archaeology:
An Explicitly North American Perspective, ed. by J. K. Johnson, pp. 205-233.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006. 205-233.
Lumin. Z. “Research on the Asymetrical Aerodynamic Forces of Reentry Vehicles” Foreign
Technology Division, Translation Division. China, 1992.
McBurney, Christian M. The Rhode Island Campaign: The First French and American
Operation in the Revolutionary War. Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2011.
McBurney, Christian. Spies in Revolutionary Rhode Island. Charleston: The History Press, 2014.
McConnell, David. British Smooth-Bore Artillery: A Technological Study to Support
Identification, Acquisition, Restoration, Reproduction, and Interpretation of Artillery at
National Historic Parks in Canada. Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites
Environment Canada – Parks, 1988.
Magnus, H.G. “On the Deviation of Projectiles: and on a Remarkable Phenomenon of Rotating
Bodies,” Taylor’s Foreign Scientific Memoirs. Berlin, 1853.
Manucy, Albert. Artillery Through the Ages. Washington DC: National Park Service, 1949.
Miller, D.G. and A. B. Bailey. “Sphere Drag at Mach Numbers from 0.3 to 2.0 at Reynolds
Numbers Approaching 107,” J. Fluid Mech., (1979). 93(3), 449.
Morrison, F.A. An Introduction to Fluid Mechanics. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013.
Murray, Thomas Hamilton. Gen. John Sullivan and the Battle of Rhode Island: A Sketch of the
Former and a Description of the Latter. Providence: The American-Irish Historical
Society, 1902.

146

Muto, M., H. Watanabe, M. Tsubokura, and N. Oshima. “Negative Magnus Effect on a Rotating
Sphere at around the Critical Reynolds Number,” 13th European Turbulence Conference,
Journal of Physics: Conference Series, 318, 032021 (2011).
Narragansett Bay to Nantucket, Maptech Chart Kit, 2nd edition, region 3.1, map 1. Reproduced
from National Oceanic and Atomospheric Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce. Chart No. 13003 Georges Bank and Nantucket Shoals, 2011.
Norris, John. Artillery: A History. Stroud, Gloucestershire, U.K: The History Press, 2011.
Pluckhahn, Thomas J., Victor D. Thompson, Nicolas Laracuente, Sarah Mitchell, Amanda
Roberts, and Adrianne Sams. Archaeological Investigations at the Famous Crystal River
Site(8CI1) (2008 Field Season), Citrus County, Florida. Tampa, FL: Department of
Anthropology, University of South Florida, 2009.
Poche, D., George, P. “Solid Shot Essentials: A Guide to the Authentic and Non-Authentic”
Web. Accessed May 21, 2016.
http://www.pochefamily.org/books/solidshotessentialsmod.html, n.d..
Powel, H.W.H. “Early Defenses of Newport During the Siege in 1778,” Bulletin of the Newport
Historical Society, 47, (November 1923): 23-24.
Rice, Howard C. and Anne S. K. Brown, trans. and eds. The American Campaigns of
Rochambeau’s Army, 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783: The Journals of Clermont-Crèvecoeur,
Verger and Berthier. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

Schiff, Stacy. A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France and the Birth of America. New York:
Henry Holt, 2005.
Schroder, Walter K. The Hessian Occupation of Newport and Rhode Island, 1776-1779.
Westminster: Heritage Books, Inc., 2005.
Simpson, E. Treatise on Ordinance & Naval Gunnery. New York, 1962.
Spearman, M. L. and D. O. Braswell, “Aerodynamics of a sphere and an oblate spheroid for
Mach numbers from 0.6 to 10.5 including some effects of test conditions.” NASA
Technical Memorandum 109016. Hampton, Virginia, 1993.

147

Stensrud, Rockwell. Newport: A Lively Experiment. Newport, RI: Redwood Library and
Athenaeum and Rockwell Stensrud, 2006.

Stinson, Brian. “Newport Notables” Redwood Library & Athanaeum. 2004. Web. Accessed
August 15, 2016. http://www.redwoodlibrary.org/research-projects/newport-notables.
Taylor, Erich A. O’D. Campaign on Rhode Island. Newport: n.p., 1928.
Terry, Roderick. “The Story of Green End Fort,” Bulletin of Newport History 51 (October 1924):
7-15.
Thompson, V., M. D. Reynolds, B. Haley, R. Jefferies, J. K. Johnson and L. Humphries. “The
Sapelo Island Shell Rings: Shallow Geophysics on a Georgia Sea Island.” Southeastern
Archaeology 23(2), (2004). 191-201.
Walker, Anthony. So Few the Brave: Rhode Island Continentals, 1775-1783. Newport, RI:
Seafield Press, 1981.
Walsh, Kenneth M. and David S. Walsh. “Memo on Location of ‘Green End Fort.’” Newport
History 161, (Winter 1976): 1-16
Walsh, K. “The Story of the Analysis of Green End Fort.” Newport History 184, (Fall 1981):
113-122.
Whitridge, Arnold. Rochambeau: America’s Neglected Founding Father. New York: Macmillan
Company, 1965.
Wise, Jennings. Gunnery. Richmond, VA: B.F. Johnson Publishing Co., 1912.
Young, C. W. Penetration Equations SAND97-2426, October 1997.

148

Glossary
Military & Technological Terms, People & Places
Military Terminology
Abbatis: A barrier of cut tries with sharpened branches toward the enemy.
Enfilade: A volley of gunfire directed along a line from end to end.
Fascine: Bundles of branches used to fill ditches and swamps.
Fleche: A projecting, arrow or V-shaped outwork in a fortification.
Gabions: Wicker Baskets filled with dirt and rock used to build forts.
Gun Emplacement: A military installation consisting of a prepared position for sitting a
weapon.
Parapet: A protective wall or earth defense along the top of a trench or other place of
concealment for troops.
Rampart: A tall, thick stone or dirt wall that is built around a castle, town, etc., to protect it from
attacks.
Redoubt: A temporary or supplementary fortification, typically square or polygonal, without
flanking defenses.
Revetment: A barricade of earth or sandbags set up to provide protection from blast, protecting
a rampart, wall, etc.
Technological Terms
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR): A geophysical technique used to collect and record
information about the earth’s subsurface, by using radar pulses to map underlying archaeological
features without disturbing the soil.
MATLAB: Engineering software produced by MathWorks in Cambridge, MA, used to solve
engineering and scientific problems. It integrates computation, visualization, and programming
in an easy-to-use environment where problems and solutions are expressed in familiar
mathematical notation.
Reynolds number: A dimensionless number that gives a measure of the ratio of inertial forces
to viscous forces for given flow conditions. The Reynolds number is an important parameter that
describes whether flow conditions lead to laminar or turbulent flow.
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Major Players
General Henry Clinton: British army officer whose forces first captured Newport in 1776. In
1778 Clinton became commander in chief of British forces in America, following General
Howe’s retirement. Although his second in command, Lord Cornwallis, was responsible for the
loss at Yorktown, it was Clinton and not Cornwallis who received much of the blame upon
returning to England, after the war.
Admiral Comte d’Estaing: A nobleman with many years in the French military, first in the
army, then in the navy, d’Estaing was commander of the Toulon fleet ordered by King Louis
XVI to aid the American colonies in 1778. Years later, he was guillotined in Paris during the
Reign of Terror.
Major General Nathaniel Greene: Hailing from Rhode Island, Greene was manager of his
family’s iron foundry before the war and became commander of the State army in 1775. After
joining the Continental Army, he was quickly promoted to Major General and became one of
Washington’s most skilled and trusted officers. He was assigned to help Sullivan retake
Newport, in the hope that his local knowledge could be of use. Greene is largely remembered for
his strategic mind and for his part in the war’s Southern theater. His actions proved crucial in the
lead up to Yorktown, luring and exhausting Lord Cornwallis’ army throughout the South. After
the war, he settled in Georgia, where he died in 1786.
Admiral Richard Howe: Commander of naval forces during the American Revolution and
brother to General William Howe, who commanded the land forces.
General William Howe: A very successfully and decorated officer, Howe became Commanderin-Chief of British forces in America in April 1776, and remained in this position until his
retirement in 1778.
Major General Marquis de Lafayette: French aristocrat and army officer who volunteered for
the American Continental Army prior to French involvement in the war. Lafayette became a
close friend and aide to Washington and participated in numerous engagements throughout the
war, most notably helping to blockade Lord Cornwallis in the lead up to the Siege of Yorktown.
He was also vital in America’s dealings with France, both during the Rhode Island Campaign
and later helping Benjamin Franklin to secure 6,000 French soldiers under the command of
Rochambeau. Lafayette went on to be a key figure in the French Revolution of 1789 and in the
July Revolution of 1830.
Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie: British officer in the Royal Welch Fusiliers, who kept a
detailed diary during the American Revolution, recording his time stationed in Boston, Newport
and New York. His diary provides enormous insight and is widely quoted and cited throughout
this report.
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Major General Robert Pigot: British officer and aristocrat, Pigot distinguished himself early in
the war at the Battle of Bunker Hill. In 1777 he became 2nd baronet after the death of his brother
George. That same year, he took command of the British forces stationed at Newport and
successfully maintained hold of the city during the Siege and Battle of Rhode Island. Pigot
remained in command of Newport until 1779 and was succeeded by General Prescott. He died
in England in 1796.
Major General Richard Prescott: A twice-captured British officer known for being “insolent,
ill-tempered and supercilious.”248 Prescott was freed the first time in a prisoner exchange for
John Sullivan (who would later lead the campaign on Rhode Island). He came to Newport in
November 1776 and eventually became its commander. He was captured for the second time, in
an embarrassing incident in July 1777, by Major William Barton and a party of 40 Americans.
Eventually returning to Newport, he took part in the Siege and Battle of Rhode Island and
succeeded Pigot to command the city in 1779 until its abandonment. He died in England in
1788.
Lieutenant General Comte de Rochambeau: A French nobleman and the general in command
of French forces in the later years of the American Revolution. Rochambeau was stationed at
Newport from July 1780-1781. He led the French Army to aid Washington in the defeat of
British forces under Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, VA, virtually ending the war. During the
French Revolution he was nearly guillotined but ultimately evaded execution and was later
pensioned by Napoleon.
Major General John Sullivan: An attorney from New Hampshire, Sullivan joined the
Continental Army as an officer in 1775 and took part in the Siege of Boston the following
March. After being promoted to major general, he was captured during the Battle of Long Island
in 1776 but was exchanged in time to lead Washington’s right column at the Battle of Trenton.
After commanding the Rhode Island campaign at the age of thirty-eight, he found success on the
battlefield defeating the Iroquois Indians in western New York, but ultimately resigned before
the war’s end due to illness. He went on to become a delegate to the Continental Congress,
presided over his state’s ratification of the Constitution and later in life became governor of New
Hampshire.
Locations
See reference maps at end of glossary for a visual aid.
Aquidneck Island / Rhode Island: Comprised of the towns of Portsmouth (to the north),
Middletown (in the center) and Newport (to the south) it is the largest island in Narragansett Bay
in the State of Rhode Island. Originally called “Aquidneck” by the Narragansett tribe, it was later
renamed “Rhode Island” by early English settlers. Both the State of Rhode Island and the Battle
of Rhode Island are named for this geographic feature. Today it is widely referred to as
248

Boatner, 886.
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Aquidneck Island, although its official name remains Rhode Island. Throughout this report it is
called Aquidneck Island to avoid confusion with the state.
Bailey’s Brook: A brook on Aquidneck Island that runs into Easton’s Pond and was a major
obstacle to the Americans during the Siege of Newport.
Bliss Hill: A hill in Middletown, Rhode Island overlooking Easton’s Pond (to the east). It was
the site of the British Position during the Siege of Newport.
Bliss House: A house on the outskirts of Newport, used as the British field headquarters during
the Siege. Today it is called the Elder John Bliss House and is considered the oldest house in
Newport.
Conanicut Island: The second largest island in Narragansett Bay in the State of Rhode Island.
It is comprised of the town of Jamestown and is located between Aquidneck Island to the east
and the mainland to the west. Newport harbor faces this island.
Easton’s Beach: A beach located on the Newport - Middletown border on Aquidneck Island. It
is south of Easton’s Pond and during the Siege of Newport was held by the British on the west
end and the Americans on the east. It was another major obstacle for the Americans during the
Siege.
Easton’s Pond: A pond on Aquidneck Island, north of Easton’s Beach that is fed by Bailey’s
Brook, in Middletown, Rhode Island. It was a major obstacle to the Americans during the Siege.
Green End: The eastern most portion of Bliss Hill in Middletown, Rhode Island, which
overlooked Bailey’s Brook, Easton’s Pond and faced the American position at Honeyman Hill.
The British position at Card’s Redoubt and the French Redoute de Saintonge were both located
in this area.
Honeyman Hill: The hill, located to the east of Bailey’s Brook and Easton’s Pond in
Middletown, Rhode Island, where the American forces entrenched during the Siege.
Middletown: A town in the State of Rhode Island, located at the center of Aquidneck Island,
between Portsmouth to the north and Newport to the south. It was the location of the Siege of
Newport cannonading, at Bliss and Honeyman Hills, during the Battle of Rhode Island.
Narragansett Bay: A large bay in the state of Rhode Island, fed by the Providence, Taunton,
and Sakonnet Rivers. Its islands include, Rhode (Aquidneck), Connanicut, and Prudence Islands.
Newport: A port city in the State of Rhode Island, located at the southern end of Aquidneck
Island. It was one of the leading colonial ports before the Revolution, until it became occupied
by British forces from 1776 to 1779. Although the Siege took place mainly in Middletown, main
objective was to drive the British out and retake Newport.
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Newport Harbor: The harbor of the mercantile port city Newport, Rhode Island, located on the
southwest side of Aquidneck Island, facing Connanicut Island (Jamestown).
One Mile Corner: A local term for an intersection on Aquidneck Island at one of the town
lines. It is where Broadway in Newport becomes West Main Road in Middletown and is roughly
one mile from the seat of government in Newport.
Point Judith: A small cape on the southwestern side of Narragansett Bay, where it opens out
onto Rhode Island Sound.
Portsmouth: A town in the State of Rhode Island located on the northern end of Aquidneck
Island. It is where the American army both landed on the island when arriving form Tiverton
and retreated to after the ending the Siege in Middletown. It is also where major fighting took
place during the retreat.
Providence: The capital city of the State of Rhode Island, located at the mouth of the Providence
River and head of Narragansett Bay. While the British occupied Newport, Providence was a
Patriot stronghold and served as General John Sullivan’s headquarters prior to the Siege and
Battle of Rhode Island.
Sakonnet River: The name for the east passage of Narragansett Bay in Rhode Island, between
Tiverton and Little Compton to the east, and Aquidneck Island to the west.
Sandy Hook: A barrier spit in northern New Jersey, protruding into and sheltering part of Lower
New York Bay. Located just south of New York City, ships headed for this port had to pass by
Sandy Point en route. The British Navy stationed at New York used the strategic geography and
location of Sandy Hook to their advantage to protect both the city and their fleet.
Tiverton: A town in the State of Rhode Island located across the Sakonnet River from
Portsmouth on Aquidneck Island.
Tonomy Hill: Also part of the British outer line. It is the highest point on Aquidneck Island and
the location of Tonomy Hill Fort.
Two Mile Corner: A local term for the intersection on Aquidneck Island, where East Main
Road and West Main Road in Middletown, Rhode Island meet. It is one-mile north, up West
Main Road, from One Mile Corner and two miles from the seat of government in Newport.
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Reference Maps
The following maps visually show the location of the many places and landmarks listed in the
above glossary.

Figure R.1 Narragansett Bay in the State of Rhode Island, including many landmarks referenced throughout the
report.
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Figure R.2 Aquidneck (aka Rhode) Island, along with towns involved in the campaign, the Sakonnet River and the
area the Siege took place in.
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Figure R.3 The above map indicates the relation of the three major hills involved in the Siege and their locations in
context to one another.
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Figure R.5 The above map shows the locations of major roads that existed during the Siege, still exist and are
referenced thought out the report.
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Appendix A
Order of the Battle

Table A.1 Ships of the French Squadron under Admiral d’Estaing249

249

SHIP

GUNS

DRAFT (FT.)

GUN TYPES / ASSIGNMENT

Languedoc

80

25

30 x 30 lb., 32 x 24 lb, 18 x 8 lb

Tonnant

80

25

Cesar

74

22

Zele

74

22

Hector

74

23

Guerrier

74

23

Marseillais

74

22.4

Protecteur

74

22

Vaillant

64

21.6

Provence

64

21.6

Fantasque

64

21.6

Assigned to West Passage

Sagittaire

50

20

Assigned to West Passage

Chimere

26

15

26 x 8 lb

Engageante

26

15

Flore

26

15

Aimable

26

15

Assigned to Sakonnet River

Alcmene

26

15

Assigned to Sakonnet River

Hattendorf, 5-8

28 x 30 lb, 30 x 18 lb, 18 x 8 lb
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Table A.2 Head of Divisions in General Sullivan’s Army of 10,1124+ men.250

RANK

HEADS OF DIVISION

DIVISION

MEN

Maj. Gen.

Nathaniel Greene

John Glover

(Line)

1,131

James M. Varnum

(Line)

1,037

Ezekiel Cornell

(RI Mil)

1,719

Solomon Lovell

(Mass Mil)

1,158

Jonathan Titcob

(Mass Mil)

959

Whipple

(NH Mil)

John Tyler

(Conn. Mil)

Col. Cmdt

Christopher Greene

(RI Line)

1,626

Col.

William West

(RI Mil)

1,025

Aides

Col. John Trumbull

John Hancock
Marquis de La Fayette
Brigadiers
Brig. Gen.

Long
H. Sherburne
Maj. Russell
Eben Sullivan
Morris Lyman
Daniel Lyman
Mr. Rufus King
Medical Corps

250

Dr. Tillotson

Erich A. O’D. Taylor, Campaign on Rhode Island, (Newport, 1928) 15.
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Table A.3 Regimental Commanders in General Sullivan’s Army of 10,1124+ men.251
RANK

REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

REG.

MEN

Col.

H.B. Livingstone

4th NY

659

John Topham

1st RI

Thorndyke & Lt. Col. Wadsworth

(Mil)

Joseph Noyes

1st King's County

Charles Dyer

2nd King's County

John Langdon

with dragoons

Stock

with N.H. light horse

Gower & Richard Gridley

with artillery

John Crane

3rd Continental Artillery

S. Burbanks

(Mass) bombs

Maj.

Nathaniel Eyres

(Pa) carpenters

Col.

Daniel Evens, Pa.
Whitworth
Christopher Lippitt

2nd RI (Mil)

W.R. Lee

boats

John Doggett

Mass (Mil)

Lt. Col.

Olney

RI line

Col.

Henry Jackson

line

Edward Wigglesworth

13th Mass line

Israel Angell

2nd RI line

Nathaniel Wade

Mass

Lt. Col.

Francois Fleury

engineer

Maj.

Silas Talbot

1st RI

Col.

John Laurens

(aide to Washington)

Col.

John Jacobs

Mass Mil

Lt. Col.

Ebenezer Sprout

4th Mass

M. de Touched

artillery

Col.

251

Taylor, 15

810
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Table A.4 British, Hessian, and Provincial (loyalist) Forces at Newport under the
Command of General Pigot252

CORPS

MEN

CORPS

Royal Artillery

592

Jager

532

16th Light Dragoons

121

Linsing

306

17th Light Dragoons

143

Lingercke

336

1st Light Infantry

334

Landgrave

301

2ed D

386

Koehler

314

1st Grenadiers

346

Ditforth

421

2ed D

300

Prince Carl

463

Fort Guards

755

Trumbach

455

7th Regiment

260

Prince Hereditaire

408

17th Regiment

259

Donch

423

23rd Regiment

259

Mirbach

400

26th Regiment

239

Losberg

279

33rd Regiment

334

Knynhauwen

303

37th Regiment

284

Arillery

350

42nd Regiment

536

44th Regiment

261

47th Regiment

387

63rd Regiment

262

British

6,601

64th Regiment

301

German

5,291

2 Co. Garrison Battalion

179

Provincials

1,769

Provincials

TOTAL

252

MEN

DFM, Vol. 1, 2

1,769

13,661
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Table A.5 Admiral Howe’s British fleet of warships that left Sandy Hook, NJ for Newport
to engage the French fleet.253

SHIPS OF THE LINE
Cornwall
Raisonnable
Eagle
Trident
Nonsuch
Sumerset
St. Albans
Ardent
Preston
Centurion
Renown
Experiment
Isis

GUNS ON BOARD
74 guns (1 x 74 guns)
64 guns
64 guns
64 guns
64 guns
64 guns
64 guns
64 guns (7 x 64 guns)
50 guns
50 guns
50 guns
50 guns
50 guns (5 x 50 guns)

FRIGATES
Phoenix
Roebuck
Venus
Richmond
Pearl
Apollo
Sphynx
Vigilant
Nautilus

GUNS ON BOARD
44 guns
44 guns (2 x 44 guns)
36 guns (1 x 36 guns)
32 guns
32 guns
36 guns (1 x 32 guns)
20 guns
20 guns (2 x 20 guns)
16 guns (1 x 16 guns)

253

DFM, 2: 332; Hattendorf, 5-7.

Cornwallis

Sent to NY

162

(Table A.5 continued)
50 gun ships

3

44 gun ships

2

Small frigates

8 (L 108 ft., B 30 ft., D 9'7", guns 20 x 9 lb (Sphinx sent to NY)

Fire Ships

3

Total
Bomb vessels
Galleys
Bomb tender

13 ships of the line, 13 small ships and frigates, 3 fire ships =
29 warships
3 (sent to NY)
4 (sent to NY)
2 (sent to NY)
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Appendix B
The following text was prepared by Ralph C. Weiss. All maps shown are in the collections of the
William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan.
Maps of the Battle of Rhode Island, by Ralph C. Weiss
There are at least three dozen maps that show information concerning the Battle for
Rhode Island. The Middletown Historical Society Research Team was able to obtain a number
of maps, sketches and charts to identify the 1778 battlefield in Middletown from the William L
Clements Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Only 12 maps identify the
Middletown fortifications or shed significant detail surrounding the events that took place in
August of 1778. All maps shown in this presentation are the courtesy of William L Clements
Library.
The “Plan of the Town and Environs of Newport Rhode Island” (Figure 1) signed by the
British chief engineer Abraham D’Aubant, provides a graphic illustration of the Middletown
battlefield. Dated 1779, this map shows the British fortifications in the first and second line of
defense to the north and east of Newport. The map is signed but it is extremely doubtful that it
was drawn by D’Aubunt. When looking at the upper right-hand quadrant of this map, the 1778
Edward Fage map of the same area (Figure 3) should be reviewed.
This map provides information concerning the British defenses and the American forces’
covered works that may have been in place at the time of the Siege in August 1778. However,
after studying Figure 3, even this information is in doubt. There are two folio sheets that must be
put together to provide the picture of the battlefield in Middletown as it developed from August
8th to August 25th. The two sheets are fitted together one over-the-top of the other with the
legend sheet on the bottom.
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Figure 1 Map drawn in 1779 by British commanding engineer Abraham D’Aubant, depicting the works built August 8
th
254
– 29 for the Siege and proposed defenses yet to be built.
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When put together the map measures 41 ¾ by 50 ½ inches and is drawn to scale of 1 inch to 500
feet. All soundings are in fathoms. This is a highly accurate, detailed, finished colored
topographical map. The shoreline coloring is not traditional blue but a very light green. This is
the obvious giveaway that these pieces belong together. The upper half shows the area of Valley
Road, Easton’s Pond upper and lower, and all the land, to the west, including Newport Harbor
and Goat Island (Figure 1).
In March 1777, D’Aubant sent a report to Gen. Howe in New York which describes the
work undertaken from December 8, 1776 to March 31, 1777. It includes an activity report that
describes the project plans being developed for the fortifications. In the correspondence, he
gives a picture of the engineering department activity in Newport. This map shows the
disposition of British and Hessian troops for the defense of Newport. D’Aubant laid out this
plan in a written document in August 1777 and received direction from Gen. Clinton to proceed.
On November 21, 1777, he sent a letter to New York concerning the fortifications. This letter
was approved by General Pigot. He made the endorsement and gave directions of things that he
wanted accomplished. In the endorsement the first fortification of the outer defense line to the
northwest of Newport he describes the area as being “Shefield to Tomini.” This is the only time
this description is ever used on any of the British maps examined. It may be that this part of the
outer line was moved further south to provide a defensive line between the North Battery and
Tomini(sic) Hill. The chain of fortifications that compose the outer line were to be manned by a
total of 840 men.255 This map exhibits the defenses prior to August 8, 1778. It also shows the
French fleet as they entered the harbor and engaged the British batteries and the works that were
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D’Aubant, 1779. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
Adams, Randolph G., British Headquarters Maps and Sketches, The William L. Clements Library, 1928, page127
through 133.
255
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raised that day until the Siege was lifted on August 29th. It includes the proposed work to be
accomplished in 1779 for the defense Newport and the rebel batteries that were erected along
with the number of canon or armament and the date on which these fortifications started firing.
This is an extremely comprehensive map and is the key to the Siege of Newport and the
Middletown battlefield. This is the only map that shows the location of the British headquarters
on Spring Street at the head or east end of what appears to be Green Street The information
contained in the legend is so important that it has been enlarged and displayed here (Figure 2).
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Figure 2 The legend for the 1779 D’Aubant map (Figure 1). Listing both completed and proposed defenses.

256

D’Aubant, 1779. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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The “Plan of the Works Which Form the Exterior Line of Defence, for the Town of Newport in Rhode Island…” (Figure 3) is signed by Edward Fage, November 1778, and is drawn to
the scale of 1 inch to 500 feet. All soundings are in fathoms, and it shows the outer line (first
line) of defense that the British used during the siege of Newport. This finished, colored,
topographical map shows a very small part of the northeast corner of the inner line (second line
of defense) that was set up. It shows the American covered trench works that came down the
west side of Honeyman Hill across what is today Aquidneck Avenue and down to the southwest
and across Green End Avenue. The map is 26 by 17 ½ inches and shows topographical detail of
the defensive works, batteries, bastions and entrenchments. This map is unique because it shows
the the dates when the defenses were changed and even though the map is dated November 8,
1778. There is a plan named, “Plan of and Entrenchment with Redoubts, ordered by Maj. Gen.
Pigot to be thrown up, for the Defense of the Town of Newport, begun the September Quarter,
No.16,” that was probably never accomplished based on the information contained on this map.
It shows fortifications built from August to October 1778, which makes it more important than
the map shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 3 Map of the British and American works used during the Siege and drawn by Fage in November 1778.
257
Defenses like Fort Fanning, that were in the process of being built when the map was drawn are also included.
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The “Plan of Rhode Island surveyed and drawn by Edward Fage in the years 1777 78 and
79” (Figure 4) is a map of the entire island of Rhode Island (Aquidneck Island), and is drawn to
scale of 1 inch to 2000 feet. This map was made on two sheets of paper and its title is in a note
on the lower right-hand corner of the main sheet. The larger piece measures 21 ¼ by 37 ½”, and
is attached at the lower left side (west) to another sheet that measures 4 ½ by 23 ¾ inches. The
map is a finished, colored, topographical map showing Rhode Island and part of Conanticut
Island, along with soundings and distances. There is a large amount of detail on this map. It
shows clearly the Rebel trench works coming down the west side of Honeyman Hill. Most
importantly it shows which houses were destroyed throughout the island during the British
occupation. It also shows where ships were scuttled in the harbor, distances between various
points, major fortifications, soundings, and a list of all the major landholders throughout the
island. The information was important because the British knew they were going to have to
house their troops. This map was certainly used by D’Aubant to draw up the defenses for
Newport. It is the only map found thus far that shows the Headley House just southwest of
Turkey Hill.
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Fage, Plan of the works, 1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Figure 4 The full “Plan of Rhode-Island” surveyed and drawn by Fage in 1777, 1778 and 1779.
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Fage, Plan of Rhode Island, 1779. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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“Plan of the Town of Newport in the adjacent Country with a Project for its Defense”
(Figure 5), is a finished colored topographical map of the town and the surrounding country side
for approximately two miles. This map has a border, a title block and is the third most
significant map of the Middletown battlefield. Edward Fage, who was an artillery officer, was
primarily interested in the distance for artillery fire. Hence all of his drawings include distances.
The scale of the map is 1 inch equals 1000 feet and measures 10 ½ by 20 inches. There is no
legend or index that corresponds to the survey for the angles for point A through L. Points M
through P no doubt anticipate landing points for a possible amphibious invasion.
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Figure 5 The map by Edward Fage displaying the plans for Newport’s defenses.
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Fage, Edward, Plan of the Town of Newport And the Adjacent Country, With a Project for Its Defence, 1777.
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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The below, incomplete, map (Figure 6) is by Edward Fage according to the Clements
Library catalog. It is a colored topographical map drawn to scale of 1 inch to 2000 feet. It also
has a scale for feet, yards, and miles in the lower left corner. The soundings are important
because the French flag ship drew 34 feet of water which made her passage extremely
vulnerable. The map is significant as it shows the French fleet arriving in Newport and
penetrating the west passage, which is titled “Narragansett passage.” It shows the first rate ship
of the line entering Newport harbor and firing on the British positions on Goat Island.
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Figure 6 The unfinished map of lower Narragansett Bay, attributed to Fage.
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Fage, Edward, Newport County, Ca., 1779. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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“A Chart of The Harbour of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay….” (Figure 7), was
printed by J.F.W. Des Barres in 1778. It shows the disposition of the British fleet and
approximately where the various British ships were sunk when the French fleet entered the
Narragansett Bay, Newport Harbor and the Sakonnet River. This is a beautiful map that has at
least seven different states. While the map is highly accurate and is based on a survey made by
Blaskowitz, who reported to Samuel Holland, there are a few things that are misplaced. The
covered trench works shown in Middletown have no explanation and are not properly placed.
Des Barres had returned to England in 1774 and convinced the British government to give him
accessed to all the information coming in from the colonies so he could print maps. The
information for this map came through the Colonial Office. Therefore, he had no firsthand
knowledge of exactly where the covered works were dug or where the ships were sunk from the
written description of the events that he was receiving. This map of Narragansett Bay is of such
high accuracy that it was a standard for the next 75 years. Map makers use others surveys for
information and incorporate it into their work. Even today the USGS survey maps still show a
British unit marked on the north end of the island with no explanation.
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Figure 7 Chart of the Harbor of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay printed by J.F.W. Des Barres in 1778.
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Des Barres, Joseph F.W.. A Chart of the harbor of Rhode Island and Narraganset Bay surveyed in pursuance of
directions from the Lords of Trade to his majesty’s surveyor general for the northern district of North America:
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The Charles Frederick William Mielatez map titled “MAP of the MILITARY
OPRRATIONS in 1777 – 78, Rhode Island” (Figure 8) was published as Plate II in Major
General George W. Cullum’s book, Historical Sketches of the Fortifications in Defense of
Narragansett Bay, Washington, 1884. This map was copied from a map in the collections of the
Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston, Massachusetts and it was actually drawn by J.
Denison. It was drawn to a scale of 1 inch equals1 miles and has a black and white border. The
original, which has discolored with age, shows the various units of the opposing forces. There is
a legend in the lower left corner. Another original of this map exists in the Rhode Island
Secretary of State Office in Providence, Rhode Island. Therefore, there are two known original
maps by J. Denison showing the retreat of the American forces from the Siege of Newport from
August 24 through August 31, 1778. Edward Field stated a third copy may have been sent to the
State of Connecticut, however, a search was made some years ago and it was determined that
there were no records of such a map.
This map shows the disposition of the American troops at the north end of the island, and
it shows them leaving the island and taking up positions on the Tiverton Heights. It also shows
the French fleet as it departs Newport Harbor. This shows clearly that without naval support and
the support of the French army, which was to attack from the west, the battle was lost. If this
battle had been won in August 1778, there would have been no Yorktown and a great number of
American and British lives would have been saved. It would have been the second major British
Army defeat in North America, the first being at the Battle of Saratoga in 1777. The sentiment

Published at the request of the right honourable Lord Viscount Howe / by J.F.W. Des Barres esq. London: J.F.W.
Des Barres, 1776. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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in England would not have allowed the American Revolution to continue. Most American
historians concede this fact.
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Figure 8 The map of the battlefield of the Siege and Battle of Rhode Island.

The “Plan of the Position of His Majesty’s Troops at Rhode Island, after the defeat of the
Rebels the 29th of August 1778” (Figure 9) may have been drawn by a Hessian soldier. It is a
colored map (done in red, blue and black) showing the disposition of British ships and military
units throughout the island. This map has stylized trees casting their shadow in the east-west
direction. The map is drawn to scale of 1 inch equals approximately 1 mile. It measures 11 ½
by 18 ½ inches. There is an unusual compass rose showing west as the direction arrow. This
map is not entirely accurate. It does show some of the fortifications in their correct position but
they are not correctly drawn. Further still, several landmarks are labeled with alternative names
or spellings. Coaster Harbor Island is called Smallpox Island263, Tomini Hill is called Domini
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Mielatz, Charles Frederick William. Map of the military operations in 1777-78 on Rhode Island. 1883. William
L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
263
In the 18th and 19th centuries this island was used to contain out breaks of small pox and other epidemics. A
portion of a small pox cemetery still remains on the island today. Due to this use Coasters Harbor Island was
frequently referred to in past centuries as “Pest Island” or “Small Pox Island.”
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Hill, and Honeyman Hill is called Haman Hill. The use and spelling of “Domini Hill” and
“Haman Hill” further suggest that a Hessian may have been involved in the creation of this map.

Figure 9 The likely hessian-drawn map of the island showing the defenses.
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Plan of the position of his majesty’s troops at Rhode Island, after the defeat of the rebels the 29 th of August 1778.
1778. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
264
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The Newport Harbor map draft (Figure 10) has no title or border. It was surveyed by
Charles Blaskowitz with a 17-man survey party in late October 1774. Ezra Stiles, the
Congregational minister and prominent Newport resident, referenced it on October 25, 1774, in
his diary. One of the interesting things about this this map is as a survey map it would have
typically been destroyed. The map shows a penciled-in fort on Goat Island and this
configuration of the outer walls lasted well into the 19th century. The North Battery which was
built by the British when they occupied Newport is not shown. However, the fields of fire for
such a fortification are clearly penciled in to protect Rose Island and to provide a clear field of
fire to the Newport Harbor entrance, clearly missing the fort on Goat Island. The North Battery
was the west end of the British inner line during the Siege of Newport. drawn on a plane table
and the grid used can clearly be seen. The map measures 17 by 15 inches and although there is
no scale shown, it appears to be made to the scale of 1 inch equals 500 feet. The inshore
measurements of the water depth are given in feet whereas further out it is given in fathoms.
The Newport Harbor draft map (Figure 10) was the basis for the one commonly seen
today titled, “A Plan of the town of Newport in Rhode Island” surveyed by Charles Blaskowitz
and engraved and published by William Faden, September 15, 1777 (Figure 11).265 In this map,
the main survey line used is just north of Spring Street. The final version (Figure 11) has
numbers on it that correspond to a list containing the street names. Trinity Church is listed as
well as the first Congregational Church and their locations are shown. The list of the street
names is not provided on the earlier draft version (Figure 10).
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It was also the basis for “A Plan of the Town of Newport” published be F.B. W. Des Barres in 1776.
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Figure 10 The draft map of Newport Harbor surveyed by Blaskowitz in 1774.
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266

Blaskowitz, Charles, Untitled map of Newport Harbor. Newport, RI, 1774. William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan.
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Figure 11 The final version of the Newport Harbor map surveyed by Blaskowitz (1774), and engraved and published
267
by William Faden in 1777.

The French map, “Plan De La Ville, Rade, et Environs de Newport…" (Figure 12) of
1780 shows the 35 fortifications of the French army, the 13 rebuilt British fortifications, the six
British forts left in ruin, the seven campsites of the French army, and the nine major ships of the
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Blaskowitz, Charles, and William Faden. A Plan of the Town of Newport In Rhode Island. (London: Willm. Faden,
Charing Cross), 1777. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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line of the French Navy. It also shows the positions of the sunken British ships used to protect
the North Battery in 1778. The map is a finished colored topographical map drawn to scale of 1
inch to 100 toise.268 The actual dimensions of the map are unknown.

268

1 Toise = 6 old French feet or 6.4 English feet.
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Figure 12 The 1780 French map detailing additions and alterations to the battlefield.
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Colbert, Edouard Charles Victurnien, Comte de Maulevrier. Plan de la ville, rade, et environs de Newport en
Rode Island, avec le campement de l'armée Françoise prés de cette place en 1780. la disposition des ouvrages
qu'elle à excuté et le mouillage de l'escadre. 1783 [ca. 1783]. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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Appendix C
The following text covers excerpts from historical newspapers including, the Providence Gazette
(Providence, RI), Massachusetts Spy (Worcester, MA) and the Royal Gazette (New York, NY). All
articles included pertain to the Battle of Rhode Island, its lead up and aftermath, and are
displayed chronologically. They were selected, studied and transcribed by James Rehill.

Battle of Rhode Island in Historical Newspapers
Transcribed Articles
20 June 1778
Providence Gazette: Letter from General John Sullivan to General Pigot270
“Sir, the repeated application of the discussed Families of those Persons who were captured by
your Troops on the 25th…induce me to write you upon the Subject. As those Men were not
in...Service, or found in Arms, I cannot conceive what were the Motives for taking them, or
guess the Terms upon which their Release may be obtained… the War, on the Part of Britain,
been founded in Justice; and had your Troops, in their [Excellence], completed the Destruction
of the Boats, and our military Preparations in that Quarter, without wantonly destroying
defenceless Towns, burning Houses...to the Deity, plundering and abusing innocent Inhabitants,
and dragging from their peaceful [Habitations] unarmed and offending Men, such an Expedition
might have shone with splendor. - It is now darkened with savage Cruelty, and stained with
[undeniable] Disgrace.
“In your last Letter to me, you gave it as your Opinion, that the Inhabitants of America, at
large, would entertain more favourable Sentiments of the Views and Intentions of Great-Britain,
than I seemed inclined [to have]. If, Sir, the unprecedented Cruelty of your Troops, displayed
upon ever petty Advantage, since the Commencement of this Conflict; the inhuman and
unexampled Treatment of Prisoners, who by the Fortune of War, have fallen into your Power,
had not sufficiently convinced the Inhabitants of the United States, that they had nothing to
270
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expect from that Nation, but a Continuance of those tyrannical and cruel Measures which drove
them to a separation; the Conduct of your Party…late Excursion, must have stamped it with
Infallible Certainty.
“The Law of Retaliation has not as yet been exerted by the Americans. Humanity has
marked the line of their Conduct thus far, even though they knew that their Tenderness was
attributed to…; but if a Departure from the Laws of Humanity can in any Instance be justified, it
must be when such relentless Destroyers are entrapped by the Vigilance of the Party invaded.
Perhaps….Period, the Americans, fired with Relentless… accumulated Injuries; wearied with the
long… or a humane Conduct, which has only been regarded with… and Insult… despairing to
mitigate the Honors of War, by… in the Practice of a Virtue, which their Enemies seem to have
banished from their Minds; may, by suddenly executing the Law of Retaliation, convince
Britons, that they have mistaken the Motives of American Clemency, and is… too long with
undeserved… should such an Event take Place, the unhappy Sufferers may charge their
Misfortune to the Commanding Officers of the British Army in this Country, whose mistaken
Conduct has weaned the Afflictions of Americans from your Nation, driven them to disavow
Allegiance to your Sovereign, and at length routed them to Acts of Retaliation.
“I should not have wrote you so particularly upon this subject, had I not observed, in the
Newport Gazette, that the Conduct of your Troops, employed on the late Expedition, had receive
your Approbation, and warmest Thanks.
“Your favoring me with a Line, informing upon what Terms a Release of those
unfortunate Persons may be obtained, will much oblige, Sir,
Your most obedient and very humble Servant,
JOHN SULLIVAN”

Providence Gazette: Letter from General Pigot to General Sullivan271

271
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“Sir, I received your very extraordinary Letter, and as you request nothing more than the Favour
of a Line to inform you upon what Terms the Prisoners taken on the 25th of last Month can be
obtained, it is unnecessary to trouble you with a Reply to any other Part of your Letter.
“You are pleased to say, you cannot conjecture upon what Terms their Release may be
obtained; You certainly must know, that by the Laws of this Country every Man above sixteen,
and under sixty, is...to serve as a Soldier, under very severe Penalties; and have Generals and
Field Officers appointed to lead them, whenever called forth; and I have no Doubt but many of
those very Persons, whom you call peaceable Inhabitants of this Island, by General Spencer. This
being the case, I do not see there can be any Objection made to their being exchanged for
Soldiers or Seamen. Any one who does not come under the above Description, of being between
sixteen and sixty, shall, upon your pointing him out, be immediately set at Liberty, without any
Exchange, Should this Proposal be agreeable to you. I am ready to make the Exchange as soon as
you please; but in case it does not meet with your Approbation, I am sorry to acquaint you, that
not having it in my Power to accommodate the Prisoner so conveniently and well as I could wish
to do, must be under the Necessity, when an Opportunity offers, of sending them to New York,
where they will be better attended to, and more at large, and I wish I could say their Exchange
more easily effected.
“I am, Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
ROBERT PIGOT.”

Providence Gazette: Letter to General Sullivan from a General Officer in the American
Army272
“The Enemy have every Thing in Readiness to [make] their Departure from Philadelphia. It is
reduced to a moral Certainty that they mean to march through Jersey. They were under Orders to
proceed this Morning, but were prevented by the Commissioners arriving last Evening from
England. They are, the Earl of [Carlisle], Governor Johnstone, and Mr. Eden, Brother to the late
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Governor of Maryland. Lord Cornwallis is with them, but in what Capacity I am not able to say I do not imagine this will prevent them from leaving the City; It may possibly delay them a few
Days.
“One County in England rose in Rebellion, in Consequence of the Attempt to raise a new
Regiment upon Subscription. The Master went to a great Length; but I am not fully ascertained
of the Particulars.”
Last Week several Transports arrived at Rhode Island from New York, and bought a
Reinforcement of what are called the new Levies, alias Tories; their Numbers not known.
Thursday last Brigadier General Varnum arrived here from the Grand Army in
Pennsylvania.
We Learn, from good Authority, that the British Commissioners are arrived at
Philadelphia from England; and that some Dispatches, relative to the Negotiation proposed by
them, have been forwarded by Express to Congress.
We hear that a Cartel is settled, and that a general Exchange of Prisoners will speedily
take Place.
The Privateeer Ship Blaze-Castle, Capt. James Munro, of this Port, has taken a small
Cruiser, of two 6 Pounders, and 4 Swivels, fitted out at Antigua. She had taken several Prizes
before Capt. Munro met with her. The Blaze-Castle has also taken a Vessel with dry Goods, and
a Brig of 130 Tons, laden with Wine, and a Schooner with slaves. The three former are safe
arrived, but the Schooner has been re-taken.

18 July 1778
Providence Gazette: Letter to General Sullivan (USA) from an Officer at Bristol273
“The Enemy landed last Night on Hog-Island, and with their usual Spirit attacked and
burnt an empty House and barn, together with some Hay which had been cut by the Inhabitants
and through Neglect was left on the island.”

273

"Letter to General Sullivan from an Officer at Bristol." Providence Gazette 18 July 1778: 3. America's Historical
Newspapers. Web.

189

Monday last a Number of the Enemy’s Ships and smaller Vessels went up the Western
Sound from Newport, bound to New York or Long Island. The next Day 21 Sail were observed
coming down Sound; one of them, a Sloop, ran on a Reef of Rocks, but was got off; her Boat, on
board which was a Captain in the British Land Service, three or four Seamen, and several
American Prisoners, was brought on Shore by the latter, who inform that the last mentioned Fleet
had on board 2000 Invalids bound to Rhode Island.
Wednesday last General Sullivan reviewed the Troops stationed at Bristol, Swansey and
Tiverton, when Salutes were fired from the Batteries in those Towns. The Men made an
excellent Appearance and performed the Manoeuvres and Firings with great Alertness and
military Order.
Captain George Allen, who lately sailed from this Port in a small Privateer, has taken a
Vessel laden with Coal, and carried her into New London.

22 July 1778
Royal Gazette: New York, July 22274
The following is a list of the Toulon fleet off Sandy Hook, under the command of the Compte
D’Estaing;
Ships

Commanders

Guns

Men

Le Languedoc

D’Estaing

94

1160

Le Tonnane

Bougainville

80

1100

Le Caesar

Le Brave

74

900

Le Hector

Moliere

74

900

Le Guerrier

74

900

Le Protecteur

74

900

Le Marseillels

74

900

Le Zele

74

900

64

700

Le Vaillant
274
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La Provence

64

700

Le Fantasque

64

700

Le Sagittaire

54

500

L’Engageant

26

300

La Chimere

26

300

Le Clement

26

300

Three ships [were] sent by Le Compte D’Estaing (names unknown) to the river
Delaware.
….Yesterday it was reported that an engagement had happened between a French frigate
of 28 guns, and his Majesty’s ship Greyhound, Captain Dixon, and that after a fierce battle the
Frenchman yielded and was carried into Rhode Island.

25 July 1778
Providence Gazette: Newport, July 16275
Last evening a fleet from New York, in which came his Excellency Major General Prescott, with
his Majesty’s 38th regiment, two regiments of [Anspach], Col. Fanning’s new raised corps, and a
detachment of royal artillery.

30 July 1778
Massachusetts Spy: Hartford, July 28276
….The Brigades of Generals Glover and Varnum are on their march to the Eastward.

275

"Newport, July 16." Providence Gazette 25 July 1778: 3. America's Historical Newspapers. Web.
"Hartford, July 28." Massachusetts Spy [Worcester, MA] 30 July 1778: 2. America's Historical Newspapers.
Web.
276

191

We have an account of the arrival of another Squadron of the French fleet; ‘tis supposed
to be at Newport.
We learn that a number of the best pilots are gone on board the French fleet likewise
several gentlemen well acquainted with the coasts and harbours.
As the Count de Estaing will doubtless be eager to improve the present favourable
moment, we every hour expect accounts of the most important and interesting events.

Massachusetts Spy: New London, July 24.277
On Saturday a flag from hence sailed for Newport, with a number of British Prisoners and
returned again on Tuesday night with one American and seven Frenchmen; by these we learn
that the fleet mentioned in our last to have gone down the Sound, from New York to Newport,
had upwards of 3000 Hessian Troops on board, whom they landed on Conanicut Island - that the
enemy are fortifying Brenton’s Point. Conanicut, and Beavertail, at the Lighthouse that they had
received intelligence of the French fleet’s arrival on this coast, by a brig which fell in with them,
but made her escape and afterwards got into Newport; that this account put them in great
consternation; since which the American prisoners had received much better treatment; but that
they are still very sickly. Among the prisoners who came in this... is a Frenchman, who has been
but 24 days from Martinico; he informs, that a fleet of 18 sail of Spanish men of war was shortly
to sail from the Havannah, to join the French Squadron on the coast.

1 August 1778
Providence Gazette: Providence, August 1278
Wednesday… the great... of every good Subject, the Fleet of his Most Christian Majesty, the
great and wise Ally of these States, commanded by Admiral Count d’Estaing… Point of Judith,
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when a Number of [Persons] belonging to this Town went immediately on board, and brought
them safe to Anchor off the Harbour of Newport, whereby our savage Enemies are in
their….blockaded. On Thursday two French Ships of the Line came up the West Side of
Conanicut, and took their Stations above the North End of that Island; several Shot were fired at
them as they passed, and a few returned; the Enemy’s Ship which lay there got under Sail on the
near Approach of our Friends, and entered Newport Harbour by the West Side of Conanicut.
Their Troops soon after evacuated Conanicut, and fled to Rhode Island, having previously...up
the Magazine, spiked their Cannon, destroyed the… and set Fire to the Barracks. The
[Kingfisher], of 16 Guns with two Gallies, were blown up by the Enemy in Sakonnet River, on
the Approach of two other French Ships. The Britons, with their friends the... are in great
Consternation; and a few… will probably produce Events of the utmost Importance.
The French have brought in 15 Sail of Prizes, one of them a ship bound to New York,
laden with… among which are six large Mortars, and a Quantity of Shells.
The Honorable Major General Sullivan, with his [Suite], went on board the French
Admiral’s ship on Thursday last, and yesterday returned to…
On Thursday Major General Greene arrived at… Seat in East Greenwich, from the
American Army; and yesterday came to town Brigadier-General Glover.
Yesterday two Boats landed on Conanicut, and brought off some Beds, a Number of
Hogs, and two Hessians.
The Navigation in this Port is now open by Way of [Sakonnet] and the West Passage.
On Thursday a vessel arrived here from Stonington.
Since our last several Deserters have arrived here from Rhode Island, who inform that the
Enemy’s Troops Consist of between 5 and 6000 men; more than one Half of them Hessians; The
latter were greatly dissatisfied on hearing of a French fleet being on the Coast; the Britons
endeavoured to pacify them by suggesting that the French Admiral intended nothing more than
to… with the Rebels. The Harbour being now blocked up, the Hessians will have an Opportunity
of judging what Kind of Trade is proposed, and were then on the Main; would doubtless desert in
great Numbers.
The Deserters likewise inform that the Enemy intend to destroy all their Ships, if they
find it impracticable to defend them.
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Providence Gazette: Navy-Board, Boston, July 18279
All Officers and Seamen, belonging to any Continental Ship or Vessel of War, within the Eastern
Department, now absent on the recruiting service, or otherwise, are hereby required immediately
to repair on board their several Ships; and all Seamen now in America, who regard the Liberty of
Mankind, or the Honor of the United States of America, as well as their own Advantage, are now
earnestly entreated to enter immediately on board some of the Continental Vessels, in order to
afford all possible Aid and Assistance to His Most Christian Majesty’s Fleet, under the
Command of the Count de Estaing, the Vice-Admiral of France, now in the American seas, for
the Purpose of assisting these American States in vanquishing a haughty and cruel Enemy, too
long triumphant on these Seas, now is the Time to secure to yourselves Safety in your future
Voyages, and to avoid the Cruelties which all those experience who have the Misfortune to be
captured by the Britons; and now is the Time to make your Fortunes.

6 August 1778
Massachusetts Spy: Worcester, August 6280
A considerable body of men, are by this time assembled at Rhode Island, as the militia of this
state, who were ordered thither, are chiefly arrived, also two brigades of continental troops, so
that we may soon expect interesting intelligence from that quarter.
We hear the State of New Hampshire are raising men very fast for the expedition.
A list of line of battle ships, etc. under the command of Lord Howe, at Sandy Hook, 21st
July, 1778.
Ship

Guns

Leviathan

70

24

Somerset

64

32

Ardent

64

24

Trident

64

24

279
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[Nonsuch]

64

24

Eagle

64

24

St. [Albans]

64

24

[Isis]

50

18

Experiment

50

12

Roebuck

44

18

Phoenix

44

18

Venus, Frigate 36
Besides several 32 gun frigates, 20 gun ships, a sloop of 16 guns.. and 1 fire-ship.
Extract of a letter from an American naval officer dated Philadelphia July 12, 1778:
“I came over in the French fleet, and send you an account of the same which you’ll show our
friends. The ships under command of Vice Admiral Count D’Estaing are:
Ship

Guns

Ship

Languedoc

90

Guerrier

[Tonanne]

80

[Fantasque]

Guns

Frigates

Guns

74

Chimere

36

64

[L’Engageant]

36
Cesar

74

Provence

64

[Clement]

74

[Vaillant]

64

[L’Arimable]

[Hector]

74

[Sagitaire]

50

Marseillels

74

Protecteur

74

36
Zele
26

Besides the fleet that sailed with Count D’Estaing, there are five French ships of forte,
gone to Virginia with supplies of various kinds for the States, and designing to return to France
loaded with tobacco, etc. ...one of 50 guns; two of 40, and two of 32 guns. These ships were put
under the direction of Beaumarchais, one of the French ministers, noted for his affection to the
American cause, and though they belong to the King, came out under the appearance of
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merchantmen. This fleet, it is said, is soon expected to join the Count D’Estaing, and act for a
season under his orders.”
Gen. Prescott is the Commander in chief of the enemy’s forces at Rhode-Island.

8 August 1778
Providence Gazette: Providence, August 8281
Sunday last the Marquis de la Fayette arrived here from the grand American Army, and on
Thursday set out for the Camp at Tiverton.
On Monday Generals Varnum and Glover’s Brigades, with two Companies of the Train
of Artillery, arrived here from White Plains, and have since marched to the Southward.
Thursday last a Company of Volunteers arrived here from Salem, to serve in the intended
Expedition against the Enemy on Rhode Island. A great Number of Volunteers are likewise
expected from Newburyport, Boston, and several Towns in Connecticut.
Yesterday the Honorable Major-General Sullivan left this Place, to take upon him the
Command of the Army destined for the [Redaction] of Rhode Island.
Monday last seven Prizes, taken by His Most Christian Majesty’s Squadron, arrived safe
at this Port; one of them a Sloop of War, called the York; the others laden with Sugar, Rum,
Coffee, etc.
The Fleet have also taken a sloop laden with [Pines]...Limes, Turtle, etc.
Two Hundred and Forty-five Prisoners, taken in the above Prizes, have been since
conducted here by Land from Point Judith, and sent on board a Guard-Ship prepared for their
Reception.
Wednesday last, on the appearance of two French Men of War on the East Side of
Conanicut, the Enemy ran four of their Frigates and a Galley ashore on Rhode Island, and soon
after burnt them with their Stores, Provisions, etc. We since learned that the Vessels destroyed
are the Lark, Orpheus, and Juno, of 32 Guns each, the Cerberus of 28, and the Pigot Galley.
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A small Privateer landed a Number of Men the same day on Rhode Island, and brought
off four...belonging to the above mentioned Frigates, having on board small Arms, clothing, etc.
The Flora, of 32 Guns, and the Grand Duke of Russia, a Storeship, are all the Vessels of
Force the Enemy have now remaining in this State.
On Wednesday three Persons made their escape from Newport; they inform that the
Enemy have sunk 11 Transports between Goats and Rose Islands, and that they have destroyed
all the Farming Utensils on Rhode Island.
Nine of the new Levies deserted from Rhode Island on Wednesday last.

12 August 1778
Royal Gazette: Extract of a Letter from Newport (Rhode Island) dated August 3, 1778282
We are now blocked up by the French fleet, 12 ships of the line, 3 frigates, and an incredible
number of American privateers, which ply backward and forward to supply them and obstruct
the passage of small craft or intelligence. Five days ago they made their appearance. Two ships
went down Conannicut and fired at a small battery we had at the Light House, which, when they
had passed, we blew up; two more went on the other side of the Island, which caused us to blow
up the King Fisher sloop of war and two galleons, stationed to defend the island. Two of the
French ships cruise, two lay on the back of the Conanicut, and 12 are at the mouth of the harbor,
near the Light-House.
...A person who left Rhode Island last Thursday declares, that the general attack of the
British lines had been deferred until last Sunday, as a large body of the Connecticut militia had
not yet arrived, and that General Green was to command the enterprize.
...By a gentleman from the Eastward we are informed, that last Friday night three whale
boats came over from Connecticut to Southhold, on the east end of Long Island, and informed
their friends there, that a 74 gun ship, belonging to Count D’Estaing’s squadron, in attempting to
go through a narrow passage near Newport, run aground, and was so severely cannonaded from

282

"Extract of a Letter from Newport (Rhode Island) dated August 3, 1778." Royal Gazette [New York] 12 August
1778: 3. America's Historical Newspapers. Web.

197

the batteries there, that the crew were obliged to abandon and set her on fire, and that an unarmed
Vessel, which was sent to her assistance, suffered the same fate.
...Last night an account was brought to town that the rebels had abandoned their
enterprise against Rhode Island, Mons. D’Estaing having suddenly left that place, and two of his
ships behind him. We hope soon to give authentic particulars of the events that may have lately
occurred in that quarter.
The following anecdote we believe may be depended on:
While the Count D’Estaing’s squadron lay off Sandy Hook, a marine officer belonging to
one of the ships, a Scotchman by birth, went on shore at Shrewsbury, the inhabitants finding he
spoke good English, crowded to converse with him, and told him how happy they were made by
the arrival of the French fleet, as they did not doubt their Independence would be established by
their co-operation. Whereas the Scotch officer with a significant shake of his head answered
them, “he believed they were mistaken, that he looked upon their Independence only as a dream,
for that France or Britain must have this country.”

13 August 1778
Massachusetts Spy: Fresh Intelligence from Rhode Island283
By a gentleman belonging to this town, (whose veracity we will vouch for) who went on Rhode
Island with our troops last Sunday, and left them in high spirits last Tuesday evening, and arrived
here late last night, we have the following particulars, with a confirmation of these preceding:
Last Sunday evening a Fleet of British Ships, (he counted twenty five sail) appeared off
Rhode Island; immediately after Count d’Estaing, who lay with 8 sail of the line, between
Prudence Island and Newport, properly arranged for an attack on Rhode Island and sent a
message onshore to Gen. Sullivan, requesting him to be under no...with regards to the English
fleet, for as soon as the wind and tide would permit he determined to go out and attack them. The
next morning the English fleet lay off Newport and about 9 o’clock the French admiral weighed
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anchor with 10 ships of the line, passed the enemy forts on his way, which he saluted with some
of his heavy metal, and silenced two of their batteries which had begun to play on his shipping,
and made fast for the British fleet, which seeing the movement of the French squadron formed
for battle; but as the French approached, the English, perceiving their force, did not wait till the
Count could come up with them, but made all the sail they could to get out of the reach of his
cannon. The count pursued them, and had not returned last Tuesday night. Two sail were seen
standing in about sun-down that evening, supposed to be two prizes which the French had taken,
as a gentleman, who was observing the motions of the shipping after our informant (the place of
observation being on an eminence where they could discover great way at sea) said he perceived,
by help of his glass, the ship the French Admiral was in, to come up with some of the British,
and concluded that two of them had stuck to the French flag.
The British fleet before mentioned are believed to be under the command of Lord Howe, who
has been very assiduous in collecting his force together, to attack Count d’Estaing ever since the
Count’s arrival on this coast.
As soon as the Count d’Estaing returns, which without doubt will be soon, a general
attack is intended to be made on the enemy on the island.
The French Admiral left several of his ships at anchor near Newport, and we are told,
there is not an English ship of force in sight of the island. The Marquis La Fayette is to have the
command of the French troops, which are to be landed immediately after the return of the Count
d’Estaing.
The American force now against Rhode Island is supposed to be above 10,000 men. The
arrival of the English fleet, from St. Helen’s on this coast, has been reported for two or three
days. The Tories tell the story with great glee, one asserts this fleet was lately seen off the Banks
of Newfoundland, another says she was parted with off the Western Islands, while others do not
scruple to say it is actually arrived before Newport; Alas poor souls… let them enjoy it. We have
search the various reports to the bottom, and if we are not mistaken, they all spring from one
fountain. The New London Gazette, of last Friday, has the following paragraph:
“A British ship of 64 guns arrived at New York last week, supposed to be from Halifax,
though it is given out in New York that she belonged to Admiral Byron’s squadron from
England, and that she parted with it in a gale of wind a few days before her arrival.”
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Another account, from Boston, says, “A commander of a privateer belonging to this state,
not long since captured by the enemy, and since made his escape from New York the… says, A
British man of war of 64 guns had lately arrived there, which came out as was reported in that
city, with a British fleet consisting of eleven sail of the line, bound for America, and every
moment expected at New York. Our informant had this account from the Doctor of the captured
privateer, who attended a hospital in the city. He received this account from a midshipman of the
64 gun ship, who was sent there as an invalid.” This undoubtedly is the same ship mentioned
under the New-London [article]. A third account, also from Boston, says, “A vessel arrived from
the West Indies, in a neighbouring port, on her passage was brought to by a British man of war
said to be from England bound to New York, who informed that a fleet of British men of war of
20 sail was at Portsmouth, when she left it, and was expected to come out for American in about
12 days.” It Is highly probable this is the ship mentioned in the other two accounts, and that she
was from Halifax.
Two of the Cork provision fleet, one of them a ship of 300 tons, the other a large brig, are
taken by a French man of war, and sent into Bedford. Another ship belonging to the British fleet
was captured by one of our….
When the enemy evacuated the Island of Conanicut, they left a large number of sheep
there, which they… from the neighbouring island….

15 August 1778
Providence Gazette: Providence, August 15284
Saturday last Count D’Estaing, with 12 Ships of the Line, entered the Harbour of Newport, to
cooperate with our Army destined for the [Redaction] of Rhode Island. The Ships were briefly
fired on as they passed the Enemy’s Batteries, but received very little Damage; the Fire was
gallantly returned, and we since learn, by a Deserter, that several of the Enemy were killed in the
North Battery.
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On Sunday a British Fleet, supposed to be Lord Howe’s, consisting of about 30 Sail,
arrived off Point Judith, with Intention, as is conjectured, of throwing [Succours] on Rhode
Island. The Wind being southerly, His Most Christian Majesty’s Fleet could not get out of the
Harbour till next morning, when a Breeze springing from the Northward, the brave Count
D’Estaing, with the 12 Ships above mentioned, came to sail. They were again briefly
cannonaded from the Enemy’s Batteries as the passed, and the Fire was returned with great
Spirit. The dastardly Britons, on perceiving the French Ships under Way to engage them,
immediately weighed their Anchors, and crowded all Sail towards the South-East. At Two
o’Clock, P.M. the southernmost of the French Ships were supposed to be within four Miles of
the British, and in our next we hope to give our Readers a good Account of them.
A person from New London informs, that a Fishing Boat is arrived there, the Master of
which says that he was between Block Island and [Monsock] on Monday last, and saw some of
the French Ships towards Evening, come up with Part of the British Fleet, when a heavy Firing
commenced, but does not know the Event.
On Wednesday and Thursday we had severe Storm of Wind and Rain, which has
prevented the Return of Count D’Estaing.
On Sunday and Monday last the Honorable General Sullivan, with the Army under his
Command, landed upon Rhode Island without Opposition. The Enemy abandoned all their
Works and Barracks at the North End, leaving them in good Order, and retreated within their
Lines, which are about three Quarters of a Mile from the Town of Newport. Our Troops have
Possession of Quaker, Wind-Mill, and Butts’s Hills, and a strong Detachment is advanced within
a Mile and a Half of the Enemy’s Lines, near which, on Saturday, the Enemy burnt several
Houses.
Our Army, consisting of about 12,000 Men are in fine spirits. The Advance, composed of
the light Troops, Independent Companies, and 50 Men from each Brigade, under the Command
of Col. Levingston; the right Wing is commanded by General Greene, the Left by the Marquis de
la Fayette, the second Line by General Hancock, and the Reserve by Col. West.
Forty-seven Deserters have come over to our Army since their landing on Rhode Island.
In the Storm on Wednesday and Thursday last a Sloop, a Schooner, and several Boats,
were drove ashore near the South Ferry.
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20 August 1778
Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a Letter from an officer on Rhode Island, to an officer in this
town, dated August 10, 1778285
“The cannonade, which continued very brisk about two hours was occasioned by the French
fleet’s passing the enemy’s batteries as they were going out to sea after the fleet which lay at the
mouth… more than eight ships of the line, besides a large number of frigates. The Admiral sent
to General Sullivan, that he should attack them in the morning, which obliged the land army to
lay upon the oars until the event is known….
“The advance of the army is composed of the light troops, independent companies, and
fifty men from each brigade, commanded by Col. Livingston, the right wing of the army by Gen.
Green, the left by the Marquis de La Fayette, the second line by General Hancock, and the
reserve by Col. West.
“The army are in fine spirits, and are determined to return victorious.”
A letter from a gentleman in the army on Rhode Island, to a General officer in this town, dated
August 11, says, “I embrace this first moment since our landing to inform you, that at 9 o’clock
yesterday, I landed with the [first] line of the army, the artillery of which I command, with the
enemy having left their works there the evening before. We have not yet go to [Logger-beads].
The heavy artillery is mostly over; it is probable we shall move forward this afternoon; our
distance from the enemy is seven miles. An English fleet of 8 ships of the line, and 25 sail of
other vessels, appeared yesterday, near the evening, to the mouth of the harbor of Newport. The
French fleet sailed out this morning to meet them. The cannonade from the enemy’s forts as they
passed them, and from the ships was beyond description. We are in anxious expectation for the
event, as our further proceeding depends much upon it.”
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Massachusetts Spy: By Boston Tuesday’s Post - Boston, August 17286
The late violent storm, and the Count d’Estaing’s going out after Lord Howe’s fleet, which in all
probability were bringing large succours of men, etc. to the British army on Rhode Island, have
retarded a closer advancement of our troops to the enemy; many of them were sheltered from the
severity of the weather in houses… and huts which they made for themselves by putting sails and
such like materials upon the stone walls, and covering them with hay and straw, etc. Those who
had tents suffered the most, as the violence of the wind blew them down.

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from an Officer on Rhode Island to an officer in this
town:287
“The French fleet have not returned; we shall wait no longer for them; to-morrow
morning the whole army advances.
“The enemy’s principal fortification is on Domini Hill - They keep entirely within their
lines - few deserters, no prisoners. The enemy have six British and six German regiments, about
six thousand - strong.
“We may soon expect some favourable accounts from the French fleet. The General has
this moment returned from reviewing the army, they are a fine body of men, from whose
exertions we may expect the most happy decision. - Affairs wear the most promising aspect.”

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from the same place:288
“We are now encamped within about 4 miles of the enemy. Yesterday we were alarmed by the
enemy’s advancing, [Estimated] to be a party of about 600, that came out to [reconnaissance].
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They took a few stacks of hay and returned. We were immediately under… and advanced within
about one mile of their works, but they had retired before we got up with them. We should have
advanced with the whole army this morning but the weather has been stormy all night and still
continues. We shall march as soon as it is cleared up; Gen. Sullivan says he has 12,000 men
today, and expects to make up 14,0000 tomorrow.”

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter brought by the last express from Rhode Island, dated
August 15289
“At six o’clock this morning the army were paraded, and at seven the signal for marching was
given, when the whole began to advance, we arrived without opposition, within two miles of the
enemy’s lines in the afternoon. Where the army now remain encamped on the hill.” - The French
fleet had not arrived when the express came…
It is said that the Count d’Estaing, when he was coming into the harbour of Newport, put
onshore a number of American gentlemen, that had been on board his fleet, saying that though he
should be proud of their joint services upon many occasions, he would have none of the exposed
in attacks that were proper to his own ships. When he went out to met Lord Howe’s fleet he left
two 64 gun ships and a brig to guard that harbour.

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from an Officer of distinction dated Rhode Island,
August 14290
“You have doubtless hear before this of our being in possession of the North-end of the island,
and may perhaps soon expect to hear of our being in Newport. The situation of the enemy is such
that it is almost impossible to make any impression upon their works - They are strongly fortified
across the whole island - Their works consist of a chain of redoubts seven in number, within half
musket shot of each other; which is what they call the front line. They have in the rear of these
five other redoubts at about the same distance from each other connected by a breast work seven
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feet high, with a ditch ten feet wide, and a battery in front, and a strong line of pickets in the rear
of the ditch. Their numbers are about 6000 - Provision they are not in want of - Desertion
prevails much among them; we had 43 come out to us yesterday. As soon as the weather permits
we shall move close down to their lines. We are not at the distance of five miles from them. The
late storm was very unseasonable for us. The Count d’Estaing is not in sight. By deserters from
them we hear, that he took four and sunk two of Howe’s fleet; but nothing certain is yet arrived.
Massachusetts Spy: Worcester, August 20291
From our correspondents in the army on Rhode Island, we have the following intelligence, as
late as the morning of Tuesday last, our army were then in high spirits, and well provided with
necessaries, as appear by the following letters to the printer hereof.

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from an Officer of distinction, dated, Camp near
Newport, August 17th, 1778292
“We landed on this island Sunday the 9th...and took possession of the enemy’s works on
the north part which they had evacuated without damaging them in the least, those on Quaker
Hill were considerable, with commodious barracks. The army was immediately formed in three
lines across the island: first and second line of battle, with a Corps de reserve; the first line
composed mostly of Continental troops. Exclusive of the aforesaid arrangement, we had a very
considerable body of light troops advance. In this situation we remained until Saturday the 15th,
in consequence of the most severe storm I ever knew; the army suffered much, for it was
impossible to keep the tents standing, the wind was so exceeding strong.
“The morning of the 15th, we advanced towards Newport, each line in three columns;
during our march, as we passed over some eminence, I could almost take the whole in at one
view; the heavy columns, with the artillery, together with the advance corps and flanking
divisions, all moving in the most regular manner, with standard displayed, was a sight truly
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animating. We advanced within about one mile and a half of the enemy’s lines, where we have
secured our camp by throwing up some redoubts. We are now employed in raising batteries the
distance of about 100 [rods] from the enemy’s redoubts; they are very frequently saluting of us
from their works.
“The French fleet, that you was informed failed out to attack the English, has not yet
returned The wind is now fair, we expect they will soon appear in sight; after which we hope
soon to render a good account of the British army in Newport.
“Gen. Pigot, (who commands the British army) was heard to say, that if the French fleet
returned, they must all be prisoners. Between fifty and sixty have deserted from the British since
we came on the island…”

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of another letter, dated Rhode Island, four miles from Newport,
August 17293
“Last night we began to throw up some works not above a hundred rods from the enemy’s
redoubts; in which we were favoured this morning by the fog; it has now cleared off, since which
the enemy have saluted us with a few cannonballs. We expect the French fleet in today, and are
all ready for an attack.”

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from an officer in camp dated Rhode Island, four miles
from Newport, August 16294
“We marched from Portsmouth yesterday morning, headed by Major-General Green and the
Marquis de la Fayette, and the reserve commanded by Col. West, and arrived here about noon.
The enemy gave us no manner of interruption. We are in plain view of their works. Our troops
last night lay on their arms, and without any covering; The Marquis to encourage them, had a
marquee pitched, and lodged just in the rear of our brigade among his guard, which the corporal
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was about to remove, but the Marquis ordered them to lie still, adding, ‘We are all soldiers alike
now.’
“August 17th. A party went last right on fatigue near the enemy’s lines; it was very foggy
and so continues, which favours the design…
“P.S. Since writing the above the fog is cleared off, and a small cannonade has begun.”

22 August 1778
Providence Gazette: Providence, August 22295
Early on Saturday Morning last the Honorable Major General Sullivan, with the Army under his
Command, advanced towards Newport, and the same Evening encamped on an Eminence two
Miles from the Enemy’s Lines, without Opposition, where the main Body of the Army now lies.
The same Night a Detachment took Possession of a Height on the Enemy’s Right, about Half a
Mile from their front Line of Works, which it commands. On Sunday Morning, the 16th, the
Enemy began a brisk Cannonade, though without Effect, and in the Evening a Battery was
opened on the Right, which they cannonaded next Day; but the Fire was not returned. Tuesday
and Wednesday, two other Batteries being opened, there was much Firing on both Sides, and the
Enemy were driven from a Work on the Right. On Thursday Afternoon a brisk Cannonade again
commenced, but nothing decisive has yet taken Place. Our Troops are in high Spirits, and eager
for Action. Deserters from the Enemy continue to come in daily, and on Sunday three Prisoners
were taken.
Thursday last his Excellency Count D’Estaing, with 11 Ships of the Line, returned from
Pursuing the British Fleet, and came to Anchor off Point Judith. The [Caesar], of 74 Guns, parted
with the Fleet in the late Storm, and is hourly expected.
The British Fleet consisted of 22 Sail, among which were [8] Ships of the Line. The
French Fleet came up with them the Day after they left Newport, when Preparations were made
for engaging; but the Storm coming on, they were compelled to separate, which favoured the
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Escape of the Britons. Two only were taken… the Senegal Sloop of War, commanded by a
Captain Gambier, and the Carcass Bomb Ketch.
The Languedoc, and one other Ship, received some Damage in the Storm, which came on
at a most critical Time, as a fair Prospect had otherwise presented of capturing a great Part of the
Enemy’s Fleet.
A small Privateer fell in with Part of the British Fleet after the Storm, the Master of
which informs, that he observed a 74 Gun Ship and a frigate to be dismasted.
Certain accounts are received, that the Spithead Fleet, of which so much Parade has been
made in the English Prints...at Anchor in that Harbour the 9th of June last. The [Brest] Fleet,
which is much superior in Force, continued to wait their Motions.
Since the destruction of the Enemy’s Shipping in the Bay, upwards of 30 pieces of
Cannon, (chiefly 12 pounders) 4 Anchors, a large Quantity of Rigging, several Boats, etc. have
been taken from the wrecks, and brought to this Town.

Royal Gazette: Some Particulars of the British and French fleets296
On Tuesday the 11th Instant, a most violent tempest arose, which continuing until Friday
following, dispersed both the fleets. On Sunday the French Rear Admiral, supposed to be Mons.
Bosse of the Le Zele (the Zealous), a ship of seventy four guns and rated to have nine hundred
men, bore down on his Majesty’s ship Isis, commanded by Capt. John Raynor, of fifty guns, and
rated to have three hundred and fifty men; who permitted not a gun to be fired until the enemy
approached very near the Isis, when a fierce engagement ensued, and continued, it is said, about
an hour and an half. The Rear Admiral’s fire being very much directed against the Isis’s rigging,
rendered her utterly incapable of pursuing the Zele, who wore round, and being one of the best
sailing ships of the Comte D’Estaing’s squadron; escaped from capture merely by … during the
action a quantity of papers were observed to be thrown out of the cabin windows of the Zele.
On Saturday afternoon his Majesty’s ship Renown, of 50 guns, commanded by Captain
George Dawson, fell in with the Languedoc, of 94 guns, and rated to have eleven hundred men,
about 30 leagues southeast of Sandy Hook; this capital ship had been distanced in the storm on
296

"Some Particulars of the British and French fleets." Royal Gazette [New York] 22 August 1778: 3. America's
Historical Newspapers. Web.

208

the 11th instant. The Renown attacked her on the quarter, and kept up a steady fire against her
from 4 o’clock till dark, intending to renew the engagement in the morning, but the French
Admiral, availing himself of the darkness of the night, brought his ship to an anchor, by which
means the Renown became separated three or four miles from him. At daybreak, Captain
Dawson observed the Count D’Estaing, attended with several other ships of his own squadrons,
which occasioned the fifty gun ship to bear away, and thereby escaped from a superiority, to
himself, invincible.
His Majesty’s ship Preston, commanded by Commodore Hotham, of 60 guns, and rated
for three hundred and fifty men, fell in with the Le Tonane, of 84 guns, and rated for eleven
hundred men, said to be commanded by Mons. Bougainville, a gentleman who in the last war,
had the honour of serving his sovereign in Canada; and is allowed to be an officer of
distinguished abilities. This ship had lost her [port-sprit?] and fore-mast, on the 11th instant. The
Preston raked her fore and aft a considerable time, and would certainly have made a prize of Her
but for the intervention of several other ships of the Toulon fleet, which occasioned the Preston
to leave her to their protection.

27 August 1778
Massachusetts Spy: By Boston Friday’s Post - Boston, August 20297
Authentic Intelligence from our army on Rhode Island:
“On the 15th instant, at six o’clock, P.M. a detachment of our troops, with a covering party,
paraded in the front of our army, where the ...intrenching tools… etc were ordered, and as soon
as it was dark, took possession of a height on the enemy’s right, which commands their front line
of works, at the distance of about half a mile. - The enemy did not discover our taking possession
of this post until the morning of the 16th, when they began and continued a brisk cannonade
without effect. During the time our detachment were at work, they opened a covered way, and
about half completed a battery on the right, which was to be finished, and another on the left
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erected, the next night that our batteries would opened on the 19th. Our troops were in high
spirits, and that great regularity ha been conspicuous in all their manoeuvres. The French fleet
not returned on the morning of the 18th.”
By the last night’s express from Rhode Island, we are informed, that on the night of the
17th instant the covered way and two batteries of 4 guns each, were almost completed. That a
fatigue party of 1000 men, were employed on the works on the 18th, which so much provoked
the enemy, that they fired three or four hundred shot at our people, but to very little purpose, two
men only being slightly wounded, and the party continued at work.

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from Major General Hancock, to the Hon. J. Powell,
Esq; dated Tuesday evening, Aug. 18298
“Nothing material has happened since my letter of this morning except a constant cannonade
from the enemy, without any other damage then slightly wounding one man. A firing has been
heard a sea, which we think denotes the approach of the French fleet, and expect to see them in
the morning, after which we shall proceed with great vigour and dispatch. Our men being fully
employed in completing the works near the enemy’s lines. Desertion prevails among them,
notwithstanding their circumscribed situation and double guards, this night being very dark we
expect many, in one day 41 have come in.
“Wednesday morning, five o’clock. Everything quiet, and very heavy fog and small rains.
No account of the French fleet; indeed it is impossible they should set in, as it is exceeding
thick.”

Massachusetts Spy: By Boston Tuesday’s Post - Boston, August 24299
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On the night of the 20th instant, our army erected another battery on Rhode Island, advanced 40
or 50 rods in front of these at first...on the hill, which have been already mentioned: This battery
is not only nearer, but better situated to annoy the enemy. We had one more killed and two
wounded. On the afternoon of the 20th, the Count d’Estaing returned with his squadron having
taken an English frigate of 28 guns… Two of the French ships suffered some little damage in
their masts in the late severe storms. The spirit of desertion greatly prevails among the enemy.

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from an officer on Rhode Island, dated Aug. 21.300
“We thought it very unlucky for us, that the French fleet [left us], but it was unavoidable. Lord
Howe had 3000 men on board his fleet...which he would have landed… The Wednesday after…
The Languedoc lost some of her topmasts, and a 74 lost some masts. They are now off Point
Judith, and have brought up the Senegal…. We have some batteries of eight guns each playing
upon the enemy today, tomorrow we shall open the mouths of fourteen guns more, and [some of
our] mortars will begin playing in the morning. We have had, I imagine, near 2000 shot fired on
us, which has killed one man wounded [some]...”

29 August 1778
Providence Gazette: Providence, August 29301
On Wednesday next the Honorable General Assembly of this State will meet at East Greenwich.
The Caesar, a French Ship of 74 Guns, mentioned in our last to be missing, is arrived at
Boston Soon after the Violence of the late Storm had abated, in which she was separated from
the Fleet, she fell in at 10 o’Clock at Night with a British Ship of 64 Guns; about Three in the
Morning a sharp Engagement commenced, which continued 3 hours, when two other British
Men of War heaving in Sight, the Caesar quitted her. The British Ship was greatly damaged,
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several of her Ports being beat into one, and her Pumps going, when the Caesar made Sail. We
learn that 13 Men were killed and 19 wounded on board the Caesar. The Captain had his right
Arm badly wounded, which has been since amputated, and one of the Lieutenants lost a leg.
Two of His Most Christian Majesty’s Ships having been disabled in the last severe Storm
on Saturday last they sailed from Point Judith to refit, convoyed by the Remainder of the Fleet.
The Operations against Rhode Island continue to be carried on with Vigour, and if the
Enemy should not receive large Reinforcements in the Absence of Count D’Estaing; whose
Return is daily expected, there is the fairest Prospect that the Expedition will be crowned with
Success. A brisk Fire has been kept up several Days this Week, with very little Effect on the Part
of the Enemy. Deserters continue to come out daily.
Last Monday Night a Party of the Enemy from Rhode Island landed on the Narragansett
Shore, and with their usual Spirit dragged an inoffensive Farmer from his House (Mr. Rowse
Potter) whom they carried off, with one of his Negroes.
Capt. Tredwell, in the Privateer Sloop Hero, of this Place, in Company with the Privateer
Barton, of Dartmouth, has taken a Schooner from Jamaica, laden with Molasses, Rum, etc. and
brought her into Port.
The above mentioned Schooner, previous to her being captured, took up Cat. John Bell
and his Crew, late of the Brig Ruby; also Capt. John Daggers, and three of his Men, late of the
Ship Nancy , the Remainder of her Crew, 15 in Number, being drowned. They were Part of a
Fleet from Jamaica, bound to England, and were, with nine others, wrecked on the [Bahamas]
Banks, in the late violent Storm.
The Privateer Sloop General Stark, of Warren, in this State, has taken a Brig with 100
bags of Cotton Wool, and a Quantity of Redwood, and sent her into Boston.

3 September 1778
Massachusetts Spy: By The Rhode Island post - Worcester, September 3. Extract of a letter
from an officer of distinction, dated camp at Rhode Island, August 30302
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“The night before last we adjourned from our camp before Newport, leaving behind us
neither ten, equipage, stores, or even an old shoe, and retired in very good order to this place,
called Butt’s Hill. At 7 o’clock yesterday morning the advance of the enemy attacked our light
troops who were posted in advance of the enemy on the east and west roads. After a severe
action, in which the enemy had vastly the superiority in numbers, we retired in excellent order to
the main body. I was sent with this order in the east road. The fire was very hot, both of cannon
and musketry, and rather disobliging for a few minutes to my nerves.
“The enemy advancing rapidly, were received warmly by a number of heavy cannon,
which induced them to halt. After lying quiet for an hour a strong party advanced Hessian and
British light infantry, with an intention to gain our right flank, under cover of two ships which
were then opposite to us; they were soon drove out of the way by the cannon from Bristol, and
two 18 pounders, which we took down on the open beach; the Hessian and British light infantry
mean-time, advanced briskly through a hollow way covered by small brush in front of a redoubt.
They were opposed, but at first ineffectually by a few brave fellows, whom they pushed in on
our quarter, a hundred yards behind the redoubt. Two continental regiments were now ordered to
attack their right, while a brigade of your militia, under General Lovell, and led on by your
friend, were to attempt their left and rear. The enemy soon gave way to this manoeuvre… I
pushed on almost too far with the militia, quite under the brow of a hill on which was a small
redoubt with artillery, and in its rear the whole left wing of the enemy. I was conscious of being
near them, but as I could not know their exact position, from the hollow in which we were, I rode
up the hill to reconnoitre them, and found myself instantly within musket shot of their whole
line; I retreated you may well believe, to my men with full speed. Our troops soon after retired,
and the enemy were happy to remain quiet, after retiring some distance from where they first
formed their line- in retiring from our right, they plundered and ruined all the houses which were
in their way in a scandalous manner.
“In the whole day we have lost about 50 or 60 killed, and 180 wounded, as near as we
can hitherto guess. The enemy’s loss must be much greater, as they received most furious and
effectual fires after they broke and ceased to return it.
“Had our troops been excessively fatigued by the retreat, we should P.M. have attacked
the enemy, and forced them to a general action. If it does not storm that will probably happen
today. Some fine lads have slept in death already. Jackson’s regiment was in all the actions, and
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behaved to admiration, as did everyone else, whether officer or soldier. Better I assure you than
British or Hessians.”

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of a letter from an officer of distinction, dated Camp at
Portsmouth, Rhode Island, August 30303
“It is with the greatest mortification I have to inform you, that we have retreated from the
enemy’s lines at Newport, after erecting works, covered ways, batteries, etc. to such an amazing
extent in the space of ten or twelve days, as must I think surprise the British army to view. We
did not retreat in consequence of having anything to fear from the army that is at present on the
island, but by being informed by General Washington that Lord Howe’s fleet had arrived at New
York, and that there was the greatest possibility of their reinforcing Rhode Island, immediately.
The General in his letter has nearly the following words, that he hopes this will arrive before the
fleet, so that you may take every precaution in order to secure a safe retreat. We began our retreat
from the lines on Friday evening, at 8 o’clock the pickets and advanced parties, left their posts at
twelve, we come off without being discovered by the enemy; they came on in the morning and
we had a severe contest with them. I have not time to give you the particulars as the post is now
obliged to cross the ferry.”

Massachusetts Spy: Extract of another letter from the same gentlemen, dated Tiverton, August
30, 1778304
“We evacuated our lines on the South end of the Island on Friday at nine o’clock in the evening
and retired to the north end, which was about 5 miles, it was discovered by the enemy by
daybreak next morning, and by 8 o’clock they came in sight, moving in two solid columns
toward us, our army was immediately formed for order of battle and detachments sent to engage
them, they seeing our army in a position for action, halted upon an eminence opposite to us a
short time, then their left wing advanced and attacked our right but were soon repulsed and drove
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back with considerable loss. We finally held our ground and obliged the enemy to retire.
Yesterday both parties were busy in intrenching; but the General finding himself and army liable
to be surrounded by an English fleet, which could cut off a possibility of retreating, he ordered
all the baggage to be carried off the Island and last night the whole army crossed unmolested and
I believe unobserved. I think the retreat has done the General great honor, to get off an Island
with so large an army and such a quantity of baggage without loss.”
We are well informed that the succours sent into the enemy, at Newport, by Gen. Howe,
were very considerable. It is supposed they consisted of 6000 men, and their whole number on
the island of 14000, besides the advantage of their shipping. Their loss in the action of the 29th
was very great...We hear the French fleet will soon be ready for sea.

5 September 1778
Providence Gazette: Boston, August 31305
Friday last the fleet of His Most Christian Majesty, commanded by his Excellency the Count
D’Estaing, arrived in Nantucket… and the day following his Excellency and part of the fleet,
came up to town. He was saluted by the shipping and forts on his landing……
Sept. 3. A fleet of ships, supposed to be Lord Howe’s… has been discovered standing off
this harbour for several days past, but disappears this day. The fleet, it is conjectured, consisted
of upwards of 20 sails, some very...ships.
The Count D’Estaing has erected very formidable… on George’s Island, in which we
hear he has mounted 100 cannon of heavy metal, which he took from his fleet with a
determination to defend himself against any invasion from our enemies, while his fleet are
repairing the damage they sustained in the late storm.
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Providence Gazette: Providence, September 5306
The Fleet of His Most Christian Majesty having sailed to Boston to repair the Damages sustained
in the late violent Storm, the Operations by Land against the Enemy’s… Holds on R. Island were
continued to be carried on with vigour till the Evening of the 28th, at which Time our… by a
Field return, consisting of only 5400 Men...unanimously determined by the General Officers,
in... to change to Position of the Army from the Advanced Batteries before the Enemy’s Lines,
and to take Post on Butts’s Hill, at the North End of the Island, till the Return of the Fleet. This
was effected before Two o’Clock the next Morning with the greatest Order, the Picket,
commanded by Col. Wigglesworth, remaining on Quaker Hill, a Mile in Front of the main Body,
and Livingston’s and Laurens’s Corps advanced on the East and West Roads, a Mile beyond the
Picket. At Seven o’Clock the advanced Corps were attacked by the Enemy, and after returning
the fire briskly,...to the Picket on Quaker Hill. Here the [army] made a stand, and were reinforced
on the Left by a Regiment from Glover’s Brigade, commanded by Lieut. Col…and on the Right
by a Regiment from Varnum’s Brigade commanded by Lieut. Col. Livingston. The Actions
became severe; our Men were well posted, and twice pulsed the Enemy on the Left; but they
being strongly reinforced, and a general Action not intended on this... the advanced Corps were
ordered to retire, which they did with the greatest Order and Regularity, having 5 killed and 16
wounded on the Left, and bringing off a Lieut. and...Prisoners. The Enemy about Nine in the
Morning began a cannonade, which was returned with great Spirit, and Skirmishing continued
between the advanced Parties until near Ten, when their two Ships of War and...small armed
Vessels having got up the River on our right flank, the Enemy send most of their Force that Way,
and endeavoured to turn our Right, under Cover of the Ships fire; they were twice Driven back in
much Confusion, when a third effort was made with greater Numbers; General Sullivan now
ordered the Right to be reinforced, and a sharp Conflict of near an Hour succeeded, in which also
the Artillery of both Armies played briskly from the Hills. The Enemy were at length routed, and
fled in great confusion to a Hill, where they had Cannon and works to cover them, leaving their
dead and wounded on the Field; we took about 60 prisoners. The… must have ended in the Ruin
of the British Army, had not the Redoubts on the Hill covered them from a close [Pursuit].
Immediately after the Repulse of the Enemy on the Right, they appeared advancing on our Left,
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in Consequence of which Glover’s Brigade, were ordered in advance, and form in a cross Road
within Half a Mile of the Enemy; They accordingly took Post, and a Cannonade, with
Skirmishing, ensued, and continued till dark. It was not judged adviseable to attack them in their
Works, as our Troops, inferior in Number to the Enemy, were much fatigued, and had been
without Provision or Refreshment of any Kind for 36 Hours. Too much… cannot be given to the
Officers and Soldiers in general for their exemplary Bravery. On the Morning of the 30th our
Army pitched their Tents on the Front of Butts’s Hill, and a heavy Cannonade commenced and
continued through the whole Day. At Seven in the Evening our Picket was posted in advance of
the...Line, and a Chain of [Sentinels] formed from the East to the West River. In Consequence of
authentic Intelligence received that Lord Howe, with his Fleet, had sailed from Sandy Hook, and
that from the best Information 150 Sail of Transports were in the Western Sound, with 5000
Troops, bound to Newport, a Council was called, who were unanimously of Opinion,
considering the Situation of the Army, the Absence of the French Fleet, and the momentary
Expectation of the Enemy’s receiving a strong Reinforcement of Troops, with a Number of
Ships, that the Island should be evacuated, which was accordingly [completed] by 12 o’Clock the
same Night, in perfect Order and Safety, not leaving behind the smallest Article of Provision,
Camp Equipage, or military Stores. The Enemy’s Fleet, with the Reinforcement, arrived off
Point Judith at Seven o’Clock next Morning.
The Number of the Enemy left dead on the Field of Action, according to the best
Accounts, was 180, exclusive of those killed in the Engagements with the light Troops, Picket,
and skirmishing Parties, and exclusive of those killed by the firing of our heavy Artillery, which
played upon their Line through the Day, with apparent great Success. The whole Loss, in Killed
Wounded and Prisoners, is supposed to be upwards of 700.
Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing, of the American Troops, in the Action of the 29th
of August.
Col. Laurens advanced Corps, 2 noncommissioned Officers, 8 Privates, killed; 7 NCOs,
24 Privates, wounded; 1 NCO , 3 Privates missing. - Col Livingston’s light Corps, 2 [Subaltern],
1 NCO, 5 privates killed; 4 [Subaltern], 5 NCOs, 16 Privates wounded; 9 Privates missing. General Varnum’s Brigade, 3 Privates killed; 1 Field Officer, 2 [Subaltern], 19 Privates
wounded; 1 Private missing. - General Glover’s, 1 [Subaltern], 2 Privates killed; 1 [Subaltern],
16 Privates, wounded; 4 Privates missing. - Col. Commandant Green’s, 1 [Subaltern], 2 Privates,
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killed; 9 Privates wounded; 11 Privates missing. - General Lovel’s, 2 Privates killed; 1 Field
Officer, 1 Captain, 1 NCO, 13 Privates wounded; 1 NCO, 4 Privates missing. - General Tyler’s,
1 [Subaltern], 4 Privates, wounded. - Col. Commandant Brown’s 1 Private wounded.
Total, 4 [Subaltern], 3 NCOs, 23 Privates killed; 2 Field Officers, 1 Captain, 8
Subalterns, 13 NCOs, 113 Privates, wounded; 2 NCOs, 27 Privates, Missing. Total, of Killed,
Wounded and Missing, 211.
Lieut. Col. William Livingston received two slight Wounds; Major Sherburne of New
Hampshire, wounded Lieut. Lowell, of Jackson’s, killed; Lieut. Barber, of Lee’s, and Lieut.s.
Henley and Phelon, of Henley’s, wounded.
On Thursday last a large Fleet was seen in the Western Sound, near New London,
supposed to be the same that brought reinforcements to Newport.

16 September 1778
Royal Gazette: Newport, September 3307
Last Saturday morning it being discovered that the rebels had dismantled their redoubts opposite
to our lines, Sir Robert Pigot gave orders for the grenadiers and light infantry, with the Hessian
[chaffeurs], to advance, which they did with their usual alacrity, being supported by the 22nd,
43rd, Brown’s and Fanning’s regiments, with the Regiment De Hayne, and two regiments of
Anspach. It was discovered as they advanced, that the rebels had been for several days removing
their stores and heavy cannon to the north end of the island. The troops met with little opposition
until they had advanced some miles, when they were fired upon behind stone walls by large
parties of the rebels posted to annoy them. But these obstacles were soon removed by the ardour
of the troops, who rushed on with such [impervosity], that the rebels were soon obliged to betake
themselves to their last post, which was upon Windmill Hill, so strongly fortified, and so
commanding a spot, that Brigadier General Smith thought it was prudent to check the progress of
the troops (who had been already fatigued by so long a march) and to take post on Quaker Hill.
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The troops remained in this situation all the next day, in hopes the rebels would feel bold enough
to renew the attack, which they however declined, and took themselves off on Sunday night,
leaving their barracks in good order.
The loss of the rebels on this occasion is supposed to be between three and four hundred
killed and wounded.
Thus ended the THIRD expedition of Rhode Island, so greatly to the honour of Mr.
Sullivan, that there is no doubt he will be enrolled among the heroes of New England.
Such was the bravery of the troops engaged, British, Hessians, and Anspach, that they
deserved to vie with each other in their exertions against the enemy.

26 September 1778
Providence Gazette: Letter from General Sullivan to the President of Congress, August 31308
“Upon the Count D’Estaing’s finding himself under a necessity of going to Boston, to repair the
loss he sustained in the late gale of wind, I thought it best to carry on my approaches with as
much vigour as possible against Newport, that no time… be lost in making the attack upon the
return of the fleet, or any part of it, to cooperate with us. I had sent expresses to the Count to
hasten his return, which I had no doubt would at least bring part of his fleet to us in a few days.
Our batteries played upon the enemy’s works for several days with [apparent] good success, as
the enemy’s fire from the...visibly grew weaker, and they began to abandon some of those
next...and on the 27th we learned they had removed their cannon from all the outworks except
one. The town of Newport is defended by two lines, supported by several… connected with the
lines. The first of these lines extends from a large pond called Easton’s pond, near to Tomminy
hill, and then turns...to the water, on the north of Windmill hill; this line was defended by five
redoubts in front. The second line is more than a quarter of a mile within this, and extends from
the sea to the north side of the island, terminating at the north battery; On the south, at the
entrance by Easton’s beach, where this line terminates, is a redoubt which commands the pass,
and has another redoubt about twenty [rods] on the north. There a number of small works
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interspersed between the lines, which render an attack extremely hazardous on the land side,
without a naval force to cooperate with it. I however should have attempted carrying the works
by storm, as soon as I found they had withdrawn their cannon from their outworks, had I not
found, to my great surprise, that the volunteers, which composed a great part of my army, had
returned and reduced my numbers to little more than that of the enemy; between two and three
thousand return in the course of twenty-four hours, and other were still going off, upon a
supposition that nothing could be done before the return of the French Fleet. Under those
circumstances, and the apprehension of the arrival of an English Fleet with reinforcements to
relieve the Garrison, I sent away all the heavy articles that could be spared from the [army] to the
main; also a large party was detached to get the works in repair on the north end of the island to
throw up some additional ones, and put in good repair the batteries at Tiverton and Bristol, to
secure a retreat in case of necessity. On the 28th a council was called in which it was
unanimously determined to remove to the North end of the island, fortify our camp, secure our
communication with the main, and hold our ground on the...till we could know whether the
French fleet would return in our assistance. On the evening of the 28th we moved with our stores
and baggage, which had not been previously sent forward, and about two in the morning
encamped upon Butts’s hill, with our right extending to the west road, and left to the east road;
the flanking and covering parties still further towards the… on the right and left. One regiment
was posted in a redoubt advanced of the right of the East line; Colonel Henry B. Livingston with
a light corps, consisting of Colonel Jackson’s detachments, and a detachment from the army, was
stationed in the...Another light corps, under the command of Colonel Laurens, Col. Fleury,
and...was posted on the west road. These corps were posted near three miles in front; In the rear
of those was the picquet of the army, commanded by Col. Wade. The enemy having received
intelligence of our movement, came out early in the morning with nearly their whole force, in
two columns, advanced in the two roads, and attacked our light corps; they made a brave
resistance, and were supported for some time by the picquet. I ordered a regiment to support Col.
Livingston, another to Col. Laurens, and at the same time sent them order to..the main army in
the best...they could. They kept up a retreating fire up on the enemy and retired in excellent order
to the main army. The enemy advanced on our left very [front] but were repulsed by General
Glover; They then [moved] to Quaker hill. The Hessian columns [moved to] a chain of hills
running northward from Quaker hill. Our army was drawn up, the first line in front of the works
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on Butts’s hill, the second in rear of the hill, and the reserve near a creek, and near half a mile in
the rear of the first line. The distance between these hills is about one mile. The ground between
the hills is meadow land, interspersed with… The enemy began a cannonade upon us about nine
in the morning, which was returned with double force. Skirmishing commenced between the
advanced parties till near ten o clock, when the Enemy’s two ships of war and some small armed
vessels having gained our right flank, and began a fire, the enemy bent their [force] that way, and
endeavoured to turn our right under cover of the ships fire, and to take the advanced redoubt on
the right. They were twice driven back in great confusions, but a...made with greater numbers
and much more resistance when, had it not been for the timely aid sent forward would have
succeeded. A sharp conflict of nearly an hour ensued, in which the cannon from both armies
placed on the hills, played briskly in support of their own party. The enemy were at length
routed, and fled in great confusion to the hill where they last formed, and where they had
artillery and...works to cover them, leaving their dead and wounded in considerable numbers
behind them. It was impossible to ascertain the number of dead on the field, as it could not be
approached by either party without being exposed to the cannon of the other army. Our party
recovered about twenty of their wounded, and took near sixty prisoners, according to the best
accounts I have been able to collect; amongst the prisoners is a Lieutenant of Grenadiers. The
number of their dead I have not been able to ascertain but know them to be very considerable.
An officer informs me that in one place he counted sixty of their dead. Col. Campbell came out
the next day, to gain permission to view the field of action, to search for his nephew, who was
killed by his side, whose body he could not get off, as they were closely pursued. The firing of
artillery continued through the day, and the...with intermission six hours. The heat of the action
continued near an hour, which must have ended in the ruin of the British army, had not their
redoubts on the hill covered them from further pursuit. We were about to attack them in their
lines, but the men’s having no rest the night before, and nothing to eat either that night or the day
of the action, and having been in constant action through most of the day, it was not thought
adviseable, especially as their position was exceedingly strong, and their numbers fully equal, if
not superior to ours. Not more than fifteen hundred of my troops had ever been in action before. I
should before have taken possession of the hill they occupied, and fortified it, but it is no defence
against an enemy coming from the south part of the island, though exceedingly good against an
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enemy advancing from the north end towards the town, and had been fortified by the enemy for
that purpose.
“I have the pleasure to inform Congress, that no troops could possibly show more spirit
than those of ours which were engaged. Col. Livingston, and all the officers of the light troops,
behaved with remarkable spirit; Colonels Laurens, Fleury, and Major Talbot, with the officers of
that corps, behaved with great gallantry. The brigades of the first line, Varnum’s, Glover’s,
Cornell’s, and Greene’s, behaved with great firmness. Major General Greene, who commanded
in the attack on the right, did himself the highest honor, by the judgment, and bravery exhibited
in the action. One brigade only of the second line was brought to action, commanded by
Brigadier General Lovell; he, and his brigade of militia, behaved with great resolution. Col.
Crane and the officers of artillery deserve the highest praise. I enclose Congress a return of the
killed, wounded and missing on our side, and beg leave to assure them, that, from my own
observation, the enemy’s loss must be much greater. Our army retired to camp after the action;
the enemy employed themselves in fortifying their camp through the night. In the morning of the
30th I received a letter from his Excellency George Washington, giving me notice that Lord
Howe had again failed with the fleet, and receiving intelligence at the same time that a fleet was
off Block Island, and also a letter from Boston, informing me that the Count D’Estaing could not
come around so soon as I expected, a council was called, and as we could have no prospect of
operating against Newport with success without the assistance of a fleet, it was unanimously
agreed to quit the island until the return of the French Squadron. To make a retreat in the face of
an enemy, equal, if not superior in number, and cross a river without loss, I knew was an arduous
task, and seldom accomplished, if attempted; As out [sentries] were within 200 yards of each
other, I knew it would require the greatest care and attention. To cover my design from the
enemy, I ordered a number of tents to be brought forward and pitched in fight of the enemy, and
almost the whole army to employ themselves in fortifying the camp. The heavy baggage and
stores were falling back and crossing through the day; at dark, the tents were struck, the light
baggage and troops passed dawn, and before twelve o’clock the main army had crossed with the
stores and baggage. The Marquis de la Fayette arrived about 11 in the evening from Boston,
where he had been by request of the general officers, to solicit the speedy return of the fleet. He
was sensibly mortified that he was out of action; and that he might not be out of the way in case
of action, he had rode from hence to Boston in seven hours, and returned in six and a half, the
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distance near seventy miles. He returned time enough to bring off the pickets, and other parties
which covered the retreat of the army, which he did in excellent order, not a man was left behind
not the smallest article lost. I hope my conduct through this expedition may merit the
approbation of Congress. Major Morris, one of my...will have the honor of delivering this to your
Excellency; I must beg leave to recommend him to Congress as in the officer who in the last, as
well as several other actions, has behaved with great spirit and good conduct, and doubt not
Congress will take such notice of him, as his long service and spirited conduct deserves. I have
the honor to be, dear Sir, with most esteem, Your Excellency’s most obedient
And very humble servant,
JOHN SULLIVAN
P.S. The Event has proved how timely our retreat took place, as one hundred sail of the enemy’s
ships arrived in the harbour the morning after the retreat. I should do the highest injustice, if I
neglected to mention that Brigadier-General Cornell’s indefatigable industry in preparing for the
expedition, and his good conduct through the whole, merits particular notice. Major Talbot, who
assisted in preparing the boats, and afterwards served in Col. Laurens’s corps, deserves great
praise.
[Since the foregoing letter was forwarded to Congress, it has been since ascertained that
the enemy’s loss, in the action of the 29th of August, amounts to a thousand and twenty-three
killed, wounded and missing]

Royal Gazette: New York, September 20, General Sullivan’s Letter embellished309
On my return from this expedition to the eastward two days ago, there fell into my hands a letter
from General Sullivan containing a very magnificent history of the warlike achievements of his
army upon Rhode Island, which it seems was published three weeks ago in your paper without
any remarks. Now although an account so palpably ridiculous should not appear to those
acquainted with the true state of the facts to deserve any notice, it ought to be considered that
misrepresentations of that kind are greedily received and implicitly believed by many ignorant
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folks throughout the provinces, and thereby answer the purposes for which they are calculated. It
would therefore be of use if any officer would upon such occasions employ an idle hour in
furnishing some illustrations to the very sublime and heroic [stories] of their rebel excellencies.
Mr. Sullivan informs Congress that, upon the departure of the French fleet, he resolved to
carry on his approaches against Newport with all possible vigor, that he silenced most of the
batteries, and drove us from all our out-works, except one, that as soon as that was also silenced,
he should have attempted to carry our lines by storm, notwithstanding their great strength, had
not the Volunteers (magnanimous fellows) abandoned him by thousands a day.
Now, Sir, during the 26 days that the General remained before our camp, or rather in
sight of it, his vigorous resolutions went executed, in so desperate a manner, as to kill one very
unfortunate soldier, and wounded another, by a random cannon shot, all his batteries being
erected at a useless distance from our lines, except one, which they attempted to bring within
point blank, on the 17th of August, and which they abandoned for ever and ever, as soon as some
guns were pointed against it.
Those who know our troops, will readily agree with Mr. Sullivan, that they are as
unlikely to abandon a post before their enemies have come near enough to be distinguished
without glasses, because in the course of a month’s cannonade, they had left one man, without
ever having had a gun damaged. Indeed the parapets still remain standing witnesses the
innocence of his Excellency's experiments upon gunnery. In fact, as General Sullivan had, with
great prudence encamped with a...between his camp and ours, and had, further to facilitate his
approaches (although the idea was rather new), rut up and abetted the only practicable passage to
us, it became unnecessary to fatigue our men, and expose some other unlucky fellow wantonly to
the chance of having his bones broke, by keeping them in the lines and our cannon, as the
General observes, were indeed silenced, after a very thorough experience, that the rebel batteries
were at such a distance, as to render it extremely absurd to expend ammunition against them.
Had General Sullivan been pleased to advance his batteries within execution distance, and to
have removed those obstacles of his own constructing that prevented the approaches of his troops
to our camp, the guns would have, I will not say to his astonishment, again broken silence, and
the lines have been again manned.
As our garrison considered themselves as the besieged, not as the besiegers, although the
rebel army seems to have held a different opinion, we did not think it incumbent upon us to
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interfere with those obstacles which Mr. Sullivan threw between us to prevent all communication
and ill blood; not whilst the French fleet threatened us in the rear, did it appear to our
commander necessary to break the truce which the rebel general had effectually established by
means of this precaution. But how General Pigot can justify himself, after this very civil and
inoffensive manner in which his antagonists have behaved themselves during their visit, for the
rude way in which he wished them a good journey, I cannot see. I know those who attempted to
defend him say, that without some little skirmish, a share of the ridicule which his visitors have
drawn upon themselves would have remained with him and that it was rather creditable with a
part of a besieged garrison unreinforced, to drive the enemy, who had come there with a certain
confidence of making him a prisoner, for six miles before them, into lines, from the nature of the
ground and works much stronger than those which he himself had occupied and still more
creditable to remain afterwards with this detachments, (which did not consist of one half of his
garrison) in front of the rebel lines, fully as near as they had ever adventured to approach to his
camp, and without any [merafs] or abettee between them, until the rebel army thought it prudent
to abandon them silently in the night, and steal over to the continent, singing in whispers, Is
Triumphe! And with reason says the General, for was it not glorious to withdraw in the face of
this garrison, which had by enchantment became a superior army. What, General, do you forget
that you served out daily nearly twenty thousand rations to your army and that General Pigot’s
garrison never consisted of 5000 men, the latter half of which (the other remained many miles
off at the opposite extremity of the Island) were then boarding your army, ready to give you
another parting blow, as soon as you quitted your stronghold, had you not yet stolen off in the
dark.
Apprehensions of so small a detachment could not proceed from nature. In spite of
appearances I will do more honour to the nerves of our antagonists. The council of war, I am
convinced, are men of reading, and must have received their precautionary ideas from Falstaff,
“what if they should rob us” or perhaps they were aware of the mishaps of the adventurous
Scotsman, who essay’d to catch a Tartar. This warlike Caledonian entered a wood in quest of his
enemy, and soon after hallowed out to his commander, “I have caught a Tartar,” “Bring him
then” “He won’t come,” “come yourself”, “he won’t let me”.
Out of the respect I bear for Congress, who certainly are an ingenious body, I will take
the liberty of giving them a little advice which cannot be disagreeable, as it accords so well with
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their grand object of saving appearances. It is to have some sober man at hand, to revise the
letters from their different commanders, upon the accomplishment of such great events as the
retreat from Rhode Island, to prevent all palpable contradictions, to give the accounts, in some
degree, an air of truth and consistency, and above all to avoid those libels, which their Generals,
without any bad intentions, I sincerely believe, have been in the custom lately of writing against
their own conduct, and the behaviour of the good people under them. Whether the reviser
understands anything of military matters, is immaterial, as I apprehend it is since hoped that
those pieces of a composition, however glossed over, can mislead men versed in war, however,
they may mislead the mob.
Had this precaution been taken, General Sullivan would not have written the paragraph
that he remained master of the field of battle, and in others, that his troops retired three miles
before those assailants when attacked, and did not stop till they [reached] the lines which the
General, with a prophetic eye, had been preparing for their safety several days before. That this
field of battle, by which his Excellency must mean the ground immediately in front of his lines,
was so commanded by our cannon that he does not send people to count the dead. That General
Pigot sent out nearly his whole force, when it is known to every old woman in Rhode Island, that
eight regiments remained in the lines. Neither would he have wrote that he had been shamefully
abandoned by the greatest part of his army, so as only to have a number equal to the detachment
of two thousand men that attacked him, and remained at his [back] until he withdrew. Nor would
he have spoke of the strength of the lines before Newport, when he must know, that those we
occupied, were crafted in days and after he had landed on the island.
From what I have said, I mean not to infer that Americans are deficient in natural courage
The idea is illiberal, and I disavow it. Although the stubborn climate of England may produce
more course and steady nerves, than either the sunshine of the continent of Europe or of
America, yet I am persuaded that the breed of Englishmen, wherever transplanted, feeling as
they retain a real love of freedom and independence, will display that superior [vigor] which we
inherit for a series of centuries from our SACRED ANCESTORS. In a just cause, Americans
have shown what blood they are sprung from with us, fighting for the constitution of Freedom,
Justice, and of their Fathers, that have reportedly proved their gallantry.
ESCARMOUCHE
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Appendix D
The following text covers written correspondence, orders and reports relating to the Battle of
Rhode Island, found in the George Washington Papers. The relevant writings have been studied
and compiled below by Jessica Analoro. Section I lists and summarizes these writings, while
Section II displays images of some of the more significant documents and those not fully
described in Section I.
George Washington Papers
Section I: Papers Relevant to the Battle of Rhode Island
Entry by Alphabetical Order
1st Rhode Island Regiment, 1778, List
of Officers
American Intelligence, August 1778,
British Navy Off Rhode
Island
Continental Army Officers to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing,
August 22, 1778
George Washington, January 1, 1778,
Plan for Arrangement of the Army of
the Campaign of 1778
George Washington, July 12, 1778,
General Orders

George Washington to Caleb
Brewster, August 8, 1778,

George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing, July
14, 1778
George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing, July
15, 1778

Brief of Transcription
(Extracting Information of Rhode Island relevance)
See Section II
See Section II
See a Section II
See Section II
(Note 21 of the entry highlighted), Liet. Ebenezer West of
Second RI Regiment; Ordering the sick to be brought to
King’s Ferry; wagons provided.
George Washington asks Caleb Brewster ( member of Culper
spy ring; carried messages from Setauket NY, NYC and Long
Island ) to gain intelligence of movement of enemy ships
sailing from “the hook” as it is pertinent to the troops at
Rhode Island.
George Washington receiving news of d’Estaing’s arrival on
the coast. Informing him to discuss means of communication
with his camp, with Col. Laurens; establishing “conventional
signals” and such.
George Washington providing d’Estaing with livestock, and
informs him that any other supplies needed will be provided
accordingly.
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George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing, July
17, 1778

George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing, July
18, 1778

George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing, July
22, 1778
George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing, July
26, 1778
George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing,
August 8, 1778

George Washington to Charles
Hector, Comte d’Estaing,
August 12, 1778
George Washington to Continental
Congress, July 12, 1778,

Camp at Haverstraw Bay (New York)
Responding to previous letters received by d’Estaing.
Provides d’Estaing with his full confidence in his duties.
Informing him of Lt. Col. Hamilton to better explain plans
and such, in person, rather through letter. Also sends to him
Lt. Col. Fleury, who is to provide knowledge o the
coast/harbors.
From Camp Haverstraw
George Washington sending Captain William Dobbs, to
assist in knowledge of coast/harbors, in particular that of
New York.

Commenting on sending reinforcements to General Sullivan.
(On Aug. 26, d’Estaing sent a letter to Congress stating that
as a result of poor information, sailors and row boats were
lost in the effort of going through the Shewsbury River)
Informing D’Estaing that General Greene will be delivering
the letter; ensures him of his abilities and his knowledge of
his home state of Rhode Island, in the assistance with the
engagement.
Information regarding the possibility of Lord Howe attacking
the Rhode Island regiments. In the letter GW does not seem
to think it probable Howe would do so.
* Note 31 states that the original draft contained information
of Lord Howe’s sailing from Sandy Hook. Actual extracts of
the letter are quotes in Washington’s letter to John Laurens
on Aug. 8 and subsequent letter to Congress on August 9.
See Section II

Note 25, it is noted that on July 11, John Laurens wrote,
“Congress have directed me to propose for your Excellency’s
consideration an attack by Vice Admiral Count d’Estaing
upon the British ships of War and Transports in the Harbor of
Rhode Island, by which possession of a safe port may be
gained, and the retreat of the British forces in the Island be
cut off, as an alternative to a hazardous or ineligible attempt
upon the British squadron within Sandy Hook.”
Laurens asking GW permission for d’Estaing to attack
British ships in Newport Harbor.
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George Washington to Continental
Congress, August 7, 1778,

George Washington to Continental
Congress, August 9, 1778,

Major Gibbs sent to Rhode Island; has received no word
from Gen. Sullivan, cannot report to Congress of what was
going on in the North East.
*Note 29- d’Estaing wrote to Washington on August 3,
dating his arrival in Rhode Island, burning 3 British frigates
and his position against the enemy. Liet. Col. Laurens wrote
on Aug. 4, a letter from Providence, detailing the occurrences
from July 25.
Included a letter from General Maxwell, in which he
reiterates a letter from General Sullivan- Lord Howe sails
from the Hook and is avoiding d’Estaing’s fleet.

George Washington to Continental
Congress, August 19, 1778,

No word had been heard from d’Estaing, as he was out with
his fleet fighting off the British. In Sullivan’s letter, he
requests making an attack but was declined.

George Washington to Continental
Congress, August 24, 1778,

General Sullivan recount of d’Estaing’s arrival (letter not in
Washington papers, but in papers of continental congress),
and reports of the damage to the French fleet as a result of
the storm ; also his desire to go to Boston, but Green,
Lafayette and John Langdon were asked to persuade him
against it.

George Washington to Continental
Congress, August 25, 1778
George Washington to Continental
Congress, September 4, 1778,
George Washington to Ezekiel
Cheever, August 31, 1778,

*Note 84- D’Estaing’s letter to Sullivan on August 21, was
sent by Sullivan to Washington- d’Estaing states his
departure for Boston, and his inability to leave him troops;
the King ordered him not to risk his fleet;
John Laurens sent Washington a letter on August 23, telling
him of d’Estaing’s plans
The aims at Rhode Island have changed; how to move
forward must be decided- whether to continue the siege,
employ immediate attack or commit to a retreat.
Recounting to the Continental Congress of the events that
occurred in Rhode Island, and the issues that may have arisen
with D’Estaing departing to Boston; hoping that rumors of
the British leaving for Halifax; references General Sullivan
Received information that Clinton and Cornwallis were
transporting troops eastward; infers that this was to assist
Rhode Island, but after the French left, they diverted
attention elsewhere; warning Cheever that if any word of
British on the Connecticut coast, then to hide artillery stores.
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George Washington to Horatio Gates,
July 3, 1778

GW reports 245 casualties against the enemy in the action on
June 28 (Monmouth Courthouse at Monmouth New Jersey);
reports a gathering of 100 prisoners.

George Washington to James Clinton,
July 31, 1778
George Washington to James M.
Orders James M. Varnum (brigadier general) to command
Varnum, July 21, 1778
Col. Livingston/Sherburne’s and Webb’s regiment.
Provides a list of places, including several in Rhode Island
(Coventry, Providence)
*special note towards providence, instructs him on his arrival
to be under the command of general Sullivan.
George Washington to Jeremiah
Ordering Jeremiah Olney (Rhode Island regiment) to march
Olney, July 21, 1778
with Col. Angells to Providence (route provided).
George Washington to Jeremiah
Letter to Jeremiah Powell (Massachusetts Senate), saying
Powell, August 2, 1778
General Glover’s brigade was detached to Rhode Island
(with an intended attack on the enemy) George Washington
requests recruits from the state.
George Washington to John Glover,
Asks John Glover (Brigadier General-from Marblehead,
July 23, 1778
Mass.) to march to Providence. A hurried note, asking his
immediate assistance.
George Washington to John Laurens, Asking Laurens to assist d’Estaing in safely getting his ship
July 22, 17781-1799
through British forces, preventing the landing of the French
forces; suggests men being sent to Long Island to destroy
enemy resources (cattle, horses, etc.); cutting off
communication between British forces
In regards to Rhode Island, deciding whether to attack the
enemy fleet as it departs from ‘the hook’
Suggests an attempt upon Halifax following Rhode Island
George Washington to John Laurens, Informs Laurens that Howe had left ‘the hook’ and departed
August 8, 1778
to Rhode Island on August 7.
Said, “no troops nor transports were thought to be with them”
GW advises that if d’Estaing had not already done so, to
employ light cruisers off Rhode Island to meet enemy forces
before they arrive at Rhode Island.
George Washington to John Sullivan, Informing Sullivan of D’Estaing’s arrival on the coast off
July 17, 1778
Sandy Hook (fleet of 12 ships of the line and 4 frigates).
Expects at this point an attack on either New York or Rhode
Island; states they are prepared for an attack at New York,
but need more preparations for one at Rhode Island;
Requests Sullivan to immediately begin applying for recruits
in Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Connecticut- 5000 men
total- in order to at least be superior by land, to counter the
British sea strength
-requesting Sullivan to engage pilots informed of Newport
harbor, to be knowledgable of certain signals in order for
Sullivan to be aware of the French Admiral’s arrival
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-GW in a disspointing tone towards Sullivan at the end of the
letter, “As I have heard from you but once or twice since
your arrival at Rhode Island, I am much at a loss for the
situation of matters in that quarter.”
George Washington to John Sullivan, Reiterate instructions of previous letter (July 17) and to be
July 22, 1778, Letter
prepared for D’Estaing’s arrival at any point.
GW sent 2 brigades as reinforcements to RI
George Washington to John Sullivan, Informs Sullivan that he has sent Nathanael Greene to assist
July 27, 1778, Letter
in the Rhode Island enterprise, with the formation of two
divisions, one directed by Greene and one by Lafayette, and
Sullivan having general command.
Informs Sullivan that there is a slight probability that upon
D’Estaing’s arrival, that he may dispatch troops on land to
assist, but it is solely up to him the specifics and to whom he
assists; suggests cooperation and harmony
George Washinton to John Sullivan, In regards to reinforcements being sent to Rhode Island;
July 28, 1778
informs Sullivan he believes his estimates of the number of
British forces are not accurate
George Washington to John Sullivan, at this point D’Estaing had not yet arrived- based on
July 31, 1778
letter from Sullivan on the 27th of July)
-GW could not afford any more reinforcements, as he was
close to the enemy himself
George Washington to John Sullivan,
August 4, 1778

George Washington to John Sullivan,
August 16, 1778
George Washington to Jonathan
Trumbull, July 18, 1778,

George Washington to Jonathan
Trumbull, July 28, 1778
George Washington to Marquis de
Lafayette, July 22, 1778,

D’Estaing’s fleet finally arrived at this point
John Sullivan had not reported the number of enemy ships in
the harbor/reaction to the French arrival
-asks Sullivan to keep him up to date and inform him of his
day-to-day operations; needs to know an estimated number at
Rhode Island in order to judge those remaining in New York
Again requesting Sullivan, more urging him, to report
everything to him.
Informing Trumbull of D’Estaing’s arrival at Sandy Hook
(16 ships total); British fleet are also at the Hook; believing
the Americans have the advantage; have also informed
Rhode Island and Massachusetts of the situation- the
vastness of the French fleet will force the British to stay
together as one.
D’Estaing’s arrival at Newport; believes it will be a success
overall; unsure if D’Estaing will divide his fleet as
Washington suggested; compared to New York, the situation
in Rhode Island was not as pressing
Instructing Lafayette to have command of Glover/Varnum
brigades/and under Henry Jackson and lead them to RI where
he would be under command of Gen. Sullivan, who has
command of the expedition agst Newport; If Layfayette, on
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George Washington to Marquis de
Lafayette, July 27, 1778,
George Washington to Marquis de
Lafayette, July 31, 1778,
George Washington to Marquis de
Lafayette, July 31, 1778,
George Washington to Marie Joseph
Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du
Motier, Marquis de Lafayette,
August 10, 1778
George Washington to Marquis de
Lafayette, September 25,
1778.
George Washington to Nathanael
Greene, August 8, 1778

George Washington to Nathanael
Greene, September 1, 1778,

George Washington to Peter
Muhlenberg, August 4, 1778,
George Washington to Silas Deane,
September 2, 1778, Letter,
From the Library of Congress,
George Washington Papers,
1741-1799, Series 3b Varick
Transcripts.
George Washington to Thomas
Tillotson, July 26, 1778,
George Washington to William
Maxwell, August 4, 1778,

the way, hears word that the British evacuate RI, he is to
countermarch;
Gen. Greene is to assist in the expedition agst RI, dividing all
American troops (continental, state and milita) into two
detachments, one commanded by Greene, and one by
Lafayette;
As of the 27th, he had not heard of D’Estaing’s arrival on
Newport Harbor; apologizes for not being able to send more
Continental soldiers- force on New York is more prominent;
Lafayette arrival at Saybrook, next stop Providence.
Thanking him for Layfayette agreeing to assist/take
command in Rhode Island
Thanking Layfayette for his service in Rhode Island;
*Notes a captain of French artillery/volunteer in Continental
Army, who lost his right arm in action at Quaker Hill
*
Gen. Greene arrived at Providence (4th); informing Greene of
Gen. Maxwell’s account of Howe sailing from Sandy Hook
with armed Vessels; reasons behind departure
unsure/whether they are assisting in the expedition in Rhode
Island is unsure
Discussing the matter of which D’Estaing departed from
Newport Harbor; not picking a side- recognizing there are
arguments for and against the departure; worries concern
distrust between America and the French- asking Greene to
attempt to ease tensions & reconcile differences; discussing
possible routes to go forth in regard to the “eastward
situation”
This letter is the same as that written to Brig. Gen.
James Clinton, July 31, 1778, q. v.16 Note 16:
Contemporary copy in an unknown hand.]”
*note 71
General Sullivan’s acct on 29th, British attacked him on
retreat, forced to leave the field in “disorder”; could not
discern whose loss/gain

Requesting a field hospital for the troops under Sullivan
As D’Estaing arrived in RI, George Washington is
attempting at seeking out intelligence from Maxwell, esp. in
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George Washington to William
Maxwell, August 31, 1778.
John Sullivan, August 24, 1778,
Rhode Island Campaign
General Orders
John Sullivan, August 26, 1778,
Rhode Island Campaign,

Staten Island- whether the British seem to be gathering on
ships or moving towards NY
Asking for immediate intelligence about the certainty of the
enemy sailing to Newport- whose command their under,
number of ships, artillery, etc.
See Section II
See Section II

John Sullivan, August 31, 1778,
Casualty Report

See Section II

John Sullivan to Charles Hector,
Comte d’Estaing, July 25,
1778
Nathanael Greene to Charles Hector,
Comte d’Estaing, August 21,
1778
Rhode Island War Council to George
Washington, Proceedings at
Providence Rhode Island,
January 15, 1778
Solomon Southwick to George
Washington, Report on
Commissary Assistants in
Rhode Island, May 26, 1778.

See Section II
See Section II
See Section II

See Section II
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Section II: Document Images

1st Rhode Island Regiment, 1778, List of Officers, From Library of Congress, George
Washington Papers, 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence, 1697-1799.
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American Intelligence, August 1778, British Navy Off Rhode Island, Library of Congress,
George Washington Papers 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence, 1697-1799.

Continental Army Officers to Charles Hector, Comte d’Estaing, August 22, 1778, Letter of
protest, From Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, 1741-1799, Series 4,
General Correspondence, 1697-1799.
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George Washington, January 1, 1778, Plan for Arrangement of the Army of the Campaign of
1778. From Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, 1741-1799, Series 4,
General Correspondence, 1697-1799.
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George Washington to Charles Hector, Comte d’Estaing, August 12, 1778, From Library of
Congress, George Washington Papers, 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence,
1697-1799.
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John Sullivan, August 24, 1778, Rhode Island Campaign General Orders, From Library of
Congress, George Washington Papers, 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence,
1697-1799.
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John Sullivan, August 26, 1778, Rhode Island Campaign, From Library of Congress, George
Washington Papers 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence, 1697-1799.
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John Sullivan, August 31, 1778, Casualty Report, From Library of Congress, George
Washington Papers, 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence, 1697-1799.
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John Sullivan to Charles Hector, Comte d’Estaing, July 25, 1778, letter, From Library of
Congress, George Washington Papers, 1741-1799: Series 4, General Correspondence.
1697-1799.
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Nathanael Greene to Charles Hector, Comte d’Estaing, August 21, 1778, Letter, From Library of
Congress, George Washington Papers, 1741-1799, Series 4, General Correspondence,
1697-1799.
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Rhode Island War Council to George Washington, Proceedings at Providence Rhode Island,
January 15, 1778, Letter, From Library of Congress, George Washington Papers 17411799, Series 4, General Correspondence, 1697-1799.
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Solomon Southwick to George Washington, Report on Commissary Assistants in Rhode Island,
May 26, 1778, Letter, From Library of Congress, George Washington Papers 1741-1799,
Series 4, General Correspondence, 1697-1799.
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Appendix E
The following text covers relevant sources on the Battle of Rhode Island, both primary and
secondary. The sources were studied and summarized below by Allyson Boucher.

Bibliographic Essay

Primary Sources
Primary sources are the root of historical research in that they offer a firsthand account of the
experience. There are several documents, journals, and first-hand accounts from the Battle of
Rhode Island in 1778 that still survive. Below are listed a select few sources and information
from each respective source.
Field, Edward, transcribed from original manuscript. Diary of Colonel Israel Angell: 1778-1781,
Commanding the Second Rhode Island Continental Regiment during the American
Revolution. Providence: Preston and Rounds Company, 1899.
Background on Angell:
Israel Angell was a fifth generation descendant of Thomas Angell, who had come to Providence
with Roger Williams. He was born in North Providence on August 24, 1740, the son of Oliver
and Naomi (Smith) Angell. Colonel Angell participated in battles of the Brandywine and Red
Bank, and was with the army during winter of 1777-78 at Valley Forge. After the Battle of
Monmouth, his regiment sent to RI to unite with General Sullivan in operations in Newport RI.
He retired from the army on January 1, 1781.
Angell’s diary begins August 20, 1778 – his regiment had been encamped at Tiverton RI,
forming part of the force under General John Sullivan, engaging in operations against British—
and ends September 23, 1778, when he left due to sickness.
Events noted in diary related to the Battle of Rhode Island:
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On August 20, Angell marched with detachment of 500 men as a covering party at 5pm;
French fleet not yet heard of “spread great consternation in the army.” The next day there was
heavy fire between the armies. News on August 22 that the French Admiral Comte D’Estaing
arrived off Beavertail, but after fog and storm they “left us in a most Rascally manner and will be
the Event God only knows,” as Angell said. On August 24 and 25, the British and American
armies continued exchange of cannonade and bombing. Colonel Livingston, Major Huntingdon
and their teams proceeded to lower works to get off cannon and mortar as they decided on
retreat. On August 27, one ensign, John Viol, and fourteen men were taken prisoner by the
British troops. At eight o’clock at night on August 28, Angell was ordered to strike tents and
march to north end of island by the commander of the Continental Army, General John Sullivan;
orders countermanded and were then ordered to tarry on the ground until further orders. On
retreat, repulsed enemy troops two or three troops. American troops took control of Butts Hill;
Hessian troops had severe attack on Americans, but they suffered more casualties. Sullivan
received word from Washington that British ships were on their way from New York to
Newport. Angell and his troops completed their retreat around three in the morning on August
31 from Aquidneck Island to Howland’s Ferry and then on to Warren.

Mrs. Mary Almy Journal: Siege of Newport, R.I. August 1778. Newport Historical Magazine, 1736.
Mrs. Mary Almy was an innkeeper who had British Loyalist sympathies. In her journal, she
describes her experience during the battle to her husband.
On July 29, Mrs. Almy hears news of the French fleet of eleven ships in the harbor. The
next few days she describes not much happening in harbor, but hears news of French ships going
up Conanicut passage on August 2. All the businesses in town are closed as talk of preparations
to sink French ships is spread. Confusion among people in Newport as to when battle will start,
and Mrs. Almy send her six children to be with her relatives away from inn. Mrs. Almy notes
her distress and anxiety at the approaching confrontation between ships. She says that
“everybody [in the town] turns politician forming and planning schemes for Lord [British
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General William] Howe, to make this naughty French Count [Comte D’Estaing] repent his
having joined the subject to rebel against the true and lawful Sovereign.” British and French
fleets engage in sea fight. There is a violent storm from August 11-12. Mrs. Almy speaks of her
loneliness and the quiet around town. On August 20, she learns that the French fleet was in bad
condition and had left. According to news from Mrs. Almy, British General Robert Pigot gave
orders to British and Hessian troops to follow American troops by day. She learns on August 24
that American troops had retreated; British troops began to decamp in the morning.

Secondary Sources
Secondary Sources are just as important in research, providing context and various
interpretations from historians. Below are select secondary sources and summary of information
on each (in alphabetical order).
Abbass, D.K., PhD. Rhode Island in the Revolution: Big Happenings in the Smallest Colony.
Available from the Rhode Island Marine Archaeology Project. USDI National Park
Service. American Battlefield Protection Program.
Part I: A Chronology of the War in Rhode Island
I-H: Siege of Newport – August 14-18, 1778
Aug 14- Two American battalions encamped south of Quaker Hill—200 Americans seen
on East Road, but British fire drove them off. RI Governor William Greene gave more supplies
of powder.
August 15 – Americans began move south toward Newport: General Sullivan at head
with 200 troops; John Laurens and Silas Talbot in command of next light infantry units; followed
by main, Nathanael Greene with Varnum’s brigade and Gen. Whipple’s NH militia. Americans
headquartered at Oakland Farm, to north of East Main Road, and took note of British positions
from Honeyman’s Hill.
August 16- American encampment began to build fortifications on Honeyman’s Hill and
one on hill near Redwood’s. Americans efforts focused on creating earthworks and trenches
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along Honeyman’s Hill to east of Newport. Nathaniel Greene wrote to wife on August 16 that
they were within two miles of Newport and would begin approach that night. Americans opened
6 batteries with connected trenches down the slope of the hill.
Aug 17- British fired 2 shots at new works – they continued to build defenses.
Aug 18- British troops fired cannons at American batteries (no. 2 and 3) but did little
damage.
Aug 19- British captured American sentry who gave information; after weather cleared,
British fired on American gallery; Americans were advanced far enough that their cannon fire
could reach any part of British line, so British drew back their positions.
Pigot had sent word to Clinton in NY that they might not be able to hold off Americans;
had asked for transports to evacuate Newport and might have to surrender. There were criticisms
of Americans of position in marshy ground on eastern side of Newport. French had planned to
take position north of the city. British responded by reinforcing defenses; continuous cannonade
between British and American troops.
The majority of American militiamen had only enlisted in July for three weeks.
American troops had trouble keeping men as well as maintaining supplies in Rhode Island.
American troops had decreased from 10,000 to 5,000 members.
After storm in mid-August, rest of British fleet under Howe had returned to NY for
repairs. French fleet returned to RI area at the top of Narragansett Bay on Aug 20. Comte
D’Estaing knew his damaged ships would not be able to defend against rest of British ships
arriving from New York.
On August 20, General Sullivan sent Lafayette and Greene to French ship Languedoc to
protest D’Estaing’s departure, in which they gave full written argument of reasons for French to
stay in Rhode Island. They argued that it was essential to alliance to defend island, however
Lafayette refused to sign because of French loyalties. Lafayette later protested Sullivan’s
behavior in letters to Washington. Greene and Sullivan wrote letters to Washington—aware of
potential damage of friction between French and American officers. By September 3, Sullivan
wrote to Washington that tensions were resolved.
The French left Narragansett Bay on August 22, heading towards Sakonnet River, the
same day, Howe and Brits left NY.

248

On August 23, American troops fired from all batteries against enemy. The next morning,
British attack on Potter’s Chimney, but one killed and two captured; also crossed Easton’s Beach
and burned Easton’s house.
On August 24 and 25, Americans and British continued to build batteries and exchange
fire. Americans ceased construction of trenches/batteries on August 26. Sullivan called another
council, decided to hold American position until reinforcements because of their decrease in
army numbers. At that point, the number of troops had diminished from 7000 to 4000 men.
Rhode Island Governor Greene said that the state was not able to send any more troops.
Battle of RI – Aug 29-31, 1778
The heaviest fighting in Rhode Island occurred as Americans were retreating to the
northern end of Aquidneck Island. American General Greene commanded right wing on West
main road, and General Glover commanded left wing on East main road. Americans had pitched
tents early in morning on August 29 on Butts hill. Greene’s regiment with Major Samuel Ward
Jr., including 100 black soldiers held redoubt near shore on right wing.
As British advanced on land, their ships (the Sphnyx, the Vigilant, and the Spitfire) took
up position between Prudence Island and American right. Captain von Malsberg saw Laurens
advanced party and engaged in first confrontation of battle on West Main Road. Laurens
retreated, taking up position near Turkey Hill. Von Lossberg and his troops joined and drove
Americans from Turkey Hill. Retreating Americans ambushed Noltenius’ Chasseurs and
continued push until they reached the edges of General Greene’s troops. Smith pursued
American Livingston’s troops, but the British had not sent an advanced party; Americans at
Union Street ambushed them.
Sullivan sent reinforcements down East Main Road. The fighting continued as they
moved further north of the island. American troops, with reinforcements, engaged British and
Hessian troops at Quaker Hill. British ships bombed from Bristol. American Major Ward in
command of “Colored Regiment”; they engaged with General Von Lossberg and his Hessian
troops. Hessian troops could not withstand the number of Americans and withdrew to top of
Turkey Hill. Cannonade and fighting continued into the night.
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The number of fatalities in that part of the battle was low. Sullivan’s troops: 30 killed,
137 wounded, and 44 missing. British and Hessian troops: 38 killed, 210 wounded, and 44
missing. British and American armies remained in positions on August 30 and continued
exchange of artillery.
Sullivan received letter from Washington that British ships were on their way from New
York to Rhode Island. He called council of war, and decided to retreat to the forts at Tiverton.
On the night of August 30, the main part of the American army reached Tiverton, and three
hours later the rest of army had left Aquidneck Island. British returned to original positions
(from July) on Conanicut and Aquidneck Islands. On August 31, Sullivan wrote complete report
of Battle of Rhode Island for Washington.
Conway, Stephen R. The British Isles and the War of American Independence. “Chapter 2: War
of American Independence, 1775-83.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Source on background of Battle of Rhode Island:
General William Howe – head of old Boston garrison—began operations in the lower
Hudson River Valley of New York. The town of Newport, Rhode Island seized at end of 1776
by British. The July 1776 Declaration of Independence made it more likely for Americans to
receive foreign aid. The war became from 1778 on – a global conflict – French and other allies
for Americans. D’Estaing unable to force a decisive action to maintain blockade of New York.
The following month, D’Estaing won Newport, and came close to compelling surrender of
British garrison with cooperation of French fleet, Continental troops and local New England
militia. British believed that French and Americans were unnatural allies (Catholic monarchs
and Protestant republicans). Conclusion: entry of France changed course of American war,
especially because of naval forces.

Dearden, Paul F. Rhode Island Campaign of 1778. Providence: Published for the Rhode Island
Publications Society by the Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 1980.
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On August 11, General Sullivan’s army numbered 10,122 men (not including 500-600
NH volunteers). Sullivan believed his army was strong enough without the French troops so
gave orders to march the next morning, August 12. However, a storm ravaged Aquidneck Island
and forced the American troops to stop advance. Both the British and American armies became
sick from weather and some died from exposure.
After a few days, Sullivan gave orders to move on the morning of August 15. On August
15 at two in the afternoon the American troops reached Honeyman’s Hill; they pitched tents and
began to station advanced posts. Their position on hill and area (which had been selected by the
Continental Congress on July 25) was poor because it gave the British a height advantage; there
were also marshy conditions on the ground.
British General Pigot had opened bombardment from August 16-17 on Sullivan’s troops.
Sullivan had many men desert throughout the Battle of Rhode Island. He had to ask for more
troops from the other New England militias; RI sent remaining half of its militiamen to
Aquidneck Island. From date of August 18, Americans began construction work of five-gun
battery at their position at Honeyman’s Hill. Pigot continued work of strengthening the British
line; starting August 10, troops cut down trees and set down across Green End line to Tomini
Hill. They continued to build defense line from Easton’s Beach to pond. On August 16, Hessian
General Von Lossberg stationed in front of little Tomini with seamen troops and 2 six pounders.
On August 19, Sullivan’s troops launched cannonade on British line, which forced them to move
back their encampment; Americans had also been hit, with two wounded and one dead.
On August 20, Comte D’Estaing returned to waters close to Newport, but gave word to
American troops that he would continue to Boston for repairs. The Americans Generals on
Aquidneck Island were upset at D’Estaing’s departure. Sullivan, Greene, and Hancock met and
wrote document that stated they had only agreed to battle in RI because of promise of French aid,
and without their aid the Americans would be abandoned and likely have to retreat. The
generals’ protest of French actions was given to General Heath to give to D’Estaing and French
troops when they arrived in Boston. Lafayette upset by American proclamations against French.
On August 23, Americans has two more batteries, engaged British all day; Sullivan’s
troops: 8,174 men, which kept dwindling each day.
Hancock left army to go to Boston. American soldiers at scene wrote in diaries about
how French had betrayed them by leaving for Boston.
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On Aug 20, Lieutenant Stanhope sent word to troops of RI of D’Estaing’s return to
Boston area.
British General Howe led his ships for Newport on August 25. On his way to RI, Howe
was met by Galatea (a British ship), which informed him D’Estaing had left Newport area, so
Howe set off for Boston. Howe arrived in Boston on August 30, two days behind arrival of
French.
General Sullivan asked commanders (Washington) for course of action for American
troops. General John Glover suggested move to the northern end of the island so ferries to
mainland could be secured; other generals agreed. Nathanael Greene disagreed, thought a force
of 300 men in small boats led by John Laurens should land on the right flank of the British lines
and carry through to guards on Easton’s Beach.
On August 24, Sullivan received word from Washington that Howe was assembling a
hundred ships on Long Island, so it was decided that the colonials would be more secure at
northern tip where they could await the return of D’Estaing’s fleet. Sullivan again asked for
reinforcements from other New England regiments. According to letters from Governor William
Greene, 60 men left on mainland to guard Providence.
On August 25, British bombarded Sullivan’s troops for an hour and a half; colonial
troops fired only a few shots with little guns. Pigot suspected that Americans expected to retreat;
he sent out reconnaissance patrols on August 26.
On August 27 at 2pm, Howe’s ships Sphnyx, Vigilant, and Nautilus anchored in Newport.
Pigot expected reinforcement from British commander Clinton. Clinton arrived with 4000
troops, hoping to cut off Sullivan and move against Providence. On night of August 27,
Lafayette left for Boston.
Greene and American troops formed right wing and took West Road, and Glover and left
wing moved towards East Road. Advanced troops were drawn off Pigot’s line and reached Butts
Hill.
Sullivan’s works of around 5-6000 formed defensive line facing Newport. Pigot’s
informant Captain MacKenzie told of American withdrawal (realignment).
Smith marched against Quaker Hill and West Road; Captain von Malsberg and Captain
Noltenius with Hessian troops marched against Laurens on East Road. Germans forced
Americans back in skirmishes near Laurens’ main flank. Pigot sent troops to aid Smith. Laurens
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and his men fell back after push from von Lossberg, which was able to storm from three sides.
Laurens was then forced to retreat to Turkey Hill and fall back to the main army near Sullivan.
Concealed Americans in cornfield sent volley on Brit. Nolt’s line. British and Hessian
troops came for both sides and attempted to cut through middle as Laurens troops retiring back
against walls. Smith faded; Hessians restocked; Liviningston received recruits from Sullivan.
Major Tousard, member of Lafayette’s military family, had horse blown from him and
his right arm severed against British artillery.
McBurney, Christian M. The Rhode Island Campaign. Yardley: Westholme Publishing, 2011.
The French ships arrived the afternoon of August 20 in Narragansett Bay. The American
camp rejoiced at their arrival. However, winds kept them from entering Newport harbor that
day.
French commander of their ship Senegal, Ensign Joseph Comte de Cambis, gave news to
the Americans on Aquidneck Island that the French fleet will go up to Boston to repair its
damages after the storm of August 11-13. Several American officers, including Nathanael
Greene, Marquis de Lafayette, and Colonel John Langdon, were sent to the French fleet to ask
the Admiral D’Estaing to change his decision to leave. D’Estaing replied to their request that the
French were leaving for reasons of self-preservation.
On August 21, the French fleet left Rhode Island waters. Americans were still upset by
their departure. Sullivan wrote letter in objection, “Protest of the General Officers on Rhode
Island,” listing nine arguments for the French to stay, which was also signed by Nathanael
Greene and several officers. The American protest slightly soured the French-American
relations, as the French felt insulted by the American reaction.
On the island, Americans continued to extend trenches and new batteries. General Pigot’s
British troops fired on American troops at work. American commanders had considered retreat,
but decided to dig in until the British reinforcements arrived. Sullivan issued plans for quick
withdrawal if necessary, especially because they were losing large number of troops. Sullivan
noted large decrease in American troops numbers, mostly due to desertion, from 11,000 to 8,800
between August 15 and August 24. Major Eyre and carpenters were instructed to put up gun
platforms on the northern end of island. Colonel John Crane’s cannon was also moved to north
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to Butts Hill. Volunteers from Salem, Massachusetts were given orders to have boats ready at
Howland’s and Bristol Ferries. Also, as a cautionary step all unnecessary baggage was to be
transported off of island.
The night of August 26, there was exchange of fire; however, the next day Americans
began to move their front line cannon.
Three ships of British navy spotted; they were a 20 gun frigate Sphnyyx, 14 gun sloop
Nautilis, and 20 gun armed vessel Vigilant. The arrival of the ships brought the news that
Clinton was gathering about 4,300 reinforcements at Long Island to bring to Rhode Island.
Greene created plan to attack British lines with 5,000 soldiers, including 300 men led by
John Laurens to surprise British redoubt. Sullivan also discussed moving to top of Butts Hill.
Lafayette went up to Boston to ask for repaired French ships to return to RI. On August 28,
Sullivan ultimately decided that all units should all fall back to defensive positions around Butts
Hill.
Sullivan’s army next goal, along with defense and retreat, was to protect Howland’s
Ferry to be able to leave island. Sullivan split troops in valley below Butts Hill, so that their
front line of defense stretched across island. The 1st RI regiment held position on right wing
commanded by Nathanael Greene, from Butts Hill to Durfee’s Hill. West Road blocked by
Laurens and Major Silas Talbot and Lieutenant Colonel Louis de Fleury, and East Road blocked
by Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston, with a detachment of 250 men of army’s picket under
Colonel Nathaniel Wade.
On August 29, British Major Frederich Mackenzie spotted withdrawal of Sullivan’s
troops, and Pigot gave orders to attack. Pigot assembled British, Hessian, and Loyalist troops
(about 5,700 soldiers and artillerymen), and then ordered 3 columns to go after Sullivan midretreat. Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossberg led 1,000 men up West Road. Brigadier
General Francis Smith led central column of 1,100 men. Major General Richard Prescott,
Pigot’s right hand man, led troops up East Road. Hessian commander von Lossberg attacked
Laurens from 3 sides; Americans were outnumbered and withdrew with Hessian after them. Von
der Malsburg came to Hessian assistance. Laurens advance troops fell to below Turkey Hill as
Hessians continued to move forward towards them. Sullivan ordered Laurens back to main
lines; Von Lossburg assaulted again, and Laurens retreated again and eventually led to ground
west of Butts Hill. Pigot ordered prescott’s troops to reinforce General Smith on East Road.
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There were 3,700 Brit regiments facing 3,900 American front line and advance troops.
Livingston’s troops headed north to Quaker Hill after seeing British Captain Thomas Coore’s
companies. British troops led by Smith and Campbell did not send out advance troops and were
ambushed by American Colonel Nathaniel Wade at Middle Road. Once they recovered, they
followed after Wade and Livingston’s troops on East Road. Americans troops were able to
check the advance of the British troops.
Sullivan sent Colonel John Trumball to order Wigglesworth’s Regiment back to main
line. Hessian von Huyn regiment had been approaching towards them. Smith’s senior
commanders on East Road prepared their troops (1100 men) for attack on Americans (900 men)
on that end. Major Mackenzie was given information that morning that troops withdrew from
Quaker’s Hill.
According to American accounts, their retreat went smoothly and orderly. British troops
continued to advance within range of American cannon. From Quaker’s hilltop British General
Smith could see positions from Butts Hill to American right wing that showed that they had not
caught up with army. They obeyed Pigot’s orders not to bring on general engagement, especially
because British troops guarding Newport were not available. Smith withdrew his infantry to
Quaker Hill and bombard Glover’s troops from above, but it had no effect.
At 10am, von Lossberg’s troops just arriving at Turkey Hill with main American
positions at Durfee and Butts Hill. Nathanael Greene and his troops were on that end; they held
key position of Artillery Redoubt (1/2 mile southwest of Butts Hill); the walls could be used for
use for protection held by Major Samuel Ward’s 1st RI regimen. Von der Malsburg charged
redoubt but regiment repelled them. Then under orders from von Lossberg tried assault again on
American right wing. Small squadron of British ships assisted on assault by shelling rear.
British Captain Alexander Graeme abandoned efforts after receiving cannonballs from Bristol
battery. After his firing from Brit ships lessened, Von Lossberg directed another assault on
Americans – 2nd RI regiment was sent in to help 1st RI regiment and able to help fight.
American cannon fire continued to hurt Hessian troops. They still pressed forward
against Americans with 1200 men forcing American retreat. Fighting for Greene’s troops
included 1600 men although many fired long range still effective because of number and coming
from downhill (Butts hill to Durfee hill). The Hessians therefore became cut off with Americans
on all sides. Greene called for MA militia to attack Hessian troops’ rear. By 3:30 pm, fighting
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on that side had ended – German troops retreated to Turkey Hill. Sullivan decided against
general attack – sought to get army of island. British had gained land, but Americans had
responded well to attacks and inflicted more casualties – British/Hessian/Loyalist 260: 38 killed,
210 wounded, and 12 missing; American 211 casualties: 30/137/44.
McBurney, Christian. Spies in Revolutionary Rhode Island. Charleston: The History Press, 2014.
As with the rest of the Revolutionary War, spies played a role in Rhode Island campaign.
Sullivan reversed sentence of whipping given by court martial panel against Mansfield Allen.
American spies on Aquidneck Island did not use real names. General Sullivan received one
fairly accurate report of British troop defense positions from an American spy. In September
1778, Marquis de Lafayette attempted to set up an American spy network that would infiltrate
the British in Newport; also, sent fake deserter and other disguised American officer. Efforts by
colonials to root out Tories may have hampered British spy efforts.
Murray, Thomas Hamilton. “John Sullivan and the Battle of Rhode Island: a Sketch of the
Former and a Description of the Latter.” American-Irish Historical Society. 1902.
According to Murray, Americans had withstood and repelled successive attacks. They
made an effect on British forces, in which they had lost one-fifth their entire force in action. The
British had taken possession of Newport, Rhode Island in December 1776. It was General
George Washington’s plan to have Americans take hold of island. General John Sullivan was
appointed to succeed Major General Spencer by Congress.
On June 19, Congress based on the request of Sullivan and Governor Greene, returned
Rhode Island troops to the state for defense, and the navy to prepare three ships for defense of
Providence, Warren, and Taunton rivers; meanwhile the British interrupted preparations and
burned several houses in Bristol.
The arrival of the French fleet in New York caused the British prepare for attack. On
July 29, 1778, the French fleet under Comte D’Estaing arrived, including twelve ships of the
line, four frigates and a corvette with 4,000 troops. He had meeting with Sullivan that decided
two ships of the frigate were to take position and cut off retreat of enemy’s vessels in bay.
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British realized plan and ran four ships aground to burn them, and later destroyed smaller
vessels to prevent being taken by French. D’Estaing changed mind, embarked troops forgoing
arrangements with Sullivan and went to give battle to Howe’s fleet; Sullivan and Lafayette
were shocked. Storm the night of August 12 scattered fleets; French had engaged some smaller
British ships but because of ships’ damages went to Boston for repairs.
Sullivan then sent away all materials not needed at main lines. On August 28, he held
council that they would move to north end of island and fortify camps. Enemy and American
troops would fire back and forth throughout the day. According to Sullivan the troops showed
great spirit when engages and “the brigades of the first line, Varnum's, Glover's, Cornell's, and
Greene's, behaved with great firmness. Major-General Greene who commanded in the attack on
the right, did himself the highest honor by the judgment and bravery exhibited in the action.”
Losses – Americans: 211 (killed, wounded, missing); British: 1023
Stevens, John Austin. An Address delivered in Newport: The French in Rhode Island, Newport
in the Revolutionary Period, 1778-1782.
Comte D’Estaing had sought to engage British with his fleet at New York, but they had
already left, so his French fleet then sailed for Newport.
Washington directed Sullivan to apply for five thousand men from New England militias,
and then said to divide the troops into divisions in Rhode Island under command of Marquis de
Lafayette and General Greene.
On July 29, they appeared off Brenton’s Ledge- detached frigates to East and West
Passages, also cut off British retreat because of shallow waters. On August 5, French frigates
holding western passage anchored in middle channel. Four British frigates were run ashore on
RI and burned as they neared Tonomy Hill. Eight vessels sunk and thirteen burned, and at same
time, British scattered over island burning houses and destroying land.
General Sullivan and D’Estaing met to discuss plan of action. On August 8, Sullivan said
he planned to cross from mainland to island with troops. D’Estaing then forced his troops in
middle passage; they had heavy fire from British, then British destroyed two remaining vessels.
D’Estaing and troops began landing after fog lifted the next day, and then began their
organization and drills.
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British troops led by General Pigot came from north of island and posted on Bannister’s
Hill and across Tonomy Hill.
Joint attack of Americans and French was scheduled to take place on August 10, with
D’Estaing landing about 4,000 troops; Sullivan’s troops began crossing at Fogland Ferry at north
end of island (with around 10,000 troops). Sullivan occupied deserted British post and then
pushed down island with Colonel Livingston to within a mile of Pigot’s line of defense.
British commander General Howe sailed towards Newport and engaged with D’Estaing.
That night, August 11, there was a great storm that damaged the ships. On August 13, French
fleet separated and Languedoc badly damaged; also, attacked at sunset by one of British ships.
Both fleets suffered great damages.
Lafayette informed D’Estaing that British Admiral Byron was on way to support British
troops in RI, so therefore French would be significantly outnumbered. The French fleet set sail
the next day as it was decided that French should go up to Boston where repairs to ships could be
made.
Schroder, Walter K. The Hessian Occupation of Newport and Rhode Island: 1776-1779.
Westminster: Heritage Books, 2005.
General John Sullivan ordered the troops to move to the northern tip of island after the
unexpected withdrawal of the French fleet to Boston.
Lieutenant Freidrich McKenzie observed American movements on morning of August 29
and gave information to General Pigot. Hessian troops ordered to move forward to Irish’s
Redoubt with 2,000 men including light infantry. Major General Von Lossberg was in overall
command of the Hessian troops; he led advance troops along West Road to attack at any
opportunity. The British 38th and 54th Regiments, along with 22nd and 43rd Regiments as
flanking companies, under Major General Prescott, pursued along East Road.
Hessian Captain Von der Malsberg spotted American Colonel John Laurens at rear of
Sullivan’s army. Hessians engaged American troops, back and forth, with a few wounded on
each side; Americans withdrew.
There was also a skirmish between Colonel Campbell’s 22nd Regiment and American
troops, under Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston, near Union Street and East Road. There were

258

many dead and wounded, especially due to ambush from behind stonewalls by the Americans;
then Americans quickly withdrew.
The Ansbach-Bayreuth troops, which were other German troops, continued push to north
of island. Sullivan’s troops withdrew to artillery redoubt and Windmill Hill (or Butts Hill).
However, the Hessians were able to advance more swiftly than the American commanders
thought. There were several smaller engagements along Turkey Hill. There was a shortage of
ammunition on the British side, which slowed Hessian advance and gave the Americans a chance
to strengthen defensive positions and fire muskets.
During the night of August 29 and 30, troops maintained positions while some American
troops moved to Howland’s Ferry. Pigot then decided to wait out American movements, but
American evacuation of island had been completed by morning and his search parties in area
found nothing.
Walker, Anthony. So Few the Brave: Rhode Island Continentals, 1775-1783. Seafield Press.
Newport, Rhode Island, 1981.
The Rhode Island General Assembly voted that every able-bodied negro, mulatto and
Indian slave could enlist for duration of Revolutionary war with the same wages as free men.
Christopher Greene led the 1st Rhode Island Regiment, and Varnum led the 2nd Rhode Island
Regiment. On August 1, the Rhode Island called its militia, which was composed of six
regiments of 3,000 soldiers. General Washington sent his most trusted generals to work with
General John Sullivan, Lafayette and Nathanael Greene. The French Admiral D’Estaing and
Sullivan made plans for Rhode Island. On August 8, French would enter Narragansett Bay; on
August 9-10, they would ferry Sullivan’s ships to east shore of Aquidneck Island, and French
soldiers and marines would, at the same time, land on west shore and then their combined forces
would attack British. The American troops were able to successfully land, but the British ships
on horizon upset D’Estaing plan. A severe storm struck Aug 11-12, that led the French fleet to
leave on August 20 for Boston for repairs.
The American troops’ strength declined after departure of French. After word that
British troops were expecting reinforcements from New York for their 7,000 men, American
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commanders decided to withdraw. The night of August 28-29, Americans withdrew to north of
island.
Sullivan positioned troops to cover island as they withdrew to north. British General
Pigot ordered his forces to pursue the Americans, but to avoid a general engagement. Brigadier
General Smith marched along east road with regiments, and Major Lossberg with Hessian troops
moved along western road towards Turkey Hill.
American troops led by Laurens fired on advanced British troops, and the British suffered
casualties and stopped; Laurens continued uphill. British on East Road came under fire from
American troops led by Livingston, who were also able to move to higher ground. General
Sullivan on hearing firing, he ordered a regiment forward and for advanced troops to return to
mainline. British troops had swept before them, but held to order of no general engagement. The
men on both sides were tired from heat exhaustion.
General Nathanael Greene and Varnum were on Butts Hill. They saw Hessian advance
in valley and sent the 2nd Rhode Island Regiment for reinforcements of the artillery redoubt.
Hessian General Lossberg urged troops forward from his view on Turkey Hill, at one point they
had more than one thousand troops to attack redoubt. Greene and Varnum committed troops to
saving redoubt. Cannon fire came from both sides of hill; however, most of firing was at long
range. Sullivan reported for army: 211 soldier killed, wounded, or missing; Pigot reported: 260
British, Hessian and Tory casualties. Greene, Laurens and other commanders recommended
assault on enemy on hills, but Sullivan rejected. The night of August 29-30, the two sides
remained in place and shot long range artillery fire. The night of August 30-31, Sullivan quietly
removed troops from island via boats to Tiverton and Bristol; many of regiments returned to
their homes around New England.

More sources for information on the Revolutionary War in Rhode Island:
Rhode Island: Historical Tracts. Providence: S.S. Rider.
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Blanco, Richard L. The War of the American Revolution: A Selected Annotated Bibliography of
Published Sources. Series: Wars of the United States (Garland Publishing, Inc.), vol. 1.;
Garland reference library of social science, v. 154. New York: Garland, 1984.
Commager, Henry Steele. Spirit of 'Seventy-Six. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.
Crane, Elaine Forman. A Dependent People: Newport, Rhode Island, in the Revolutionary Era.
New York: Fordham University Press, 1985.
Greene, F.V. Biography on Nathanael Greene. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1893.
James, Sydney V. Colonial Rhode Island: A History. New York: Scribner, 1975.
Lippitt, Charles Warren. Battle of Rhode Island. Newport, 1915. Bulletin of the Newport
Historical Society, no. 18.
Meyers, Frank C. The Navies and Marines of the American Revolution. Bradford, James C.,
PhD; The Armed Forces; A Companion to American Military History, 2 Volumes;
Bradford/A Companion to American Military History; A Companion to American
Military History; 329-337; Wiley-Blackwell : Oxford, UK.
Schumacher, Alan T. and Diana Macarthur-Stanham. The Siege of Newport: July-August, 1778.
Smith, Page. A New Age Now Begins: A People's History of the American Revolution. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.
Stevens, John Austin and Mary Morris Stevens. The French in Rhode Island: Newport in the
Revolutionary Period, 1778-1782; The French Occupation, 1780-1781. Newport:
Franklin Print House, 1928.
Stone, Edwin Martin. Our French Allies: Rochambeau and His Army, Lafayette and His
Devotion, D'Estaing, De Ternay, Barras, De Grasse, and Their Fleets, in the Great War
of the American Revolution, from 1778 to 1782, including Military Operations in Rhode
Island, the Surrender of Yorktown, Sketches of French and American Officers, and
Incidents of Social Life in Newport, Providence, and Elsewhere. Providence: Providence
Press Co., 1884.
Taylor O’D, Erich A., John Howard Benson. Campaign on Rhode Island. M. DCC. LXX. VIII.
Newport: publisher not identified, 1978.
Tretler, David Allan. The Making of a Revolutionary General—Nathanael Greene: 1742-1779.
Vol. I & II. Rice University. PDF.
Walker, Anthony. The Despot's Heel: British Occupation of the Bay, Island and Town,
December 1776-October 1779. Newport: Seafield Press, 1996.
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Neimeyer, Charles P. Rhode Island Goes to War: The Battle of Rhode Island, 1776-1778. Digital
Commons @ Salve Regina 2003-10-01T07:00:00Z; Computer file.
http://digitalcommons.salve.edu/newporthistory/vol72/iss249/8/.
Stevens, John Austin. “The French in Rhode Island.” Magazine of American History, Newport,
3, 7 (1879).
Amory, Thomas C. “Siege of Newport, RI in 1778.” Massachusetts Historical Society. 17
(1879), 163-184.
Billias, George N. “General Glover’s Role in the Battle of Rhode Island (August 1778).” RI
Historical Society, 36 (1959), 33-42
Gibbs, Caleb. Orderly book kept by Major Gibbs, 1778.
Summary: "Orderly" book kept by or for Major Gibbs (1778 August 8-28). Orders from
headquarters at Tiverton (R.I.) and Newport (R.I.) concern securing provisions, shelter,
and ammunition. Included in the volume is information about courts martial, and the
organization of troops and detachments.
Notes: George C. Mason produced six known unique "Extra Illustrated" editions of his
published book, Reminiscences of Newport. There are original manuscripts and
engravings carefully interspersed and bound in with the text, sometimes illustrative of the
text they accompany, sometimes seemingly unrelated to the text but relevant to the
history of Newport, R.I. The Redwood Library holds three editions of one volume each
and one set in two volumes. Institutions known to hold other versions are the Rhode
Island Historical Society, in six volumes, and the New York Public Library.
https://archive.org/details/reminiscencesofn01mason
“Frederick Mackenzie papers, 1760-1783.”
Abstract: The Frederick Mackenzie papers contain military documents and several bound
volumes relating to numerous aspects of British army administration during the American
Revolutionary War. These include returns of casualties, provisions, vacancies, and
ordnance for various regiments, as well as scattered orders and memoranda on army
policies.
Howard M Chapin; Grolier Club. Gazette françoise: a facsimile reprint of a newspaper, printed at
Newport on the printing press of the French fleet in American waters during the
Revolutionary War. New York: Grolier Club, 1926.
Journal with an Account of the Battle of Newport: fragments, 1778, July 29--1781, Dec. 31.
Notes: All inquiries regarding this collection should be directed to Norris Foundation Curator of
American Historical Manuscirpts.
Letters from British Army Officers Regarding Revolutionary War Battles in Newport, R.I.
Edinburgh Advertister Extraordinary, Oct. 19, 1778. Edinburgh: James Donaldson, 1778.
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Bartlett, John Russell, ed. Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, in
New England. 10 volumes. 1856. Reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1908.
Gianmarco, Joe. “The History and Significance of Pallas & Tantae.” The Continental Line.
www.continentalline.org.
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Appendix F
The following report was prepared by Dr. Jon Bernard Marcoux. It provides more detailed
results of the Ground Penetrating Radar surveys conducted for this project.

Ground Penetrating Radar Survey at Three Sites
Associated with the Battle of Rhode Island
Middletown and Portsmouth, RI

Submitted by: Jon Bernard Marcoux, Ph.D. (Salve Regina University)
Submitted to: Dr. Kenneth Walsh (Middletown Historical Society)

August 2016
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Introduction
This report summarizes the results of a ground penetrating radar (GPR) survey conducted
between July 16, 2014 and November 19, 2015 for Dr. Kenneth Walsh of the Middletown
Historical Society. The survey was performed by Dr. Jon Bernard Marcoux of Salve Regina
University, primarily assisted by Dr. Kenneth Walsh and Mersina Christopher. Areas included in
the survey were distributed across three sites – the Redoubt de St. Onge, the Aaron Lopez Farm,
and the suspected site of Fort Fanning (Figure 1). All of these sites are associated with the
Revolutionary War landscape on Aquidneck Island during the Battle of Rhode Island. The goal
of the survey was to determine whether the study sites contained any intact archaeological
deposits that might be associated with the Revolutionary War period. The results of the survey
demonstrate the following: 1) the Redoubt de St. Onge is quite intact, with construction layers
still visible in the GPR profiles; 2) one of the areas investigated at the Aaron Lopez farm (Grid 1)
contains an anomaly that may related to a structure or stone wall foundation; 3) the surveyed area
at the suspected site of Fort Fanning did not show evidence of a military feature; instead the
primary anomaly was a mid-20th century baseball diamond.
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Figure 1 Map depicting three survey areas in current study.
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Survey Methods
The survey employed techniques and methods that fall under the subfield of
archaeological geophysics (AG). Archaeological geophysics is a field of study that utilizes
precise measurements of certain physical properties of soil in order to identify and define buried
archaeological features (e.g., storage pits, trash-filled pits, burials, house posts). The most
obvious benefit of AG is that it provides the archaeologist with a "picture" of sorts of what lies
beneath the surface of the ground. This image can be used as map to direct excavations to
specific features within an archaeological site - greatly reducing the amount of time spent
searching for these features using traditional field methods. Archaeological geophysics has been
in existence since the 1940s; however, only within the last decade have major advances in
computing power and increases in the sensitivity of measuring instruments made AG a practical
and cost-effective research tool (Ernenwein and Hargrave 2009; Gaffney and Gater 2003;
Johnson 2006). While still at a nascent stage, AG is growing in popularity among archaeologists
in the southeastern U.S.. Recently, AG techniques were used to define the size and structure of
manmade "shell rings" along the coast of Georgia (Thompson et al. 2004) and to identify buried
trash-filled pits and house structures at the Crystal River Mound site in western Florida
(Pluckhahn et al. 2009). Despite this recent growth, however, AG remains largely limited to
projects conducted by researchers at large universities (Johnson 2006).
Archaeological geophysics includes a number of different techniques, each of which
focuses on a different physical property of soil. Ground penetrating radar (GPR) is the most
popular technique because it is cost effective and time efficient (Conyers 2006; Aspinall et al.
2008; Kvamme 2006) GPR accurately maps objects (like metal pipes) and archaeological
features by sending radar wave pulses through the soil and measuring the time it takes for each
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wave to be reflected back to an antenna at the surface. Differences in soil, such as would be
expected between the subsoil and a filled-in pit or the presence of subsurface objects are detected
as changes in the velocity of the radar wave. The benefit of GPR is that it results in a threedimensional picture of subsurface features, where the analyst can record the horizontal positions
of features as well as their depths.
For the GPR survey, we established a 45m-x-19m grid at the Redoubt de St. Onge site, a
25m-x-12m grid and a 23m-x-27m grid at the Aaron Lopez Farm site, and an 80m-x-20m grid at
the Fort Fanning site. The geophysical survey instrument parameters were set to collect the
maximum amount of data within reasonable time and data storage limits. The GPR instrument is
capable of relatively dense data point collection. The GPR instrument was set to record 50 scans
per meter with 512 individual radar pulses per scan on transects spaced 50 cm apart. This
resulted in 25,600 radar pulses per meter, which for example would equate to 20,992,000
individual pulses for a 20 m-x-20m area. Pin flags were used to mark transects for Dr. Marcoux,
who covered each grid by pacing in a zigzag pattern. The data recovered from the GPR survey
were processed by Dr. Marcoux using RADAN software by GSSI, Inc.

Survey Results
Redoubt de St. Onge
Figure 2 shows the location of the survey area at the site of Redoubt de St. Onge in
Middletown, RI. This site is owned by the Newport Historical Society, who graciously gave us
permission to perform the survey. The upper-right portion of Figure 3 depicts the survey results
at a depth of 50 centimeters below surface (cmbs). This plan view map, and those associated
with the other two sites in the survey are oriented with North facing the top of the page. The
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plan view map depicts the amplitude of radar reflections recorded by the GPR instrument. The
amplitude, or strength, of the reflection is color-coded from dark low (gray) to high (white). As
stated above, one of the benefits of GPR is the ability to explore subsurface features in three
dimensions. Each transect in the survey captures a vertical profile of the soil to a depth of
approximately two meters. The bottom of Figure 3 shows a single representative profile from the
survey. The location of this profile is shown as a dashed line in the plan view. The features
shown as high amplitude reflections (light colored) represent significant differences in the soil
encountered by the radar waves. Hyperbolas - the upside-down, U-shaped reflections- suggest a
round object like rocks, which there are plenty of, roots, and perhaps even ordinance. Flat or
undulating planar reflections represent flat objects or surfaces, such as what would be expected
in rammed earth fortifications. The profiles of features with multiple high amplitude point-source
reflection hyperbolas and planar reflections typically indicate a fill. The profiles from each
survey block are combined to create a three-dimensional subsurface model. All of the plan-view
map figures in this report represent horizontal “slices” taken at a particular depth below surface.
The plan view map in the upper right portion of Figure 3 shows two North-South oriented
linear anomalies at approximately 50 cmbs. One anomaly is located in the center of the survey
area and the other along the eastern margin. When the GPR profiles are consulted, it is clear that
these are high-amplitude planar reflections that increase in depth as they move east. Such
reflections represent sloped surfaces that descend from West to East across survey area. In the
lower portion of Figure 3, the GPR profile shows three such planar surfaces. The first surface (on
the left) likely represents the original ground surface of the slope from which the redoubt was
constructed. The second surface (in the center of the profile) represents tamped or rammed earth
that was used to level and extend the redoubt away from the natural slope. The last surface (on
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the right) is associated with a final extension and construction of the embankment that protected
the soldiers within the redoubt. The upper left portion of Figure 3 shows a photograph of the
redoubt taken in the late 19th century.

270

Figure 2 Map depicting GPR survey grid at Redoubt de St. Onge.
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Figure 3 Top Left: 1896 Photograph of Redoubt de St. Onge. Top Right: Plan view of GPR survey at 50 cm below
surface (cmbs). Bottom: GPR profile taken at position marked by dotted line.
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Aaron Lopez Farm
The Aaron Lopez Farm site is located in Portsmouth, RI. We surveyed two areas
searching for possible intact remains of outbuildings associated with this merchant’s 18th century
farm (Figure 4). The results of the GPR survey in Grid 1 are presented in Figure 5. The upper
portion of the figure depicts a horizontal “slice” of the survey area at 100 cmbs. There are a
number of small bright “spots” in the survey area. These are high amplitude point anomalies that
likely represent large rocks, as the soil at this site contained many large pieces of glacial till. In
addition to these, there appear to be a number of lower amplitude linear anomalies trending
Southeast to Northwest. In the eastern portion of the survey area, two of these linear anomalies
intersect with two other perpendicular linear anomalies to form a square-shaped feature (outlined
in Figure 5). A GPR profile cutting through this feature (Figure 5: bottom) shows two areas of
multiple high amplitude reflections at a depth of 100 cm (approximately at 18m and 26m along
the transect measured along the top of the profile). In between these two areas are multiple
moderate amplitude reflections. Taken together, this data suggests the possible remnants of a
stone foundation that has been filled in.
The results of the survey in Grid 2 are presented in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 6 includes a
plan view “slice” of the survey area at a depth of 40 cmbs (top), as well as a representative
profile (bottom) whose position in the survey area is marked by the dotted line. The profile
contains a high amount of reflectivity. This “noisy” appearance is doubtless caused by the dense
glacial till observed in the soil. The eastern margin of the survey area contains a high amplitude
linear anomaly that appears as a distinct hyperbola in the profile. It is the anomaly at the very
eastern edge of the profile highlighted at the bottom of Figure 6. This feature, which runs NorthNortheast to South-Southwest, is a metal or ceramic pipe. Two other anomalies identified at this
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depth may be associated with the Aaron Lopez occupation. In the plan view (Figure 6: top), these
anomalies appear as two rectangular areas of high reflectivity along the northern margin of the
survey grid. In profile, they are two distinct areas of high amplitude point (hyperbolic) and
planar (flat) reflections (Figure 6: bottom). These types of reflections are often associated with
filled-in features like pits. The western feature extends to a depth of approximately 100 cmbs and
the eastern feature to a depth of 50 cmbs. These features may be associated with the stone wall
that forms the northern boundary of the survey grid. However, given that that the features extend
approximately two meters south of the wall and that they are 50 cm and 100 cm deep, it seems
more likely that another interpretation is warranted.
Figure 7 shows a plan view “slice” of the survey Grid 2 at a depth of 100 cmbs (top) and
a representative profile (bottom) whose position in the survey area is marked by the dotted line.
The prominent feature at this depth is a high amplitude linear anomaly along the eastern margin
of the survey area. In profile, this anomaly presents as a high amplitude hyperbola similar to that
identified as a pipe in Figure 6. Indeed, it is clear in the profile that this anomaly is another
ceramic or metal pipe laid at a greater depth than that described in Figure 6. At a depth of 100
cm, the soil in the western half of the survey area is more highly reflective. The profile in the
western portion of Grid 2 shows a series of high amplitude reflective surfaces at this depth
(Figure 7: bottom). The likely cause of these reflections is a stratigraphic change in soil
composition, as soils in this portion of Aquidneck Island are characterized by a change from silty
loam to sandy loam at this depth.
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Figure 4 Map depicting GPR survey grids at the Aaron Lopez Farm site.
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Figure 5 Top: Plan view of GPR survey Grid 1 at 100 cm below surface (cmbs). Bottom: GPR profile taken at position
marked by dotted line.
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Figure 6 Plan view of GPR survey Grid 2 at 40 cm below surface (cmbs). Bottom: GPR profile taken at position
marked by dotted line.
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Figure 7 Plan view of GPR survey Grid 2 at 100 cm below surface (cmbs). Bottom: GPR profile taken at position
marked by dotted line.
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Fort Fanning
The suspected site of Fort Fanning includes a portion of a public park (Linden Park) in
Middletown, RI (Figure 8). This wooden fort was one a complex of British military features
commanding the heights of Aquidneck Island. The site was used for a school for a number of
decades in the 20th century and is currently a public park featuring athletic fields and a
playground. The survey grid at this site was established in an area where we believed a remnant
of the fort might still exist based on comparisons to Revolutionary War-era maps.
The results of the survey are shown in Figure 9. The top of the figure is a plan view
“slice” of the survey area at a depth of 40 cmbs, and the bottom of the figure is a representative
profile whose position in the survey area is marked by the dotted line. The high-amplitude linear
anomaly located in the eastern portion of the survey area is a cement sidewalk that is visible on
the surface. Three other anomalies are visible in the central and western portions of the survey
area. In the center of the survey area, there is a roughly diamond-shaped area containing patches
of highly reflective soil. Indeed, a profile cutting through the center of the anomaly shows a
single, somewhat dissected, high amplitude planar reflection at a depth of 40cmbs (Figure 9:
bottom). This suggests that the diamond-shaped feature forms a single surface. The same type of
high-amplitude planar reflection defines the profiles of the ovoid area along the south-central
portion of the survey area and the “bent” linear anomaly to the west and north of the ovoid
anomaly.
The diamond shape and orientation of the first anomaly is reminiscent of what would be
expected for Fort Fanning based on its depiction on 18th century maps; however, the anomaly is
much too small and its profile is much too uniform to suggest a match. Furthermore, the other
two anomalies do not match any expectations generated by the maps. The probable interpretation
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for all three anomalies is depicted in Figure 10. An aerial photograph of the area taken in 1962
(when the school was in use) clearly shows a baseball diamond in the same area as the anomalies
detected in our survey. The use of clay to build the diamond and the pitcher’s mound explains
the high amplitude planar reflections recorded in the profiles.
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Figure 8 Map depicting GPR survey grid at the Fort Fanning site.
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Figure 9 Top: Plan view of GPR survey at 40 cm below surface (cmbs). Bottom: GPR profile taken at position marked
by dotted line.
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Figure 10 Comparison of GPR survey results with a 1962 aerial photograph of the Fort Fanning site.
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Conclusions
The results of the survey suggest that GPR can contribute useful information to the search
for remnants of the Revolutionary War landscape on Aquidneck Island. The survey provided
new information addressing the construction history of the Redoubt de St. Onge. At the Aaron
Lopez Farm site, the GPR survey identified a potential buried structure foundation and two filled
pits. Based on comparisons to 18th century maps, the structure foundation likely served as the
base for an outbuilding. Finally, the survey did not find any evidence for remains of Fort
Fanning. Given that the survey area at this site only included a small portion of the park, these
results should not be seen as definitive evidence of the fort’s absence. Indeed, more GPR survey
should be conducted to the east and west of the current survey grid. While the anomalies
identified in this survey must also be “ground truthed” though archaeological testing, in all, the
results of this survey are encouraging that portions of Aquidneck Island’s Revolutionary War
landscape are still intact.
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Appendix G
The following technical supplement was prepared by Drew Canfield to provide a detailed
explanation of the scientific analysis in Chapter 2 of this report.

Technical Supplement for the Analysis of the Battle of Rhode Island in August
1778
Drew Canfield, Roger Williams University

Summary of the Battle at Valley Road
The British held Newport in 1778 during the Revolutionary War, which was a seaport
capable of providing the British with units and needed supplies. In the same year, a treaty with
France aligned the French with the Colonials in the war. Admiral d’Estaing commanded a fleet
of twelve ships to aid the Colonials in the war. At the request of General Washington, Admiral
d’Estaing was reassigned to aid General Sullivan in the removal of the British in Newport.
General Pigot, in charge of the British Forces, sought to defend Newport due to its value as a
seaport. Armed with reports of the French’s aid and marching orders for General Sullivan on
Newport, General Pigot called his units to pull back and fortify Newport. Defensive
fortifications, including the structures redoubt and abbatis, were constructed by the British to
hold the seaport. The abbatis ran from Green End to Tonomy Hill, defense working 4 feet high
and 6 feet deep, about 40 feet behind the abbatis. The Colonial troops stationed themselves in
Portsmouth, and intended on marching to Honeyman Hill to combat Card’s Redoubt on Valley
Road. A map of the battlefield can be seen in Figure 4.
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nd

British 2 line

British first line

Colonial First line
Honeyman Hill

Colonial Secondary line and camps

Figure 4: Map of battlefield at Valley Road. Positions of Combatants noted.

The colonials held smooth bore cannons, which featured a maximum range of 2000
yards, yet were most effective at ranges less than 1000 yards. While their elevated position at
Honeyman Hill provided an advantage due to elevation (176 feet), the distance between the
emplacements and the British’ Card’s Redoubt was 1700 yards, elevated 74 feet high. There was
also a 10 Gun battery at a range of 1800 yards and a height of 113 feet. Gail winds and rain
caused Eastons Pond, which bordered the British encampments, to increase and size, and turned
surrounding terrain into a marsh; therefore, Colonial maneuverability was decreased.
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Records by Captain Mackenzie of the British in his diary reveal that cannon fire did not
result in irreparable damage to British artillery and defenses. General Washington ordered the
Colonials to retreat on August 28, 1778 due to the lack of progress. While the failure of the battle
can be partially attributed to the lack of an element of surprise due to the lack of cover for
arriving French Naval ships, and the delivery of a letter from Colonial Generals telling General
Pigot of their incoming attack, a question remains: why were the cannons fired by the Colonials
incapable of destroying British artillery and defenses? This technical report aimed to analyze the
ballistics of cannon fire during the era of the Revolutionary War through simulation in order to
uncover potential explanations for the loss.
For a more thorough analysis of the battle, including tactics, details of the terrain, and
other details including references, please refer to the historical evaluation which this supplement
accompanies.

Cannon fire Simulation Theory
Internal Ballistics Theory
Cannon fire and associated ballistics is a relatively understudied field when compared to
other weapon ballistics studies, such as rifles, missiles, etc. Benjamin Robins, a military engineer
and mathematician, developed an analytical model for internal ballistics for cannon fire in 1742
(Robins 1805). Robins claimed that the force exerted on the cannonball traveling down the
muzzle can be approximated using the following equation:
! " =

$%&'( )*
"

Equation 1: Force exerted on cannonball due to expansion of gas from gunpowder ignition in a
cannon muzzle from Robins 1805.

288

where:
F(x): force exerted on the cannonball
R: initial ratio of hot gas pressure to atmospheric pressure
%&'( : atmospheric pressure
A: cross-sectional area of the cannon-ball
C: length of the barrel occupied by the powder charge prior to ignition
The Australian Research Council (ARC), specifically Dr. Collins, reviewed Robin’s
work, as well as work done by others, to derive models for analyzing smooth bore cannon
ballistics (Collins n.d.). Robin’s research also discussed the air resistance experienced by the
cannonball as it accelerates, as well as models for approximating the velocity of the cannonball.
As the ARC states, Newton’s second law (Equation 2) can be utilized to derive an expression for
the velocity of the ball (Equation 3).
! = +,
Equation 2: Newton's Second Law
where:
F: Force
m: mass of the body
a: acceleration of the body
1
+/ 0 =
2

2

! " 1"
3

Equation 3: Kinetic energy of the cannonball in terms of the work done on the ball derived from
Newton's Second Law
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where:
m: mass of the cannonball
v: muzzle velocity of the cannonball at a distance L down the barrel
L: full length of the barrel
The left-hand term is the kinetic energy of the cannonball, while the right-hand integral is
the work done on the ball. Substituting Equation 1 into Equation 3 and solving the integral
results in Equation 4.
1
6
+/ 0 = $%&'( )*45
2
*
Equation 4: Solution to the integral shown in Equation 3.
The cross-sectional area of a cannonball can be modeled as a circle, and the length of
barrel occupied by powder charge can be approximated using the density of gunpowder, as
shown by ARC in Equation 5.
%=

71 0 *
9
4

Equation 5: Mass of the powder charge in terms of density
where:
P: Powder Charge
9: Gunpowder density
d: diameter of cannonball
Rearranging Equation 5 and substituting into Equation 4 yields Equation 6.
1
71 0
+/ 0 = $%&'(
2
4

4%
6
45
0
971
*
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Equation 6: Full expression for kinetic energy as a function of work done on a cannonball in the
muzzle of a cannon
Again, rearranging and simplifying Equation 6 in terms of muzzle velocity results in an
expression capable of approximating muzzle velocity (Equation 7).
/=

2$%&'( %
6
45
+
9
*

Equation 7: Muzzle velocity of a cannonball exiting a cannon

External Ballistics Theory
Dr. Collins also outlines the ballistics acting upon a cannonball external to the cannon.
The main force acting to decelerate the cannonball is aerodynamic drag acting on the surface of
the cannonball (Equation 8).
!: =

1
< =)/ 0
2 :

Equation 8: Drag force acting on an objecting traveling through a fluid
where:
!: : Force of drag acting on the cannonball
<: : Coefficient of drag
=: Density of the fluid through which the body is traveling
v: velocity of the body
Note that this analytical model neglects viscous drag, which is an appropriate assumption
for objects with high Reynolds numbers. Reynolds number is a non-dimensional parameter for
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comparing the inertial forces, or similarly pressure drag, of the object moving through the fluid
to the viscous forces impeding it (Equation 9). The higher the Reynolds number, the less viscous
drag forces impact the object. Fluids with a Reynolds number below 2300 are considered
laminar, transitional between 2300 and 4000, and turbulent above 4000.
$> =

=/6
?
Equation 9: Reynolds number

where:
Re: Reynolds Number
L: Hydraulic diameter of the object
?: Kinematic viscosity of the fluid
Note that the hydraulic diameter of a circle is the diameter of that circle. The Reynolds
number of the cannonballs in flight will be calculated in the simulation to verify this assumption.
The drag coefficient of an object is dependent on the geometry of the object, the surface
roughness, fluid properties, and the velocity of the fluid passing over the object. A model
developed by Spearman and Braswell for the drag coefficient of a sphere for Mach numbers, or
ratio of current velocity to the speed of sound (1125.33 feet/second), between 0.6 and 10.5 was
utilized for approximating the drag coefficient on the cannonball (Spearman and Braswell 1993).
J. W. M. Bush in the department of mathematics at MIT impresses the importance of
considering another phenomenon termed the drag crisis when modeling drag forces acting on an
object in flight (Bush 2013). While the viscous effects are negligible and the pressure drag is the
most influential force on the ball in flight when looking at the system as a whole, within the layer
of fluid adjacent to the ball, titled the boundary layer, the viscous forces play a larger role. Below
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is a figure taken from Bush’s report showing the progression of the boundary layer as the
Reynolds number increases.

Figure 5: Figure 3 from Bush 2013. Caption reads as follows. Figure 3: Schematic illustration
of the evolution of the flow past a smooth sphere with increasing Reynolds number, Re = Ua/ν.
a) For Re # 1, the streamlines are fore-aft symmetric and the drag is principally of viscous
origins. b) For Re > 10, boundary layer separation downstream of the sphere induces a vortical
wake and a significant pressure drag.c) For 100 < Re < 1000, the vortical wake becomes
unstable, resulting in lateral forces on the sphere. d) For Re > 1000, the wake becomes
turbulent, its extent being maximum for e) Re ≈ 2×105. f) For Re > 2×105, the boundary layers
become turbulent, delaying the boundary layer separation and decreasing the extent of the
turbulent wake. Owing to the resulting dramatic reduction in drag on the sphere, the latter
transition is called the drag crisis. Note that the precise Re-values at which flow transitions
occurs depends strongly on the sphere’s surface roughness. Images from Daish (1972).
As shown in the transition from picture d to e to f in Figure 5, the boundary layer
separates from the object with increasing Reynolds numbers and then conforms back to the
surface geometry as Reynolds number continues to increase. A body experiencing fluid flow
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with a Reynolds number between 2x105 and 2x106 experiences what is known as the drag crisis.
In this range, the drag coefficient increases significantly before lowering again at higher
Reynolds numbers. Again, the Reynolds number for the cannonball in flight needs to be
calculated over the course of its flight to assess whether or not the cannonball experiences the
drag crisis.
Zhang Lumin in the Foreign Technology Division report titled “Research on the
Asymmetrical Aerodynamic Forces of Reentry Vehicles” states that asymmetric surface drag can
impart a rotational acceleration upon a reentry vehicle (Lumin 1992). Asymmetric surface drag
can be generated from asymmetric surface roughness. Rotational velocities of a body in flight
within a fluid medium experience the Magnus effect, which can alter the trajectory of the ball
depending on the axis about which the ball is rotating. J. W. M. Bush also enumerates the
different effects the Magnus Effect can have on a ball’s trajectory (Bush 2013). In summary, the
cannonball could experience an acceleration in any direction, causing the ball to potential spread
horizontally, or fall short of the target, or pass over the target.
David Poche and Peter George detail in their paper titled “Solid Shot Essentials: A guide
to the Authentic and Non-Authentic” the formation of a mold seam and mold vent sprue from a
solid shot mold on a cannonball, which would create asymmetric surface roughness ()Poche and
George n.d.). Dr. Steve Jordan from the University of Rhode Island asserted that super-sonic
bodies experience negligible accelerations resulting from surface roughness phenomena.
Evaluation of the simulation would reveal the nature of the cannonball in flight and the necessity
of including rotational acceleration into the simulation will be determined at that point. The
Mach number can be used to determine this necessity.
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MATLAB Code Rationale
Cannons with varying bores and associated gunpowder quantity and cannonball size were
used in the simulation to observe the trajectory of the different cannons used in the 18th century.
The first section of the code uses the equations for internal ballistics to approximate the velocity
of the cannon at any point along the muzzle. The velocity and force acting on the cannonball are
checked at one thousand positions within the muzzle.
The drag equations discussed in the external ballistics section were used to calculate the
velocity at each point using Newton’s second law. The equation itself can be rewritten in a
differential form in terms of velocity, for acceleration is the first derivative of velocity (Equation
10). Position can also be derived from this expression, for velocity is the first derivative of
position.
!
1/
1 1/
=,=
=
+
1@ 1@ 1@
Equation 10: Differential form of Newton's Second law
The aerodynamic drag forces impart a deceleration on the ball; therefore, the velocity of
the ball at any time can be approximated as the velocity of the point prior subtracted by the
deceleration approximated by Equation 10, multiplied by the amount of time the object
experienced that acceleration (Equation 11).
/A @B = /A @BCD −

!A @B
∗ 1@
+

Equation 11: Approximation of the velocity of the cannonball heading downfield
This equation can be modified to include any other decelerating effects needed for
simulation, such as gravity in the y-direction (Equation 12).
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/G @B = /G @BCD −

!G @B
∗ 1@ − H ∗ 1@
+

Equation 12: Approximation of the velocity of the cannonball heading in the vertical direction
Total velocity of the cannonball at any point can be calculated using vectors and the Pythagorean
Theorem (Equation 13).
I'J'&K @B =

/G @B

0

+ /A @B

0

Equation 13: Total velocity of the cannonball at any point in time.
Given that the cannon is fired at an upward angle, the muzzle velocity must be separated
into the vertical and downfield components based on the angle, θ, it was fired at (Equation 14).
/G 0 = I(NOOKP sin T ,

/A 0 = I(NOOKP cos (T)

Equation 14: Vertical and downfield components of the cannonball velocity at the first instant
the cannonball leaves the muzzle
The position of the ball over time after it leaves the muzzle will be approximated using
the average of the velocity one point in the simulation prior to the current point and the current
velocity (Equation 15). The position of the ball is checked for twelve thousand and 1 positions, at
0.001 second intervals.
Z @B = Z @BCD +

/G @B + /G @BCD
2

∗ 1@

Equation 15: Position of the cannonball at any time. Written in terms of the y-direction
This equation can be rewritten for the x or z-direction. The code also calculates the
kinetic energy of the cannonball, as well as the Reynolds number of the fluid around the
cannonball and the angle of attack of the cannonball. Angle of attack is defined as the arctangent
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of the velocity in the y and x direction (Equation 16). The returned angle is the vertical angle at
which the cannonball is ascending or descending.
[ = atan

/G @B
/A @B
Equation 16: Angle of attack of the cannonball

Once the simulation has run, the time and position downfield at which the cannonball
lands can be determined. Note that the altitude would be set as -200 feet for the cannon is fired at
an elevated position and fired at a 4 degree angle. Internal and external ballistics are plotted over
position, including velocities, forces, Reynolds numbers, Mach numbers and kinetic energy. All
code can be seen in the Appendix.

Results for Cannon Fire Simulation
Validation of Assumptions
The minimum Mach number for muzzle velocities of the different cannons fired was
1.164, meaning the ball is exiting the muzzle at supersonic speed; therefore, neglecting
asymmetric surface roughness is a valid assumption. The minimum Reynolds number of the
cannonballs during flight was 9.42x105; therefore, the drag crisis occurs within the muzzle and
does not occur during flight. Additionally, the airflow around the cannonball is turbulent,
meaning the viscous drag is negligible compared to the pressure drag.
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Internal Ballistics Plots
Below are two plots, one showing the force exerted on the cannonball over the length of
the cannon (Figure 6) and the other showing the Mach number of the cannonball over the length
of the cannon (Figure 7).

Figure 6: Force exerted on the cannonball over the length of the cannon. Legend shows weight
of cannonballs
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Figure 7: Mach number of the cannonball over the length of the cannon. Legend shows weight of
cannonballs

External Ballistics Results
Below are the plots from the external ballistics simulation. Each of the following figures
were plotted against the distance downfield the cannonball currently achieved at each point.
Figure 8 shows the altitude of the cannonball. Figure 9 shows the angle of attack of the
cannonball. Figure 10 shows the kinetic energy of the cannonball. Figure 11 shows the Reynolds
number of the cannonball. Figure 12 shows the total velocity of the cannonball. Figure 13 shows
the x-component velocity of the cannonball. Figure 14 shows the y-component of the cannonball.
Finally, Figure 15 shows the coefficient of drag for a cannonball as a function of Mach number.
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Figure 8: Altitude of the cannonball as a function of against the distance downfield
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Figure 9: Angle of Attack (in degrees) of the cannonball as a function of against the distance
downfield
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Figure 10: Kinetic Energy of the cannonball as a function of against the distance downfield
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Figure 11: Reynolds number of the airflow around the cannonball as a function of against the
distance downfield
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Figure 12: Total velocity of the cannonball as a function of against the distance downfield
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Figure 13: X-component velocity of the cannonball as a function of against the distance
downfield
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Figure 14: Y-component velocity of the cannonball as a function of against the distance
downfield
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Figure 15: Coefficient of drag as a function of Mach number. The shown trend lines were used to
approximate the drag for any given Mach number during flight. Modeled after the work done by
Spearman and Braswell 1993.

Sensitivity Analysis for Cannonball Ballistics
Above results model the behavior of a cannonball in an idealized scenario: no wind, no
rotation, no horizontal spread and a constant vertical angle. In order to answer the question “what
lead to the inaccuracy of the cannon fire during the battle,” scenarios need to be evaluated with
less than ideal conditions.
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Four scenarios were considered for assessment: the presence of a horizontal angle away
from the target when firing, a non-preferred vertical angle when firing, variation in gunpowder
quality, and a cross wind. An 18-pound cannonball with associated cannon size and gunpowder
quantity was used for each study, and the changes in total velocity, x-component velocity, ycomponent velocity, kinetic energy, Reynolds number, landing position, altitude, angle of attack,
and horizontal spread were used to analyze the impact of each scenario.

Horizontal Angle Modeling
The vertical angle used for firing was kept at 4 degrees, while the horizontal angle was
varied from 0.1 to 2 degrees in increments of 0.1 degrees. A new z-component was integrated
into the simulation, which alters how the total velocity and other velocity components are
calculated. In 3D kinetics, the 3D vector must be projected onto a plane through which the
desired component passes (Equation 17). For example, to calculate the x-component, the vector
must be projected into either the x-y plane, or the x-z plane. The total velocity simply involves
another square term (Equation 18).
IO 0 = cos ^ sin T I(NOOKP
IG (0) = sin (^)cos (T)I(NOOKP
IA (0) = cos (^)cos (T)I(NOOKP
Equation 17: Vertical, downfield and horizontal components of the cannonball velocity at the
first instant the cannonball leaves the muzzle

I'J'&K (@B ) =

/O @B

0

+ /G @B

0

+ /A @B

0

Equation 18: Three-dimensional Total velocity of the cannonball at any point in time.
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Horizontal angle errors can be generated either from operator error or improper support
from the wooden platform below. The impulse generated from the cannon fire could wear the
platform and cause the cannon to either sink into the damaged platform or ground, or change
angle during fire.

Vertical Angle Modeling
The vertical angle at which the cannon was fired was varied from 3 to 5 degrees in 0.1
degree increments to see the variation in multiple parameters resulting from a 1-degree variation.
All other parameters and equations were kept constant. The vertical angle could vary either due
to improper setup by the operator or wear in the wooden platform causing the cannon to sink into
either the ground or the wood, or tilt.

Gunpowder Quality Modeling
Gunpowder quality was varied from 1500 to 1600, known values for gunpowder quality
in the 18th and 19th century as stated by Robins 1805, in increments of 100 to simulate either poor
gunpowder packing in the muzzle or moisture. All other parameters and equations were kept
constant.

Cross Wind Modeling
Addition of a cross wind incorporates another direction of drag as well as movement. The
average maximum wind speed in August in Middletown, RI was found by NOAA to be 15 miles
per hour, and drag coefficients for that speed were found using the same model implemented in
the original simulation. The drag force acting in the z-direction was considered using the relative
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velocity of the cannonball to the cross wind. The same total velocity equation seen in Equation
18 was used to approximate the total velocity of the cannonball.
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Results from Each Scenario
The standard deviations of the key parameters identified in the introduction to the sensitivity analysis can be seen in Table 1.
Standard deviations for velocity, energy, altitude and angle of attack are based on the maximum value found in each simulation.
Standard Deviations
Assessment
Total Velocity (ft/s) Y-Velocity (ft/s) X-Velocity (ft/s) Kinetic Energy (ft-lb) Reynolds Number Landing Position (ft) Altitude (ft)
Angle of Attack (degrees)
Horizontal Spread
0.001
0.018
0.254
185.586
518.119
0.988
0.048
0.000
Vertical Angle
0.000
13.488
0.957
698.457
13546.083
657.614
38.441
0.607
Gunpowder Quality
14.112
0.984
14.077
10344.912
6723.339
47.127
2.710
0.000

Table 1: Standard deviation of key parameters for the various assessment scenarios.
Table 2 below shows the maximum and minimum Reynolds numbers within the simulations, as well as the maximum change
in landing position downfield.
Assessment
Horizontal Spread
Vertical Angle
Gunpowder Quality

Max. Reynolds Number
Min. Reynolds Number Max. Change in Landing Position (ft)
3254892.615
1419526.945
0
3254892.615
1337555.231
1141.079
3330076.747
1357272.55
229.0123

Table 2: Values of Key Parameters for the various assessment scenarios
Additionally, firing the cannon at an angle causing horizontal spread lead to a maximum 500-foot difference a 0.1-degree angle
to a 2 degree angle. Rather than only use the 18-pound cannonball for the cross wind, each cannon with their associated cannonball
and gunpowder quantity was used in the simulation. For comparison, only the results from the 6-pound cannonball are listed in Table
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3. Values shown in the table are the differences between the cross wind simulation and the original simulation rather than standard
deviations, for the speed of the cross wind was kept constant at 15 miles per hour.
Parameter
Difference
Min. Reynolds Number
-169.984
Max. Reynolds. Nummber
0
Landing Position (ft)
6
Horizontal Spread (ft)
13.102
Altitude (ft)
0.14
Angle of Attack (degrees) 0.000786

Table 3: Values of the differences between the original cannon simulation for the 6-pound cannonball and the simulation including a
cross wind.
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Analysis and Conclusions
The minimum Reynolds number for all simulations ensures the validity of the underlying
assumptions made in this report. The cannonball avoids the drag crisis during external ballistic
performance, and the pressure drag is the dominant force acting on the cannonball. Additionally,
the standard deviations of the total velocity are very small in comparison to the speed of sound.
The assumption that the projectile is moving at supersonic speed and, thus, rotational forces can
be neglected is also verified since the original simulation found this assumption valid.
As expected, changing the vertical angle at which the cannon is fired causes the largest
changes in key parameters. Properly adjusting the angle at which the cannon is fired for the
desired landing position downfield is crucial for hitting a target. Insufficiently-trained militia
men may have encountered misses from improper angle selection due to inexperience.
Additionally, as stated previously, damage to the wooden platform beneath the cannon could
cause changes in vertical angle.
Variations in gunpowder quality also caused significant variations in landing position: a
difference of about 230 feet. Quality can change depending on manufacturing, as well as storage.
Improperly storing the gunpowder such that moisture contaminates the powder could change the
performance of the cannon, as seen by the results. Middletown, Rhode Island air is higher in
moisture content due to coastal environment; therefore, there is an increased chance for moisture
to contaminate the gunpowder if not stored properly.
While horizontal angle did not cause a change in downfield landing position in the xdirection by more than about a foot, there was a large window of error for landing position in the
z-direction (left and right when facing downfield), specifically 500 feet when fired at a four-
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degree vertical angle. Changes in horizontal angle can occur from the same sources as the
vertical angle: inexperience and platform damage.
The presence of a cross wind perpendicular to the desired trajectory of the cannonball
does produce some undesired flight trajectory elements. The cannonball did land 6 feet short of
the target, as well as about 13 feet to the right of the center of the target. It is worth noting,
though, that the speed of the wind was based on the average maximum wind speed in August for
Middletown, Rhode Island. The wind speed was not likely at this maximum while every
cannonball was fired. Wind speed could have also been higher than average at that time.
Regardless of the exact speed of the cross wind, the presence of a cross wind causes the smallest
changes in performance but could be just enough to miss a target.
In conclusion, the vertical angle at which the cannon is fired and gunpowder quality
cause the largest changes in ballistic performance when firing a cannon.
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Summary: The present report is an engineering analysis of cannonballs (shots) launched from a
cannon barrel typical of the revolutionary war. First attempts assumed ideal conditions meaning
that the shot was smooth with no rotary motion at launch. During ideal flight, an opposing
aerodynamic drag and a vertical gravitational acceleration were the prime input parameters to a
2nd-order time-dependent numerical computation of the shot trajectory. The aerodynamic drag
was calculated by a semi-empirical expression in terms of the instantaneous shot Mach and
diameter-based Reynolds numbers. By adhering to the historical data, the ideal computations
involved four combinations of a constant shot/charge weight ratio. Comparisons between the ideal
trajectories and historical range data showed largest differences at the lowest launch angles (0° to
10°). But a consistent outcome revealed the surrounding flow as strictly supercritical (fully
turbulent). Attempts to reduce the range-data disparity began with treating the shot’s rough
surface. Knowing that the cannonballs were formed inside a sand/clay/water mixture mold, the
aerodynamic drag coefficient was modified accordingly which produced an overall higher resistive
force during shot flight. The differences in the range data comparisons reduced substantially where
the highest launch angle (10°) was under 4%. A second improvement in the trajectory simulation
involved the shot’s rotary motion. This added effect gave an initial angular velocity and
acceleration at shot launch. Moreover, the computation extended to a three-dimensional spherical
system to account for out-of-plane (2D) rotary motions. New comparisons between the numerical
and historical range data revealed logical trends in the shot trajectory. The shot consistently missed
the intended target with rise in launch angle until reaching a peak lateral distance (~ 50 yards) at
8°. Future efforts to improve predictions of the shot trajectory rest on the highly complex
interaction between the shot’s rotary motion and the oncoming freestream flow.
TRAJECTORY OF A CANNONBALL
The following white paper is a brief engineering study of a cannonball (called shot) fired from
a cannon typical of the revolutionary war. Under ideal conditions, the shot trajectory would be
two-dimensional (2D)- traveling horizontally and vertically giving an arc-type shape. Ideal
conditions in this sense describe a perfectly-spherical shot launched through a frictionless cannon
barrel of known length at a fixed angle relative to the horizontal axis (ground level). Frictionless
implies a shot launched with no circumferential spin. The launch initiates from an impulsive force
delivered by an instantaneous explosion (delta function) of compacted gun power behind the shot.
As the shot traverses towards the intended target, its trajectory is affected only by a resistive
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aerodynamic drag force and a vertical gravitational acceleration. We will begin this study
assuming ideal conditions with comparisons to experimental data in terms of distance traveled by
the shot under varying parameters of shot weight, gun power weight and launch angle. Units of
each material property and launch parameter will adhere to the Imperial (or US customary) system
(lb., ft. and sec).
The launch dynamics of the cannon shot begin with the impulsive force (F). The initial velocity
of the shot at time t = 0 is msvo = ∑F0-1 = msv1 where ms and v are the shot mass and shot velocity.
Because the force is an impulse and the initial velocity vo is zero, the launch velocity is simply v1
= F/ms. However, this ratio for estimating v1 is not immediately useful because no experimental
data exists for the impulsive force. Instead, an alternate expression was developed by Robins1
involving the impulsive force distributed over the total barrel length (L). Accordingly, this
L
approach required a kinetic energy balance of the form msv12 = 2 l !(#) + msv02 for determining
the shot launch velocity with F(s) evaluated by the expression F(s) = RpAℓ/s where R, p, A, ℓ and
s are the ratio of hot gas pressure to atmospheric pressure, atmospheric pressure, barrel area (or
bore) and gun power length within the barrel length (s); 0 < s < L. After substituting this force
definition into the energy balance equation, integrating along s, then simplifying, the amplitude of
the launch velocity becomes2
v12 =

2Rp
ms

lπr2 ln( L ℓ )

(Eq. 1)

where r is the bore (or shot) radius. The length ℓ is given by ℓ = mp/(πr2ρp) with mp and ρp as the
mass and density of the gun power. For the present calculations, p = (14.7)(144) lb/ft2 and ρp =
55lb/ft3. Robins1 measurements provided R = 1000, but the later experiments by Hulton1
suggested 1500 < R < 1600. In the present calculations, we will use the latter value (R = 1600).
Lastly, we note that the position direction of the launch velocity (v1) is coincident with the
longitudinal axis of the cannon barrel.
Given the launch velocity, the next step
demands obtaining a useful expression for the
aerodynamic drag force (Fa) acting on the spherical
shot during flight. The position vector of this drag
force aligns with the shot’s local trajectory, but
opposes the corresponding direction of the flight
velocity vector (vs). According to our conventional
definition, Fa = 1/2CDρaAvs2 where CD, ρa and A are
the aerodynamic drag coefficient, air density and
shot cross-sectional area. Herein, we emphasize
that the drag coefficient CD of a sphere is not a
simple determination. This parameter is highly
dependent on the trajectory Mach number (Ma) and
the Reynolds number (ReD) as illustrated in Fig. 1;
Ma
= vs/a and ReD = 2vsr/υ where a and υ are the speed of sound and the kinematic viscosity at local
atmospheric conditions. Experimental measurements show that the effects of ReD on CD become
negligible at high values of Ma and vice versa. Unfortunately, the trajectory of a cannon shot
covers the full range of these coupled parameters. After many experimental and analytical studies,
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resultant formulations and procedures for estimating the coupled effects of Ma and ReD on the
aerodynamic drag coefficient CD have become reasonable reliable.
The procedure adopted herein for evaluating CD adheres to the collected works of Miller and
Bailey2 and Morrison3 as described by Collins4. According to Morrison3, CD for a smooth sphere
can be estimated in terms of only ReD at low-Ma (Ma < 0.3 → incompressible flow conditions) by
the semi-empirical expression
CD′(ReD) = a/ReD + b(ReD/B)/[1.0+(ReD/B)α] + c(ReD/C)β/[1.0+(ReD/C)λ] + ReDδ/D (Eq. 2)
where a = 24, b = 2.6, B = 5.0, α = 1.52, c = 0.411, C = 263,000, β = -7.94, λ = -8.0, δ = 0.8 and D
= 461,000. This expression is graphically illustrated in Fig. 2 for 104 < ReD < 107 with the
following limits;
ReD > 2.0x106

→ CD′ = 0.15

6

6

1.20x10 < ReD < 2.0x10 → CD′ = 0.19 - 8x104/ReD
4.77x106 < ReD < 1.2x106 → CD′ = -0.485 – 0.1·log(ReD)
In view of Fig. 2, ReD < 3.5x105 identifies a subcritical state (laminar flow surrounding the shot),
3.5x105 < ReD < 4.2x105 as critical (transitional flow) and ReD > 4.2x105 as supercritical (turbulent
flow).
0.6

The impact of Ma as well as the coupled effects of Ma and
ReD are modeled using cubic Benzier functions. These functions
appear as

3

2

2

Bb(u) = b1·(1-u) + 3b2·u·(1-u) + 3b3·u ·(1-u) + b4·u

3

3b)

(Eq.

0.4
CD

Ba(u) = a1·(1-u)3 + 3a2·u·(1-u)2 + 3a3·u2·(1-u) + a4·u3(Eq. 3a)
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with the variable u ranging as 0 < u < 1. The coefficients ai are
four points that target Ma whereas the coefficients bi target CD. An example at high Ma where the
ReD influence becomes negligible on CD produces the coefficients ai = (0.1, 0.95, 0.55, 1.5) and bi
= (0.0, 0.0, 0.95, 1.0). The last two coefficients denote CD = 1.0 when Ma = 1.5 (u = 1). Thus, the
limit Ma = min(1.5, Ma) is necessary to implement Eqs. 3. Likewise, the first two coefficients
(0.1, 0.0) create the limit Ma = max(0.1, Ma) where Ma no longer influences CD. For Ma = Ba =
0.1 → 1.5, the variable u is determined iteratively under an error tolerance (~0.001) followed by
CD = Bb given u. When Ma < 1.5, the impact of ReD is introduced using the coefficients gi = (0.0,
0.85, 0.57, 1.0) and hi = (1.1, 1.1, 0.05, 0.0) for the Benzier functions Bg(u) and Bh(u). Again, u is
iteratively evaluated for Bg = Ma followed by Bh knowing the variable u. Combining these Benzier
functions with Eq. 2 gives the relationship
CD = Bb(u) + Bh(u)·CD′(ReD)

(Eq. 4)

Beside raising the drag coefficient, Ma > 0.1 shifts the CD curve in Fig. 2 to the right along the ReD
axis (see Fig. 1). This shift is handled by the approximation
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S(Ma) = s1 + s2·tan-1[s3·(Ma – s4)]

(Eq. 5)

where si = (0.78, 0.22, -12.0, 0.23). Thus, the final expression for estimating CD is
CD = Bb(u) + Bh(u)·CD′[S(Ma)·ReD]

(Eq. 6)

This relationship is graphically illustrated in Fig. 1 for 0.3 < Ma < 1.5 and 104 < ReD < 107 (see
Miller and Bailey2 for additional details).
Knowing the aerodynamic drag force (Fa) and the initial velocity (v1), we can formulate the
trajectory path of the shot during flight. According to Newton’s 2nd law Fa = msas where as is the
shot acceleration during flight. Using the variable fs = ss where ss is the shot arc distance, then
dss/dt = fs′ = vs and fs′′ = d2ss/dt2 = [as – g·sin(θ)] such that Newton’s law becomes a 2nd-order
ordinary differential equation (ODE) written as
fs′′ + Λfs′2 = 0

(Eq. 7a)

where Λ = 1/2CDρaA/ms, g is the vertical gravitational acceleration (32.2 ft/s2) and θ is the local
angle of the trajectory path referenced to the horizontal axis (ground level). Equation 7a can be
readily advanced temporally using a 4th-order Runge-Kutta method from time t = 0. The horizontal
(x) and vertical (y) components of Eq. 7a are
fx′′ + Λfs′fx′ = 0

(Eq. 7b)

fy′′ + Λfs′fy′ = 0

(Eq. 7c)

with fs′ = (fx′2 + fy′2)1/2, θ = tan-1(fy′/fx′) and fy′′ = ay – g. The solution sequence for calculating the
shot trajectory proceeds as Eq. 1 [fs′ (t=0) = v1], Eqs. 3, 5 and 6 [CD(t)] and Eqs. 7 [ss(t), xs(t), ys(t),
vs(t), vx(t) and vy(t)] with fixed time step dt = 0.01. The computation terminates when ys < 0. The
air density was ρs = 0.0023slugs/ft3 which was modified by the shot altitude according to H(ys) =
e-κys with κ = 3.158x10-5.

Table 1 Historical Range Measurements Listed by Collins4
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1050
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5
6
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1854
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1600
2085
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1964
1622
1770
1938
2100

Collins4 extracted forty-nine trajectory measurements
(see Table 1) from two 19th-century British experimental
studies on the shot trajectory at four sets of shot (Ws) and
charge (Wc) weights that were launched at eleven angles (0°
< θ1 < 10°). The ratio Sc = Ws/Wc ~ 3 was the standard
service charge ratio which produced a consistent launch
velocity (v1 ~ 1685ft/s). Figure 3 shows four shot paths for
the same launch angle θ1 = 6°. In that figure, the notations
signify the shot and charge weights as Ws-Wc. Notice that
the higher shot and charge weights generate longer
trajectory ranges. Apparently, the elevated drag force due
to the increased diameter of the larger shot is offset by the
shot mass; that is Λ = Fa/ms decreased with consistent Sc
and v1.
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Listing comparisons between the historical
80
experimental measurements and the present numerical
12-4
Fig. 4
predictions of the shot ranges under assumed ideal
24-8
60
32-10
conditions is futile at this point. Instead, plotting their
42-14
percent differences in terms of the required Fa to reach
40
agreement is more appropriate to better understand the
contributing factors leading to realistic conditions.
Inasmuch as CD is the only adjustable quantity, we will
20
focus on that applied force parameter. Figure 4 shows a
CD factor (in percent) against the shot launch angle (θ1) for
0
the four sets of shots and charges. To be perfectly clear,
0
5
10
the CD factor (CDF) in the figure is the additional drag force
Launch Angle (θ1)
coefficient (or percent drag Ds) that is necessary to reach
agreement between the experimental range measurements and the present numerical predictions;
Λ(CD) = Λ[CD (Eq. 6)] + Λ(CDF). Looking at Fig. 4, the only immediate observation is the
reduction of CDF with higher θ1.
The first deviation from ideal conditions that is worth investigating is the shot’s assumed
smooth surface. Reports5 of cannon balls recovered without several centuries of environmental
degradation indicate a sand surface roughness. This discovery is certainly acceptable because the
cannon ball molds were constructed of a coarse sand mixed with clay and water. Sand surface
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roughness is sized ε ~ 1mm. Scaling this value by the
various cannon ball diameters (3in < D < 7in) gives
5.0x10-3< ε/D < 1.3x10-2. Figure 5 shows the resultant
shift in the drag coefficient curve (Fig. 2) in the form
of increasing ε/D versus ReD. According to the
computations of the four sets of shot-charge weights
and eleven launch angles under ideal conditions,
Fig. 5
minimum Reynolds numbers (at the target point ys =
0) varied 1.5x106 < ReD < 5x106. Knowing that ReD
> 106, the shot flight is always in a supercritical state
meaning that the surrounding flow condition is fully turbulent with a non-shedding vortical wake.
Small surface imperfections such as the mold seam, filler hole sprue and mold vent sprue would
most likely have little impact on the flight flow parameters. Moreover, ε/D > 5x10-3 suggests that
CD′ > 0.4 regardless of the coupled conditions of Ma and ReD during flight (see Fig. 5).
80
12-4

Fig. 6

24-8

60

CD Factor

Upon applying the restriction CD′ > 0.4 in Eq. 6, Fig.
6 shows the modified CD factors for the shot-charge
weights and launch angles in Table 1. The trend of a
decreasing CD factor with increasing launch angle (θ1) that
was previously observed in Fig. 4 is much more
pronounced in this figure. At a launch angle θ1 = 10°,
direct comparisons between the field range measurements
and numerical predictions are within 5%. Although one
should expect cannon preparation subtleties that would
affect the shot launch and resultant trajectories, their
disparities would not discount the recognizable trend
between the CD factor and the launch angle.

32-10

42-14

40

20

0
0

5

10

Launch Angle (θ1)

A second deviation from ideal conditions is circumferential spin of
the spherical shot at launch. Circumferential spin would in fact be
α,ω
faster with lower launch angle under equivalent shot and charge
Fig. 7
W
weights due to the increased effect of wall friction while the shot
θ
transverses the cannon barrel. Unlike the longitudinal motion, the shot
Fθ
would experience both an angular velocity (ωs) and acceleration (αs) at
launch. Assuming that the spherical shot is rolling and sliding while
N
traversing the cannon barrel, we can readily approximate ωs and αs in
the following manner. Looking at Fig. 7, the frictional force (Fθ) is Fθ = µk·N = µk·W·cos(θ) with
µk as the kinetic (sliding) friction coefficient. By applying Newton’s 2nd law at the sphere center,
the shot acceleration becomes Fθ·r = I·α where I is the sphere’s moment of inertia. Given that Isphere
= 2/5ms·r2 and Ws = ms·g, the shot’s angular acceleration (α1) at launch is
α1 = 5µk·g·cos(θ1)/2r

(Eq. 8)

with the angular velocity ω1 = α1·t1. The variable t1 is the time the shot traverses the cannon barrel.
Again, by assuming an impulsive force at time t0 = 0 and initial distance s0 = 0 we can easily
formulate t1 as s1 = s0 + v1t1 + ½a1t12. The acceleration a1 at launch is Fθ = ms·a1 (Newton’s 2nd
law) or a1 = µk·g·cos(θ1). Knowing the launch velocity from Eq. 1, the time t1 is calculated using
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t1 = -v1/a1 + [(v1/a1)2 + 2s1/a1]1/2

(Eq. 9)

Engineering tables list µk ~ 0.2 for dry sliding contact between two cast-iron surfaces. This
parameter ranges between 0.48 and 0.55 for dry sandblasted surfaces. For the present calculations
of the spherical shot traversing the cannon barrel, the sliding friction coefficient was set to 0.5.
An example calculation of v1 ~ 1683ft/s and θ1 = 6° for a 12-lb shot and 18-caliber cannon
shows t1 = 0.0041sec with α1 = 211sec-2 and ω1 = 0.86sec-1. Thus, the rotation of a shot exiting
the cannon barrel would be observable by the field team. This argument is supported by several
historical reports on Naval gunnery where a particular report6 notes that the shot experiences a
‘peculiar rotary motion through the air’. One should expect that any surface discontinuities on the
shot surface (such as the mold seam, filler hole sprue and mold vent sprue) would enhance the
rotary motion while traversing the cannon barrel (material contact) as well as during flight
(aerodynamic contact).
A rotating sphere with an oncoming freestream will
experience a lift force called the Magnus effect. Although
Heinrich Magnus7 reported this lift force in 1853, Walker
(1671) noted much early the effect on a tennis ball as well as
Robins (1742)1 as a British artillery scientist. The Magnus
force (FM) is perpendicular to the drag force (FD) as illustrated
Fig. 8
in Fig. 8 for an oncoming freestream from the left and a
counter-rotating sphere8. Due to the resultant interaction
between the oncoming freestream flow and sphere rotation, a positive Magnus force is a negative
lift force (negative y-direction) as shown in Fig. 8. In the case of the cannon shot where the
freestream is oncoming from the right with a clockwise rotation at an angle θ1 from the ground
level (x-axis), the positive Magnus force vector is directed -90° from the aerodynamic force vector
(counter-clockwise is positive) or θ1 - 90° from the x-axis. Notably, the combined effects of the
flow state and rotational speed will lead to either a positive or negative Magnus force. According
a report by Muto et al.9, both the subcritical and supercritical states generate a positive Magnus
force with minor dependence on the rotation rate. Conversely, the Magnus force becomes negative
in the critical flow state with strong influence by the rotation rate. Knowing that the flow state of
cannon shot is always supercritical, we can exploit the experimental measurements of Kray8 and
the computational results of Muto et al.9 to access the Magnus effect on the shot trajectory.
According to Muto et al.9 the Magnus force is positive and monotonically proportional to the
spin rate (SP) when the sphere flow state is supercritical. This variable is defined SP = ωr/vs which
is easily evaluated at shot launch. After launch, dynamic interaction between the rotating sphere
and oncoming freestream is incredibly complex and exceedingly difficult to reliably quantify in
terms of a time-varying Magnus force during shot flight. To date, both the experimental
measurements and numerical computations have reported the Magnus effect for constant spin rates
and freestreams. Even under those constant conditions, very little data is available for the
supercritical state. One option for assessing the Magnus effect on the present cannonball study is
to assume an average force (or coefficient, CMavg) during flight. This average Magnus force can
be readily quantified by iterative adjustments to the Λ variable in Eqs. 7 until close agreement is
reached between xs(t) and the historical ranges listed in Table 1.
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SPavg

The Magnus force coefficient (CM) holds a similar definition as the drag coefficient; CM = 2FM
/(ρaAvs2). Thus, the force variable becomes Λ(CD,M) = Λ[CD (Eq. 6)] + Λ(CMavg) where (as before)
CD′ > 0.4. Kray et al.10 measured a near-linear relationship between CM and SP with SP < 0.3 for
a soccer ball spinning in the supercritical regime. For our initial exercise, we will assume CMavg =
SPavg with the sphere rotation being strictly 2D (along the
0.06
x-y plane). Figure 9 plots the average spin rates necessary
12-4
Fig. 9
to reach agreement with the historical range
24-8
0.04
32-10
measurements. The distribution of SPavg data points
42-14
indicate minimums when approaching the lowest and
0.02
highest launch angles (θ₁→0° and θ₁→10°). These
results are quite reasonable because the smaller launch
0.00
angles reach the target sooner (highest vs, lowest FM)
whereas the larger angles launch the shot at the lowest
-0.02
spin rates (again lowest FM). Negative average spin rates
were found for about 15% of the test cases listed in Table
-0.04
0
2
4
6
8
10
1. These opposite results are very reasonable when
Launch Angle (θ₁)
considering variabilities such as the shot surface
roughness, cannon-shot-charge preparation, measurement
error, etc.
To continue our analysis of the Magnus effect, we will consider only the positive spin rates.
Assuming that the rotation vector coincides with the x-y plane is obviously not realistic, but
certainly not improbable. If we assume that these maximum positive SPavg values represent x-y
rotations, then they also define the spin rate envelope associated with 2D → 3D rotations. This
envelope is illustrated in Fig. 9 as a 2nd –order polynomial (solid line); SPavg = d1θ₁2 + d2θ₁ + d3
with d1 = -3.086x10-4, d2 = 2.128x10-3 and d3 = 1.556x10-2. Positive spin rates within the envelope
represent a rotation vector in 3D spherical space. In spherical space, a second angle (φ₁) is required
to position the rotation vector from the x-y plane. Again using the historical range data, we can
approximate φ₁ from the four sets of shot-charge weights listed in Table 1. Evaluating φ₁
completes the present investigation for understanding the potential major factors contributing to
cannon shots missing their intended targets.
The solution sequence in Eqs. 7 require additions and adjustments to treat a spherical trajectory
path. A new lateral (z) coordinate is introduced of the form
fz′′ + Ωfs′fz′ = 0

(Eq. 10)

with the trajectory velocity (fs′) and new angle (φ₁) evaluated as fs′ = (fx′2 + fy′2 + fz′2)1/2 and φ₁ =
sin-1(fz′/fs′), respectively. In Eq. 10, fz = zs(t) and fz′ = vz(t) which are the lateral distance and
velocity of the shot trajectory path. The lateral acceleration component is fz′′. The new forcing
function (Ω) is defined as Ω = 1/2CMsin(φ₁)ρaA/ms which becomes negligible (Ω = 0) for a shot
rotation vector coincident with the x-y plane. As before, we will assume CM = SPavg with SPavg
defined by the 2nd-order polynomial. In Eqs. 7, the forcing function (Λ) for the x-y components
of the trajectory path requires an adjustment as Λ = 1/2CDcos(φ₁)ρaA/ms which reduces to a 2D
solution of the trajectory path when φ₁ = 0. Although the variability of φ₁ during shot flight is
most likely a non-linear function, no trajectory data exists to support a representative expression.
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Thus, the present assessment of φ₁ assumes that this angle is constant (or average angle) during
shot flight.

(φ₁)avg

250
The estimated angles [(φ₁)avg] to account for the out12-4
Fig. 10
of-plane Magnus force vector are plotted in Fig. 10
24-8
200
32-10
versus launch angle (θ₁) Again, these angles arose from
42-14
agreement between the trajectory predictions and
150
historical range data listed in Table 1 that lie inside the
Magnus force envelope. The condition CD′ > 0.4 was
100
maintained throughout these determinations. The angles
above 90° denote a negative Magnus force (SPavg < 0 in
50
Fig. 9) which may be possible when considering the
0
complex interaction between the oncoming freestream
0
2
4
6
8
10
and shot rotation. At first glance, the φ₁ angles generally
Launch Angle (θ₁)
increase with launch angle (θ₁) for each shot-charge
combination. This result should be expected because the gravitational vector would induce the
friction vector (Fθ) that represents contact between the shot and inside barrel to cause a more x-y
planar rotation for the lowest launch angles. Notably, the φ₁ angles in Fig. 10 reveal a very large
scatter for each launch angle. In many cases, the rotation vector varies between the x-y (φ₁ = 0°)
and x-z planes (φ₁ = 90°). This particular result may reflect the non-uniformity of the shot surface.
Inasmuch as the cannon bore was not much larger than the shot itself (windage < 0.25 inches),
surface imperfections such as the mold seam, filler hole sprue, mold vent sprue, rust and rough
casting would play a contributing role in the initial direction of the shot’s rotation vector.
Seemingly, the large variability in the historical range data (even at equivalent launch angles) is
probably attributed to the orientation of the Magnus force during shot flight.
60

12-4
50

Fig. 11
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The lateral distances (z) from the x-y trajectory path
that correspond to the φ₁ angles in Fig. 10 are plotted in
Fig. 11. Of the forty-nine shots listed in Table 1, only
nine shots (18%) show close proximity to the presumed
targets in Table 1 (z < 1yd) even under the present
analysis. A higher variability in the shot surface would
reduce this accuracy percentage even further. The clear
trend towards missing the intended targets is illustrated in
Fig. 11 for the higher launch angles where 8° appears as
the worst case. In the present analysis, a higher launch
angle (θ₁ > 8°) reduces the lateral variability due simply
to the lower impact of the gravitational force on the
angular velocity (ω).
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Further improvements in the present prediction of the shot trajectory center on the complex
interaction between the rotary motion and the high-speed freestream flow during flight to obtain a
better quantitative understanding of resultant Magnus force. The available data used herein
represents experimental measurements and numerical computations of the Magnus force at
constant conditions of rotation rate and freestream velocity. But the Magnus force, rotation rate
and oncoming freestream are all highly interactive and time-dependent. Fortunately, numerical
strategies presently exist to quantify this time-dependent behavior. Building such a numerical
strategy with an appropriate trajectory simulation matrix would require a couple of years to
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finalize. But the final product would be ubiquitous meaning that one could accurately predict and
clearly understand the shot’s trajectory behavior which responds to the applied forcing during
aerodynamic flight.
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Appendix: MATLAB Software used for Simulation
Drew Canfield’s Analysis of Various Cannons
clear;
clc;
hold off
%% Define Initial Parameters
g = 32.2; %ft/s^2
CB = zeros(6,5);
CB(:,1) = [6;12;18;24;32;36]; %Cannon Ball mass lbs
CB(:,2) = [3.49;4.40;5.04;5.55;6.10;6.34];%Cannon Ball Dia inches
CB(:,3) = CB(:,2)*25/24; %Cannon Bore inches
CB(:,4) = CB(:,3)/12; %Bore in ft.
CB(:,5) = (pi/4).*CB(:,4).^2; %Bore Area sq ft
CB(:,6) = CB(:,1)/g ;%mass of CB in slugs
CB(:,7) = (pi/4).*(CB(:,2)/12).^2; %Ball cross section Area sq ft
CB(:,8) = CB(:,2)/12; % Cannon ball dia. feet
CWt
= [1.25;1.87;2.5;6;8;9];% Charge Wt in lbs gunpowder
L_ft
= CB(:,4)*18;%length of the bore in Feet
Patm = 14.7*144; %DC from Robin 1804
R = 1600; %DC based on 19th century, Collins
GPden = 55; %Gun powder density lbs/ft cu
C_ft = (CWt./GPden)./CB(:,5); %Length of charge in ft
F = zeros(1000,6);
FD = zeros(1000,6);
V = zeros(1000,6);
Vmach = zeros(1000,6);
X = zeros(1000,6);
dx = L_ft(:)/1000; % DC divides up the length of the cannon into 1000th's
CD = 5; %Coefficient of Drag
Fkn = zeros(1000,6);
Vkn = zeros(1000,6);
%% Estimation of Muzzle V including drag
K1 = zeros(6,1);
K2 = zeros(6,1);
K1(:) = R*Patm*CB(:,5).*C_ft(:);
K2(:) = -0.0871*0.5*CD*CB(:,1)/g;
%% Simulation within the Cannon
for k=1:6
for n=1:1000
X(n,k) = n*dx(k); %DC defines 1000 positions in the canon
if(X(n,k)>C_ft(k))
F(n,k) = R*(C_ft(k)/(n*dx(k)))*Patm*CB(k,5)-.5*.08071*V(n-1).*V(n1)*CD*CB(k,5);
%DC First term gunpowder force, second term drag
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if(n>1) %DC allows velocity at bottom of cannon to be zero
V(n,k) =
1991*sqrt(((CWt(k)./((CB(k,1))+(CWt(k)/3)))*log(X(n,k)./C_ft(k))));
%
V(n,k) =
1991*sqrt(((CWt(k)./((CB(k,1))))*log(X(n,k)./C_ft(k))));
Vmach(n,k) = V(n,k)./1087.4;
%DC Current mach number of cannonball
end
end
end
end

MuzzleV = V(1000,:)'; %DC exit velocity of cannonball
Re(:,1) = ((CB(:,2).*MuzzleV(:)/(12*1.69))*10000)'; %DC Based on 80 F temp,
true
%% Parameters for Air Simulation
ang = 4/57.3 ;% cannon elevation radians, where 4 is degree of cannon
MN(1:6,1) = 1;
MN(1:6,2) = 2;
x = zeros(12000,6);
y = zeros(12000,6);
Vx = zeros(12001,6);
Vy = zeros(12001,6);
Vt = zeros(12001,6);
Ret = zeros(12000,6);
Ret(1,:)=Re(:,1);
AngA = zeros(12001,6);
CD = zeros(12001,6);
VxFps = Vx(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Vx for each cannonball
VyFps = Vy(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Yx for each cannonball
Table =MN(:,1);
CB_mass = CB(:,1)/g; %Mass of Cannonball in slugs
rho = .074; %density of air lbs/ft^3(1.225kg/m^3)
y0 = 10; % Height of cannon
nb = zeros(1,6);
dt = .001;
En = zeros(12000,6);
MACH = zeros(12000,6);
Mach = zeros(12000,6);
t = zeros(12000,1);
CannonAlt = 112; %Altitude of Cannon
TgtAltitude = 176; %Altitude of Target
TgtAltD = 176-112; %Altitude difference in feet
EOF = zeros(3,1);
% Drag Coef Model
%SphereCD
hold off
CDA = zeros(2500,2);
M = zeros(2500,1);
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M = (1:1:2500)/1000;
n = 1:1:2500;
CDA(1:300,1)= .1;
CDA(301:500,1) = .1+ n(1:200)./6000;
for n=1:400
CDA((500+n),1) = CDA(500,1)+ n*.5/400 + .1*(1+(sin(-pi/2+n*(2*3.1416/400))));
end
for n=1:700
CDA((900+n),1) = CDA(900,1) +.38*(1-exp(-.005*n));
end
CDA(1601:2500,1) = CDA(1600,1);
CDA(700:2500,2) = CDA(700:2500,1);
CDA(1:600,2 )= .47;
for n=1:99
CDA(600+n,2)= CDA(600,2)+ (n*.001);
end
figure(15)
%Plot Drag Coef
semilogx(M(200:2500),CDA(200:2500,1),'k');
hold on;
semilogx(M(200:2500),CDA(200:2500,2),'--');
Limits = [.2,2.5,0,1.5];
axis(Limits);
grid on;
grid minor;
title('CD vs MACH ')
ylabel('CD');
xlabel('MACH');
legend('Re > Transition', 'RE < Transition');
hold off
%end Drag coef++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
%% In Air Simulation
for k=1:6
x(1,k) = 0; % Range
y(1,k) = y0;
% altitude
Vy(1,k)= sin(ang)*MuzzleV(k);
Vx(1,k)= cos(ang)*MuzzleV(k);
Vt(1,k) = sqrt(((Vx(1,k))^2)+((Vy(1,k))^2));
MACH(1,k)
= MuzzleV(k)/1125.33;
for n=2:12000
t(n) = n*dt; %time in msec
MACH(n,k) = Vt(n-1,k)./1125.33;
Mach(n,k) = 1000*MACH(n,k);% used in drag cal.
Icd = round(Mach(n,k));% index for drag cal.
if(Icd>2500)
Icd = 2500;% Limit of CD
end
CD(n,k) = CDA(Icd,1);%Drag coef from function
Fdrx = .5*rho*(Vx(n-1).^2)*CD(n,k)*CB(k,5);%Drag Force
dvx = (Fdrx/CB(k,1));
Fdry = .5*rho*(Vy(n-1).^2)*CD(n,k)*CB(k,5);%Drag Force
dvy = (Fdry/CB(k,1));
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Vy(n,k) = Vy(n-1,k)- g*dt-dvy*dt;
Vx(n,k) = Vx(n-1,k)-dvx*dt;
En(n,k) = 0.5*CB_mass(k).*Vx(n,k).*Vx(n,k); %DC neglects y energy
Vt(n,k) = sqrt(Vx(n,k).^2+Vy(n,k).^2);
Ret(n,k) = (((CB(k,2))*Vt(n,k))/(12*1.69))*10000'; %DC Based on 80 F
temp, true
AngA(n,k) = atan(Vy(n,k)/Vx(n,k));
dy = ((Vy(n-1,k)+ Vy(n,k))*dt/2); %average velocity *time
dx = ((Vx(n-1,k)+ Vx(n,k))*dt/2);
% CD = .2; % Tupbulent flow, Re ~10^6
x(n,k)= x(n-1,k)+dx;
y(n,k) = y(n-1,k)+dy;
if((y(n,k)<-200)* nb(k)<1) %DC finds the location of when the altitude
%is less than -200 ft from the starting height
nb(k) = n;
end
end
end
nbp = 0;
for n=1:6
if nbp<nb(n);
nbp = nb(n); %finds the latest element position for when the altitude
%of the cannonball is less than -200 ft from starting altitude
x_land(n)=nbp;
end
end
xp = zeros(1,length(x));
xp(:) = x(:,1)'/3;
%% Penetration
A = CB(:,7);%Cross section area ft^2
d = CB(:,2);%penitrator dia in inches
W = CB(:,1); %Cannon ball Wt. lbs.
Vnew = zeros(6,1);
CBN = zeros(6,1);
N = zeros(6,1);
D = zeros(6,1);
S = 10;%Penitrability of Tgt
for G =1:6
Vnew(G) = Vt(nbp,G);%Velocity at Impact ft/sec
CBN(G) = .5/1; %Ln/d for cannon ball nose length r, devided by diameter
N(G) = 0.188*(CBN(G)+.56); %Tangent Ogives nose performance
K = 0.2*((W(G)).^4);% Soft soil and W<60 lbs
D(G) = .00178.*S.*N(G).*((W(G)./A(G))^.7).*(V(G)-100); %Penitration for soil
in feet
end
Range = x_land';
table(Range, D)
%% Figures/Tables from internal ballistics
Bore = CB(:,3);
CB_dia = CB(:,2);
adeg = [4,4,4,4,4,4]';
Table =MN(:,1);
table(Table,CB_mass,Bore,CB_dia,CWt)
Table = MN(:,2);
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table(Table,adeg,L_ft,C_ft, MuzzleV,VxFps,VyFps, Re)
figure(7)
for n=1:6
plot(X(:,n),F(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),F(:,n))
end
title('Force vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Force lbs')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(8)
for n=1:6
plot(X(:,n),V(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),V(:,n));
end
title('Velocity vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(9)
for n=1:6
plot(X(:,n),Vmach(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),Vmach(:,n));
end
title('Velocity vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity Mach')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
%% Figures/Tables for Exterior Ballistics
figure(1)
for k=1:6
AngAp(k,:) = AngA(1:12000,k)'*57.3;
plot(xp(1:nbp),AngAp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
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end
title('AngA vs Distance ')
ylabel('AngA');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off;
MaxAngA = max(AngA(1:12000,1))*57.3;
disp('Maximum Angle of Attack in 1');
disp(MaxAngA)
figure(2)
for k=1:6
Enp(k,:) = En(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Enp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('En vs Distance ')
ylabel('En ft-lb');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(3)
for k=1:6
Vxp(k,:) = Vx(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vxp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vx vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vx ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(4)
for k=1:6
Vyp = Vy(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vyp(1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vy vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vy');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
Vtp = zeros(1,12001);
figure(5)
for k=1:6
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Vtp(k,:) = Vx(1:12001,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vtp(k,(1:nbp)))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Velocity vs Distance ')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(6)
for k=1:6
Atp(k,:) = y(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Atp(k,(1:nbp)))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Altitude vs Distance ')
ylabel('Altitude Feet');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
maxAlt1 = max(y(1:12000,1));
disp('Maximum Altitude in 1 in ft')
disp(maxAlt1)
figure(10)
Ret = Ret';
for n=1:6
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
if n == 1
hold;
end
end
title('Reynolds Number vs Distance ')
xlabel('Distance (ft)')
ylabel('Reynolds Number')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
%% Double Check Assumptions about fluid mechanics
% Reynolds Number Minima per Cannonball
MinRe = zeros(6,1);
for n = 1:6
Min = find((Ret(n,:) == min(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MinRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Min);
end
ReMIN = min(MinRe(:,1));
disp('Minimum Reynolds Number');
disp(ReMIN);
MaxRe = zeros(6,1);
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for n = 1:6
Max = find((Ret(n,:) == max(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MaxRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Max);
end
ReMAX = max(MaxRe(:,1));
disp('Maximum Reynolds Number');
disp(ReMAX);

Drew Canfield’s Sensitivity Analysis
Analysis of Cross Wind
% Evaluation of Cross Wind Impact on Cannonball Ballistics
clear;
clc;
hold off
%% Define Initial Parameters
CB = zeros(6,5);
CB(:,1) = [6;12;18;24;32;36]; %Cannon Ball mass lbs
CB(:,2) = [3.49;4.40;5.04;5.55;6.10;6.34];%Cannon Ball Dia inches
CB(:,3) = CB(:,2)*25/24; %Cannon Bore inches
CB(:,4) = CB(:,3)/12; %Bore in ft.
CB(:,5) = (pi/4).*CB(:,4).^2; %Bore Area sq ft
CWt
= [1.25;1.87;2.5;6;8;9];% Charge Wt in lbs gunpowder
L_ft
= CB(:,4)*18;%length of the bore in Feet
Patm = 14.7*144; %DC from Robin 1804
R = 1600; %DC based on 19th century, Collins
GPden = 55; %Gun powder density lbs/ft cu
C_ft = (CWt./GPden)./CB(:,5); %Length of charge in ft
F = zeros(1000,6);
FD = zeros(1000,6);
V = zeros(1000,6);
Vmach = zeros(1000,6);
X = zeros(1000,6);
dx = L_ft(:)/1000; % DC divides up the length of the cannon into 1000th's
g = 32.17; %ft/s^2
CD = 5; %Coefficient of Drag
Fkn = zeros(1000,6);
Vkn = zeros(1000,6);
%% Estimation of Muzzle V including drag
K1 = zeros(6,1);
K2 = zeros(6,1);
K1(:) = R*Patm*CB(:,5).*C_ft(:);
K2(:) = -0.0871*0.5*CD*CB(:,1)/g;
%% Simulation within the Cannon
for k=1:6
for n=1:1000
X(n,k) = n*dx(k); %DC defines 1000 positions in the canon
if(X(n,k)>C_ft(k))
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F(n,k) = R*(C_ft(k)/(n*dx(k)))*Patm*CB(k,5)-.5*.08071*V(n-1).*V(n1)*CD*CB(k,5);
%DC First term gunpowder force, second term drag
if(n>1) %DC allows velocity at bottom of cannon to be zero
V(n,k) =
1991*sqrt(((CWt(k)./((CB(k,1))+(CWt(k)/3)))*log(X(n,k)./C_ft(k))));
%DC changed 1928 to 1991 to allign with use of R = 1600,
%19th century values
Vmach(n,k) = V(n,k)./1087.4;
%DC Current mach number of cannonball
end
end
end
end

MuzzleV = V(1000,:)'; %DC exit velocity of cannonball
MuzzleVdrag_2 = Vdrag_2(1000,:)';
Re(:,1) = ((CB(:,2).*MuzzleV(:)/(12*1.69))*10000)'; %DC Based on 80 F temp,
true
%% Parameters for Air Simulation
ang = 4/57.3 ;% cannon elevation radians, where 4 is degree of cannon
N(1:6,1) = 1;
N(1:6,2) = 2;
x = zeros(12000,6);
y = zeros(12000,6);
Vx = zeros(12001,6);
Vy = zeros(12001,6);
Vt = zeros(12001,6);
Ret = zeros(12000,6);
Ret(1,:)=Re(:,1);
AngA = zeros(12001,6);
CD = zeros(12001,6);
VxFps = Vx(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Vx for each cannonball
VyFps = Vy(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Yx for each cannonball
Table =N(:,1);
CB_mass = CB(:,1)/g; %Mass of Cannonball in slugs
rho = .074; %density of air lbs/ft^3(1.225kg/m^3) - based on pounds
y0 = 10; % Height of cannon
nb = zeros(1,6);
dt = .001;
En = zeros(12000,6);
MACH = zeros(12000,6);
Mach = zeros(12000,6);
t = zeros(12000,1);
CannonAlt = 112; %Altitude of Cannon
TgtAltitude = 176; %Altitude of Target
TgtAltD = TgtAltitude - CannonAlt; %Altitude difference in feet
EOF = zeros(6,2);
% Drag Coef Model
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%SphereCD
hold off
CDA = zeros(2500,2);
M = zeros(2500,1);
M = (1:1:2500)/1000;
n = 1:1:2500;
CDA(1:300,1)= .1;
CDA(301:500,1) = .1+ n(1:200)./6000;
for n=1:400
CDA((500+n),1) = CDA(500,1)+ n*.5/400 + .1*(1+(sin(-pi/2+n*(2*3.1416/400))));
end
for n=1:700
CDA((900+n),1) = CDA(900,1) +.38*(1-exp(-.005*n));
end
CDA(1601:2500,1) = CDA(1600,1);
CDA(700:2500,2) = CDA(700:2500,1);
CDA(1:600,2 )= .47;
for n=1:99
CDA(600+n,2)= CDA(600,2)+ (n*.001);
end
figure(15)
%Plot Drag Coef
semilogx(M(200:2500),CDA(200:2500,1),'k');
hold on;
semilogx(M(200:2500),CDA(200:2500,2),'--');
Limits = [.2,2.5,0,1.5];
axis(Limits);
grid on;
grid minor;
title('CD vs MACH ')
ylabel('CD');
xlabel('MACH');
legend('Re > Transition', 'RE < Transition');
hold off
%end Drag coef++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
%% In Air Simulation
for k=1:6
x(1,k) = 0; % Range
y(1,k) = y0;
% altitude
z(1,k) = 0; % Horizontal Spread
Vy(1,k)= sin(ang)*MuzzleV(k);
Vx(1,k)= cos(ang)*MuzzleV(k);
Vz(1,k)=0;
Vt(1,k) = sqrt(((Vx(1,k))^2)+((Vy(1,k))^2)+Vz(1,k)^2);
MACH(1,k)
= MuzzleV(k)/1125.33;
for n=2:12000
t(n) = n*dt; %time in msec
MACH(n,k) = Vt(n-1,k)./1125.33;
Mach(n,k) = 1000*MACH(n,k);% used in drag cal.
Icd = round(Mach(n,k));% index for drag cal.
if(Icd>2500)
Icd = 2500;% Limit of CD
end
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CD(n,k) = CDA(Icd,1);%Drag coef from function
% Cross Wind Incorporation
% Average Max Wind Speed in August - 15mph
Ws = (15*5028)*(1/60)*(1/60); % ft/s
Ws_Icd = round(abs(Vz(n-1,k)-Ws)*1000);
if (Ws_Icd>2500)
Ws_Icd = 2500;
end
CD_cw = CDA(Ws_Icd,1);
Fdrz = 0.5*rho*((Vz(n-1,k)-Ws)^2)*CD_cw*CB(k,5); % Cross Wind Drag
dvz = (Fdrz/(CB(k,1)));
Vz(n,k) = Vz(n-1,k)+dvz*dt;
dz = ((Vz(n-1,k)+Vz(n,k))*dt/2);
z(n,k)=z(n-1,k)+dz;
% 2D Ballistics
Fdrx = .5*rho*(Vx(n-1).^2)*CD(n,k)*CB(k,5);%Drag Force
dvx = (Fdrx/(CB(k,1)));
Fdry = .5*rho*(Vy(n-1).^2)*CD(n,k)*CB(k,5);%Drag Force
dvy = (Fdry/(CB(k,1)));
Vy(n,k) = Vy(n-1,k)- g*dt-dvy*dt;
Vx(n,k) = Vx(n-1,k)-dvx*dt;
En(n,k) = 0.5*CB_mass(k).*Vx(n,k).*Vx(n,k); %DC neglects y energy
Vt(n,k) = sqrt(Vx(n,k).^2+Vy(n,k).^2+Vz(n,k).^2);
Ret(n,k) = (((CB(k,2))*Vt(n,k))/(12*1.69))*10000'; %DC Based on 80 F
temp, true
AngA(n,k) = atan(Vy(n,k)/Vx(n,k));
dy = ((Vy(n-1,k)+ Vy(n,k))*dt/2); %average velocity *time
dx = ((Vx(n-1,k)+ Vx(n,k))*dt/2);
% CD = .2; % Tupbulent flow, Re ~10^6
x(n,k)= x(n-1,k)+dx;
y(n,k) = y(n-1,k)+dy;
if(y(n,k)>TgtAltD)
EOF(k,1) = x(n,k);
EOF(k,2) = n;
end
if((y(n,k)<-200)* nb(k)<1) %DC finds the location of when the altitude
%is less than -200 ft from the starting height
nb(k) = n;
end
end
end
nbp = 0;
for n=1:6
if nbp<nb(n);
nbp = nb(n); %finds the latest element position for when the altitude
%of the cannonball is less than -200 ft from starting altitude
end
X_land(1,n)=nbp;
end
xp = zeros(1,length(x));
xp(:) = x(:,1)'/3;
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Np = n;
Range = EOF./3;% Range yards
MaxRange = max(Range);
%% Figures/Tables from internal ballistics
Bore = CB(:,3);
CB_dia = CB(:,2);
adeg = [4,4,4,4,4,4]';
Table =N(:,1);
table(Table,CB_mass,Bore,CB_dia,CWt)
Table = N(:,2);
table(Table,adeg,L_ft,C_ft, MuzzleV,VxFps,VyFps, Re)
figure(7)
for n=1:6
plot(X(:,n),F(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),F(:,n))
end
title('Force vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Force lbs')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(8)
for n=1:6
plot(X(:,n),V(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),V(:,n));
end
title('Velocity vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(9)
for n=1:6
plot(X(:,n),Vmach(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),Vmach(:,n));
end
title('Velocity vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity Mach')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
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%% Figures/Tables for Exterior Ballistics
nbp = max(EOF(:,2))-1;
figure(1)
for k=1:6
AngAp(k,:) = AngA(1:12000,k)'*57.3;
plot(xp(1:nbp),AngAp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('AngA vs Distance ')
ylabel('AngA');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off;
figure(2)
for k=1:6
Enp(k,:) = En(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Enp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('En vs Distance ')
ylabel('En');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(3)
for k=1:6
Vxp(k,:) = Vx(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vxp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vx vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vx ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(4)
for k=1:6
Vyp = Vy(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vyp(1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vy vs Distance ')
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ylabel('Vy');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
Vtp = zeros(1,12001);
figure(5)
for k=1:6
Vtp(k,:) = Vx(1:12001,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vtp(k,(1:nbp)))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Velocity vs Distance ')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(6)
for k=1:6
Atp(k,:) = y(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Atp(k,(1:nbp)))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Altitude vs Distance ')
ylabel('Altitude Feet');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(10)
Ret = Ret';
for n=1:6
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
if n == 1
hold;
end
end
title('Reynolds Number vs Distance ')
xlabel('Distance (ft)')
ylabel('Reynolds Number')
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
figure(14)
for k=1:6
plot(xp(1:nbp),z(1:nbp,k))
if (k == 1)
hold;
end
end
title('Horizontal Spread vs Distance ')
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ylabel('Horizontal Distance (ft)');
xlabel('Range (Yds)');
legend('6lb','12lb','18lb','24lb','32lb','36lb');
hold off
%% Double Check Assumptions about fluid mechanics
% Reynolds Number Minima per Cannonball
MinRe = zeros(6,1);
for n = 1:6
Min = find((Ret(n,:) == min(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MinRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Min);
end
disp('Minimum Reynolds Numbers');
disp(MinRe);
ReMIN = min(MinRe(:,1));
MaxRe = zeros(6,1);
for n = 1:6
Max = find((Ret(n,:) == max(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MaxRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Max);
end
ReMAX = max(MaxRe(:,1));
%% Analysis of Impact
Hspread = z(end,1);
Land = (X_land(1));
disp('Horizontal Spread in ft');
disp(Hspread);
disp('Maximum Reynolds Number');
disp(ReMAX);
disp('Minimum Reynolds Number');
disp(ReMIN);
disp('Landing Position in ft');
disp(Land);

% Data from Original Simulation
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Minimum Reynolds Number
9.224075405632702e+05
Maximum Reynolds Number
4.883343867833446e+06
Range(1,1)
ans =
7855
Maximum Angle of Attack in 1
4.302281140389114
Maximum Altitude in 1 in ft
1.671552540999079e+02
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DiffReMIN = ReMIN - 9.224075405632702e+05;
DiffReMAX = ReMAX - 4.883343867833446e+06;
DiffLandPos = Land - 7855;
DiffAlt = max(y(1:12000,1))- 1.671552540999079e+02;
DiffAngA = max(AngA(1:12000,1))*57.3 - 4.302281140389114;
disp('Difference in
disp(DiffReMIN)
disp('Difference in
disp(DiffReMAX)
disp('Difference in
disp(DiffLandPos)
disp('Difference in
disp(DiffAlt)
disp('Difference in
disp(DiffAngA)

Min. RE')
Max. RE')
Landing Position in ft')
Altitude in ft');
Angle of Attack in degrees')

Analysis of Vertical Angle
% Evaluation of change of Angle on ballistics of 18 lb Cannonball
clear;
clc;
hold off
%% Define Initial Parameters
CB = zeros(1,5);
CB(1,1) = 18; %Cannon Ball mass lbs
CB(1,2) = 5.04;%Cannon Ball Dia inches
CB(1,3) = CB(1,2)*25/24; %Cannon Bore inches
CB(1,4) = CB(1,3)/12; %Bore in ft.
CB(1,5) = (pi/4).*CB(1,4).^2; %Bore Area sq ft
CWt
= 2.5;% Charge Wt in lbs gunpowder
L_ft
= CB(1,4)*18;%length of the bore in Feet
Patm = 14.7*144; %DC from Robin 1804
R = 1600; %DC based on 19th century, Collins
GPden = 55; %Gun powder density lbs/ft cu
C_ft = (CWt./GPden)./CB(1,5); %Length of charge in ft
F = zeros(1000,1);
FD = zeros(1000,1);
V = zeros(1000,1);
Vmach = zeros(1000,1);
X = zeros(1000,1);
dx = L_ft(:)/1000; % DC divides up the length of the cannon into 1000th's
g = 32.2; %ft/s^2
CD = 5; %Coefficient of Drag
Fkn = zeros(1000,1);
Vkn = zeros(1000,1);
%% Simulation within the Canon
for n=1:1000
X(n) = n*dx; %DC defines 1000 positions in the cannon
if(X(n)>C_ft)
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F(n) = R*(C_ft/(n*dx))*Patm*CB(1,5)-.5*.08071*V(n-1).*V(n1)*CD*CB(1,5);
%DC First term gunpowder force, second term drag
if(n>1) %DC allows velocity at bottom of cannon to be zero
V(n) = 1991*sqrt(((CWt./((CB(1,1))+(CWt/3)))*log(X(n)./C_ft)));
%DC changed 1928 to 1991 to allign with use of R = 1600,
%19th century values
Vmach(n) = V(n)./1087.4;
%DC Current mach number of cannonball
end
end
end
MuzzleV = V(1000,1)'; %DC exit velocity of cannonball
Re(:,1) = ((CB(:,2).*MuzzleV(:)/(12*1.69))*10000)'; %DC Based on 80 F temp,
true
%% Parameters for Air Simulation
AngV = 3.1:0.1:5;
AngV = AngV./57.3;
x = zeros(12000,20);
y = zeros(12000,20);
X_land = zeros(1,20);
Vx = zeros(12001,20);
Vy = zeros(12001,20);
Vt = zeros(12001,20);
Vx(1,:) = MuzzleV*cos(AngV(:));
Vy(1,:) = MuzzleV*sin(AngV(:));
Ret = zeros(12000,20);
Ret(1,:)=Re(:,1);
AngA = zeros(12001,20);
CD = zeros(12001,20);
VxFps = Vx(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Vx for each cannonball
VyFps = Vy(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Yx for each cannonball
CB_mass = CB(1,1)/g; %Mass of Cannonball in slugs
rho = .074; %density of air lbs/ft^3(1.225kg/m^3)
y0 = 10; % Height of cannon
nb = zeros(20,1);
dt = .001;
En = zeros(12000,20);
I = 0;
%% In Air Simulation for Varying Angles
for H = 1:20
ang = AngV(H);
x(1,H) = 0; % Range
y(1,H) = y0;
% altitude
Vy(1,H)= sin(ang)*MuzzleV;
Vx(1,H)= cos(ang)*MuzzleV;
Vt(1,H) = sqrt(Vx(1,H).^2+Vy(1,H).^2);
for n=2:12001
t = n*dt; %time in msec
Mach = Vt(n-1,H)/1125.33;
CD(n,H) = .58+0.58*tanh(2*(Mach -.8));%Drag coef
Fdrx = .5*rho*(Vx(n-1).^2)*CD(n,H)*CB(1,5);%Drag Force
dvx = (Fdrx/CB(1,1));
Fdry = .5*rho*(Vy(n-1).^2)*CD(n,H)*CB(1,5);%Drag Force
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dvy = (Fdry/CB(1,1));
Vy(n,H) = Vy(n-1,H)- g*dt-dvy*dt;
Vx(n,H) = Vx(n-1,H)-dvx*dt;
En(n,H) = 0.5*CB_mass.*Vx(n,H).*Vx(n,H); %DC neglects y energy
Vt(n,H) = sqrt(Vx(n,H).^2+Vy(n,H).^2);
Ret(n,H) = (((CB(1,2))*Vt(n,H))/(12*1.69))*10000'; %DC Based on 80 F
temp, true
AngA(n,H) = atan(Vy(n,H)/Vx(n,H));
dy = ((Vy(n-1,H)+ Vy(n,H))*dt/2); %average velocity *time
dx = ((Vx(n-1,H)+ Vx(n,H))*dt/2);
% CD = .2; % Tupbulent flow, Re ~10^6
x(n,H)= x(n-1,H)+dx;
y(n,H) = y(n-1,H)+dy;
if((y(n,H)<-200)* nb(H)<1) %DC finds the location of when the altitude
%is less than -200 ft from the starting height
nb(H) = n;
end
if y(n,H)<-200
I = I +1;
if I == 1
X_land(1,H)=x(n,H);
end
end
end
I = 0;
end
nbp = 0;
for n=1:6
if nbp<nb(n);
nbp = nb(n); %finds the latest element position for when the altitude
%of the cannonball is less than -200 ft from starting altitude
end
end
xp = zeros(1,length(x));
xp(:) = x(:,1)'/3;
E_land = X_land(1,20)-X_land(1,1);
%% Figures/Tables from internal ballistics
figure(1)
plot(X,F);
title('Force vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Force lbs')
figure(2)
plot(X,V);
title('Velocity vs Length
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec')
figure(3)

')
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plot(X,Vmach);
title('Velocity vs Length
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity Mach')

')

%% Figures/Tables for Exterior Ballistics
AngV = AngV.*57.3;
AngA = AngA.*57.3;
figure(4)
for k=1:20
AngAp(k,:) = AngA(1:12000,k)'*57.3;
plot(xp(1:nbp),AngAp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('AngA vs Distance ')
ylabel('AngA');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off;
figure(5)
for k=1:20
Enp(k,:) = En(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Enp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('En vs Distance ')
ylabel('En');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(6)
for k=1:20
Vxp(k,:) = Vx(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vxp(k,1:nbp))
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if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vx vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vx ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(7)
for k=1:20
Vyp = Vy(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vyp(1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vy vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vy');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
Vtp = zeros(12001,20);
figure(8)
for k=1:20
Vtp(:,k) = Vx(:,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vtp(1:nbp,:))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Velocity vs Distance ')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
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,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(9)
for k=1:20
Atp(k,:) = y(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Atp(k,(1:nbp)))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Altitude vs Distance ')
ylabel('Altitude Feet');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(10)
Ret = Ret';
for n=1:20
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
end
title('Reynolds Number vs Distance ')
xlabel('Distance (ft)')
ylabel('Reynolds Number')
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
%% Double Check Assumptions about fluid mechanics
% Reynolds Number Minima per Cannonball
MinRe = zeros(20,1);
for n = 1:20
Min = find((Ret(n,:) == min(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MinRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Min);
end
ReMIN = min(MinRe(:,1));
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MaxRe = zeros(20,1);
for n = 1:20
Max = find((Ret(n,:) == max(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MaxRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Max);
end
ReMAX = max(MaxRe(:,1));
%% Calculation of Standard Deviation of each measure by the end
Vtmax = max(Vt(:,:));
Vymax = max(Vy(:,:));
Vxmax = max(Vx(:,:));
Emax = max(En(:,:));
Atp = Atp';
Altmax = max(Atp(:,:));
AngMax = max(AngA(:,:));
Vstd = std(Vtmax(:));
Vystd = std(Vymax(:));
Vxstd = std(Vxmax(:));
Enstd = std(Emax(:));
altstd = std(Altmax(:));
Angstd = std(AngMax(:));
nbstd = std(nb(:));
Restd = std(MinRe(:,1));

X = java_array('java.lang.String', 6);
X(1) = java.lang.String('Velocity');
X(2) = java.lang.String('Y_Velocity');
X(3) = java.lang.String('X_Velocity');
X(4) = java.lang.String('Energy');
X(5) = java.lang.String('Reynolds_Number');
X(6) = java.lang.String('nbp');
D = cell(X);
X = java_array('java.lang.String',2);
X(1) = java.lang.String('Altitude');
X(2) = java.lang.String('Angle_Of_Attack');
D2 = cell(X);
StandardDeviations =
table(Vstd,Vystd,Vxstd,Enstd,Restd,nbstd,'variablenames',D)
StandardDeviations2 = table(altstd,Angstd,'variablenames',D2)
disp('Max Re');
disp(ReMAX);
disp('Min Re');
disp(ReMIN);
disp('Max Change in Landing Position');
disp(E_land);

Analysis of Horizontal Spread
% Evaluation of change of Angle on ballistics of 18 lb Cannonball
clear;
clc;
hold off
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%% Define Initial Parameters
CB = zeros(1,5);
CB(1,1) = 18; %Cannon Ball mass lbs
CB(1,2) = 5.04;%Cannon Ball Dia inches
CB(1,3) = CB(1,2)*25/24; %Cannon Bore inches
CB(1,4) = CB(1,3)/12; %Bore in ft.
CB(1,5) = (pi/4).*CB(1,4).^2; %Bore Area sq ft
CWt
= 2.5;% Charge Wt in lbs gunpowder
L_ft
= CB(1,4)*18;%length of the bore in Feet
Patm = 14.7*144; %DC from Robin 1804
R = 1600; %DC based on 19th century, Collins
GPden = 55; %Gun powder density lbs/ft cu
C_ft = (CWt./GPden)./CB(1,5); %Length of charge in ft
F = zeros(1000,1);
FD = zeros(1000,1);
V = zeros(1000,1);
Vmach = zeros(1000,1);
X = zeros(1000,1);
dx = L_ft(:)/1000; % DC divides up the length of the cannon into 1000th's
g = 32.2; %ft/s^2
CD = 5; %Coefficient of Drag
Fkn = zeros(1000,1);
Vkn = zeros(1000,1);
%% Simulation within the Canon
for n=1:1000
X(n) = n*dx; %DC defines 1000 positions in the cannon
if(X(n)>C_ft)
F(n) = R*(C_ft/(n*dx))*Patm*CB(1,5)-.5*.08071*V(n-1).*V(n1)*CD*CB(1,5);
%DC First term gunpowder force, second term drag
if(n>1) %DC allows velocity at bottom of cannon to be zero
V(n) = 1991*sqrt(((CWt./((CB(1,1))+(CWt/3)))*log(X(n)./C_ft)));
%DC changed 1928 to 1991 to allign with use of R = 1600,
%19th century values
Vmach(n) = V(n)./1087.4;
%DC Current mach number of cannonball
end
end
end
MuzzleV = V(1000,1)'; %DC exit velocity of cannonball
Re(:,1) = ((CB(:,2).*MuzzleV(:)/(12*1.69))*10000)'; %DC Based on 80 F temp,
true
%% Parameters for Air Simulation
AngV = 0.1:0.1:2;
AngV = AngV./57.3;
ang = 4/57.3;
x = zeros(12000,20);
y = zeros(12000,20);
z = zeros(12000,20);
Fdry= zeros(12000,20);
Fdrx= zeros(12000,20);
Fdrz= zeros(12000,20);
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dvy= zeros(12000,20);
dvx= zeros(12000,20);
dvz= zeros(12000,20);
dy= zeros(12000,20);
dx= zeros(12000,20);
dz= zeros(12000,20);
X_land = zeros(1,20);
Vx = zeros(12001,20);
Vy = zeros(12001,20);
Vz = zeros(12001,20);
Vt = zeros(12001,20);
Ret = zeros(12000,20);
t = zeros(12000,20);
Ret(1,:)=Re(:,1);
AngA = zeros(12001,20);
CD = zeros(12001,20);
VxFps = Vx(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Vx for each cannonball
VyFps = Vy(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Yx for each cannonball
CB_mass = CB(1,1)/g; %Mass of Cannonball in slugs
rho = .074; %density of air lbs/ft^3(1.225kg/m^3)
y0 = 10; % Height of cannon
nb = zeros(20,1);
dt = .001;
En = zeros(12000,20);
% Drag Coef Model
%SphereCD
hold off
CDA = zeros(2500,2);
M = zeros(2500,1);
M = (1:1:2500)/1000;
n = 1:1:2500;
CDA(1:300,1)= .1;
CDA(301:500,1) = .1+ n(1:200)./6000;
for n=1:400
CDA((500+n),1) = CDA(500,1)+ n*.5/400 + .1*(1+(sin(-pi/2+n*(2*3.1416/400))));
end
for n=1:700
CDA((900+n),1) = CDA(900,1) +.38*(1-exp(-.005*n));
end
CDA(1601:2500,1) = CDA(1600,1);
CDA(700:2500,2) = CDA(700:2500,1);
CDA(1:600,2 )= .47;
for n=1:99
CDA(600+n,2)= CDA(600,2)+ (n*.001);
end
figure(15)
%Plot Drag Coef
semilogx(M(200:2500),CDA(200:2500,1),'k');
hold on;
semilogx(M(200:2500),CDA(200:2500,2),'--');
Limits = [.2,2.5,0,1.5];
axis(Limits);
grid on;
grid minor;
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title('CD vs MACH ')
ylabel('CD');
xlabel('MACH');
legend('Re > Transition', 'RE < Transition');
hold off
%% In Air Simulation for Varying Angles
for H = 1:20
ang2 = AngV(H);
x(1,H) = 0; % Range
y(1,H) = y0;
% altitude
z(1,H) = 0; %Horizontal Spread
Vy(1,H) = cos(ang2)*sin(ang)*MuzzleV;
Vx(1,H) = cos(ang)*cos(ang2)*MuzzleV;
Vz(1,H) = cos(ang)*sin(ang2)*MuzzleV;
Vt(1,H) = sqrt(Vx(1,H).^2+Vy(1,H).^2+Vz(1,H).^2);
for n=2:12001
t(n,H) = n*dt; %time in msec
MACH(n,H) = Vt(n-1,H)./1125.33;
Mach(n,H) = 1000*MACH(n,H);% used in drag cal.
Icd = round(Mach(n,H));% index for drag cal.
if(Icd>2500)
Icd = 2500;% Limit of CD
end
CD(n,H) = CDA(Icd,1);%Drag coef from function
Fdrx(n,H) = .5*rho*(Vx(n-1,H).^2)*CD(n,H)*CB(1,5);%Drag Force
dvx(n,H) = (Fdrx(n,H)/CB(1,1));
Fdry(n,H) = .5*rho*(Vy(n-1,H).^2)*CD(n,H)*CB(1,5);%Drag Force
dvy(n,H) = (Fdry(n,H)/CB(1,1));
Fdrz(n,H) = .5*rho*(Vz(n-1,H).^2)*CD(n,H)*CB(1,5);%Drag Force
dvz(n,H) = (Fdrz(n,H)/CB(1,1));
Vy(n,H)
Vx(n,H)
Vz(n,H)
En(n,H)
Vt(n,H)

=
=
=
=
=

Vy(n-1,H)- g*dt-dvy(n,H)*dt;
Vx(n-1,H)-dvx(n,H)*dt;
Vz(n-1,H)-dvz(n,H)*dt;
0.5*CB_mass.*Vx(n,H).*Vx(n,H); %DC neglects y energy
sqrt(Vx(n,H).^2+Vy(n,H).^2+Vz(n,H).^2);

Ret(n,H) = (((CB(1,2))*Vt(n,H))/(12*1.69))*10000'; %DC Based on 80 F
temp, true
AngA(n,H) = atan(Vy(n,H)/Vx(n,H));
dy(n,H) = ((Vy(n-1,H)+ Vy(n,H))*dt/2); %average velocity *time
dx(n,H) = ((Vx(n-1,H)+ Vx(n,H))*dt/2);
dz(n,H) = ((Vz(n-1,H)+ Vz(n,H)) *dt/2);
x(n,H) = x(n-1,H)+dx(n,H);
y(n,H) = y(n-1,H)+dy(n,H);
z(n,H) = z(n-1,H)+dz(n,H);
if((y(n,H)<-200)* nb(H)<1) %DC finds the location of when the altitude
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%is less than -200 ft from the starting height
nb(H) = n;
end
end
end
nbp = 0;
for n=1:20
if nbp<nb(n);
nbp = nb(n); %finds the latest element position for when the altitude
%of the cannonball is less than -200 ft from starting altitude
end
X_land(1,n)=nbp;
end
xp = zeros(1,length(x));
xp(:) = x(:,1)'/3;
E_land = X_land(1,20)-X_land(1,1);
%% Figures/Tables from internal ballistics
figure(1)
plot(X,F);
title('Force vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Force lbs')
figure(2)
plot(X,V);
title('Velocity vs Length
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec')

')

figure(3)
plot(X,Vmach);
title('Velocity vs Length
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity Mach')

')

%% Figures/Tables for Exterior Ballistics
AngV = AngV.*57.3;
AngA = AngA.*57.3;
figure(4)
for k=1:20
AngAp(k,:) = AngA(1:12000,k)'*57.3;
plot(xp(1:nbp),AngAp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('AngA vs Distance ')
ylabel('AngA');
xlabel('Range Yds');
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legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off;
figure(5)
for k=1:20
Enp(k,:) = En(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Enp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('En vs Distance ')
ylabel('En');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(6)
for k=1:20
Vxp(k,:) = Vx(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vxp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vx vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vx ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(7)
for k=1:20
Vyp = Vy(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vyp(1:nbp))
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if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vy vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vy');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(21)
for k=1:20
Vzp = Vz(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vzp(1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vz vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vz (ft/s)');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(22)
for k=1:20
plot(t(:,k),Vz(:,k))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vz vs Time ')
ylabel('Vz (ft/s)');
xlabel('Time (s)');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
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hold off
Vtp = zeros(12001,20);
figure(8)
for k=1:20
Vtp(:,k) = Vx(:,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vtp(1:nbp,:))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Velocity vs Distance ')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(9)
for k=1:20
Atp(k,:) = y(1:12000,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Atp(k,(1:nbp)))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Altitude vs Distance ')
ylabel('Altitude Feet');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(20)
for k=1:20
plot(t(1:nbp,k),z(1:nbp,k))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Horizontal Spread vs Time ')
ylabel('Horizontal Spread (ft)');
xlabel('Time (s)');
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
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,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
figure(10)
Ret = Ret';
for n=1:20
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
end
title('Reynolds Number vs Distance ')
xlabel('Distance (ft)')
ylabel('Reynolds Number')
legend(num2str(AngV(1)),num2str(AngV(2)),num2str(AngV(3)),num2str(AngV(4))...
,num2str(AngV(5)),num2str(AngV(6)),num2str(AngV(7)),num2str(AngV(8))...
,num2str(AngV(9)),num2str(AngV(10)),num2str(AngV(11)),num2str(AngV(12))...
,num2str(AngV(13)),num2str(AngV(14)),num2str(AngV(15)),num2str(AngV(16))...
,num2str(AngV(17)),num2str(AngV(18)),num2str(AngV(19)),num2str(AngV(20)));
hold off
%% Double Check Assumptions about fluid mechanics
% Reynolds Number Minima per Cannonball
MinRe = zeros(20,1);
for n = 1:20
Min = find((Ret(n,:) == min(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MinRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Min);
end
ReMIN = min(MinRe(:,1));
MaxRe = zeros(20,1);
for n = 1:20
Max = find((Ret(n,:) == max(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MaxRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Max);
end
ReMAX = max(MaxRe(:,1));
%% Calculation of Standard Deviation of each measure by the end
Vtmax = max(Vt(:,:));
Vymax = max(Vy(:,:));
Vxmax = max(Vx(:,:));
Emax = max(En(:,:));
Atp = Atp';
Altmax = max(Atp(:,:));
AngMax = max(AngA(:,:));
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Vstd = std(Vtmax(:));
Vystd = std(Vymax(:));
Vxstd = std(Vxmax(:));
Enstd = std(Emax(:));
altstd = std(Altmax(:));
Angstd = std(AngMax(:));
nbstd = std(nb(:));
Restd = std(MinRe(:,1));
X = java_array('java.lang.String', 6);
X(1) = java.lang.String('Velocity');
X(2) = java.lang.String('Y_Velocity');
X(3) = java.lang.String('X_Velocity');
X(4) = java.lang.String('Energy');
X(5) = java.lang.String('Reynolds_Number');
X(6) = java.lang.String('nbp');
D = cell(X);
X = java_array('java.lang.String',2);
X(1) = java.lang.String('Altitude');
X(2) = java.lang.String('Angle_Of_Attack');
D2 = cell(X);
StandardDeviations =
table(Vstd,Vystd,Vxstd,Enstd,Restd,nbstd,'variablenames',D)
StandardDeviations2 = table(altstd,Angstd,'variablenames',D2)
disp('Max Re');
disp(ReMAX);
disp('Min Re');
disp(ReMIN);
disp('Max Change in Landing Position in ft');
disp(E_land);
HSpread = z(end,20)-z(end,1);
disp('Horizontal Spread in ft');
disp(HSpread);

Analysis of Gunpowder Quality
% Evaluation of change of quality of gunpowder on ballistics of 18 lb
Cannonball
clear;
clc;
hold off
%% Define Initial Parameters
CB = zeros(1,5);
CB(1,1) = 18; %Cannon Ball mass lbs
CB(1,2) = 5.04;%Cannon Ball Dia inches
CB(1,3) = CB(1,2)*25/24; %Cannon Bore inches
CB(1,4) = CB(1,3)/12; %Bore in ft.
CB(1,5) = (pi/4).*CB(1,4).^2; %Bore Area sq ft
CWt
= 2.5;% Charge Wt in lbs gunpowder
L_ft
= CB(1,4)*18;%length of the bore in Feet
Patm = 14.7*144; %DC from Robin 1804
GPden = 55; %Gun powder density lbs/ft cu
C_ft = (CWt./GPden)./CB(1,5); %Length of charge in ft
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F = zeros(1000,11);
FD = zeros(1000,11);
V = zeros(1000,11);
Vmach = zeros(1000,11);
X = zeros(1000,11);
dx = L_ft(:)/1000; % DC divides up the length of the cannon into 1000th's
g = 32.2; %ft/s^2
CD = 5; %Coefficient of Drag
Fkn = zeros(1000,11);
Vkn = zeros(1000,11);
R = 1500:10:1600; %Quality of Gunpowder Changes
%% Simulation within the Canon
for k = 1:11
for n=1:1000
X(n,k) = n*dx; %DC defines 1000 positions in the cannon
if(X(n,k)>C_ft)
F(n,k) = R(k)*(C_ft/(X(n,k)))*Patm*CB(1,5)-.5*.08071*V(n-1,k).*V(n1,k)*CD*CB(1,5);
if(n>1)
V(n,k) =
sqrt(2*g*R(k)*(Patm/GPden)*(CWt/CB(1,1))*log(X(n,k)./C_ft));
Vmach(n,k) = V(n,k)./1087.4;
%DC Current mach number of cannonball
end
end
end
end
MuzzleV = V(1000,:)'; %DC exit velocity of cannonball
Re(:,1) = ((CB(:,2).*MuzzleV(:)/(12*1.69))*10000)'; %DC Based on 80 F temp,
true
%% Parameters for Air Simulation
AngV = 4;
AngV = AngV./57.3;
x = zeros(12000,11);
X_land = zeros(1,11);
y = zeros(12000,11);
Vx = zeros(12001,11);
Vy = zeros(12001,11);
Vt = zeros(12001,11);
Vx(1,:) = MuzzleV*cos(AngV(:));
Vy(1,:) = MuzzleV*sin(AngV(:));
Ret = zeros(12000,11);
Ret(1,:)=Re(:,1);
AngA = zeros(12001,1);
CD = zeros(12001,11);
VxFps = Vx(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Vx for each cannonball
VyFps = Vy(1,:)'; %DC first entry in Yx for each cannonball
CB_mass = CB(1,1)/g; %Mass of Cannonball in slugs
rho = .074; %density of air lbs/ft^3(1.225kg/m^3)
y0 = 10; % Height of cannon
nb = zeros(11,1);
dt = .001;
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En = zeros(12000,11);
I = 0;
%% In Air Simulation for Varying Angles
for H = 1:11
ang = AngV;
x(1,H) = 0; % Range
y(1,H) = y0;
% altitude
Vy(1,H)= sin(ang)*MuzzleV(H,1);
Vx(1,H)= cos(ang)*MuzzleV(H,1);
Vt(1,H) = sqrt(Vx(1,H).^2+Vy(1,H).^2);
for n=2:12001
t = n*dt; %time in msec
Mach = Vt(n-1,H)/1125.33;
CD(n,H) = .58+0.58*tanh(2*(Mach -.8));%Drag coef
Fdrx = .5*rho*(Vx(n-1).^2)*CD(n,H)*CB(1,5);%Drag Force
dvx = (Fdrx/CB(1,1));
Fdry = .5*rho*(Vy(n-1).^2)*CD(n,H)*CB(1,5);%Drag Force
dvy = (Fdry/CB(1,1));
Vy(n,H) = Vy(n-1,H)- g*dt-dvy*dt;
Vx(n,H) = Vx(n-1,H)-dvx*dt;
En(n,H) = 0.5*CB_mass.*Vx(n,H).*Vx(n,H); %DC neglects y energy
Vt(n,H) = sqrt(Vx(n,H).^2+Vy(n,H).^2);
Ret(n,H) = (((CB(1,2))*Vt(n,H))/(12*1.69))*10000'; %DC Based on 80 F
temp, true
AngA(n,H) = atan(Vy(n,H)/Vx(n,H));
dy = ((Vy(n-1,H)+ Vy(n,H))*dt/2); %average velocity *time
dx = ((Vx(n-1,H)+ Vx(n,H))*dt/2);
% CD = .2; % Tupbulent flow, Re ~10^6
x(n,H)= x(n-1,H)+dx;
y(n,H) = y(n-1,H)+dy;
if((y(n,H)<-200)* nb(H)<1) %DC finds the location of when the altitude
%is less than -200 ft from the starting height
nb(H) = n;
end
if n <12000
if y(n,H)<-200
I = I +1;
if I == 1
X_land(1,H)=x(n,H);
end
else
X_land(1,H)=x(n,H);
end
end
end
I = 0;
end
E_land = X_land(1,11)-X_land(1,1);
nbp = 0;
for n=1:6
if nbp<nb(n);
nbp = nb(n); %finds the latest element position for when the altitude
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%of the cannonball is less than -200 ft from starting altitude
end
end
xp = zeros(1,length(x));
xp(:) = x(:,1)'/3;
%% Figures/Tables from internal ballistics
figure(1)
for n=1:11
plot(X(:,n),F(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),F(:,n))
end
title('Force vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Force lbs')
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
figure(2)
for n=1:11
plot(X(:,n),V(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),V(:,n));
end
title('Velocity vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec')
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
figure(3)
for n=1:11
plot(X(:,n),Vmach(:,n))
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(X(:,n),Vmach(:,n));
end
title('Velocity vs Length ')
xlabel('Distance ft')
ylabel('Velocity Mach')
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
%% Figures/Tables for Exterior Ballistics
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AngV = AngV.*57.3;
AngA = AngA.*57.3;
figure(4)
for k=1:11
AngAp(k,:) = AngA(1:12001,k)'*57.3;
plot(xp(1,1:nbp),AngAp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('AngA vs Distance ')
ylabel('AngA');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off;
figure(5)
for k=1:11
Enp(k,:) = En(1:12001,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Enp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('En vs Distance ')
ylabel('En');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
figure(6)
for k=1:11
Vxp(k,:) = Vx(1:12001,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vxp(k,1:nbp))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vx vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vx ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
figure(7)
for k=1:11
Vyp = Vy(1:12001,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vyp(1:nbp))
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if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Vy vs Distance ')
ylabel('Vy');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
Vtp = zeros(12001,20);
figure(8)
for k=1:11
Vtp(:,k) = Vx(:,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Vtp(1:nbp,:))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Velocity vs Distance ')
ylabel('Velocity ft/sec');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
figure(9)
for k=1:11
Atp(k,:) = y(1:12001,k)';
plot(xp(1:nbp),Atp(k,(1:nbp)))
if k == 1;
hold;
end
end
title('Altitude vs Distance ')
ylabel('Altitude Feet');
xlabel('Range Yds');
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
figure(10)
Ret = Ret';
for n=1:11
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
if n == 1;
hold;
end
plot(xp(1,:),Ret(n,:));
end
title('Reynolds Number vs Distance
xlabel('Distance (ft)')

')
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ylabel('Reynolds Number')
legend(num2str(R(1)),num2str(R(2)),num2str(R(3)),num2str(R(4)),...
num2str(R(5)),num2str(R(6)),num2str(R(7)),num2str(R(8)),...
num2str(R(9)),num2str(R(10)),num2str(R(11)));
hold off
%% Double Check Assumptions about fluid mechanics
% Reynolds Number Minima per Cannonball
MinRe = zeros(11,1);
for n = 1:11
Min = find((Ret(n,:) == min(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MinRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Min);
end
ReMIN = min(MinRe(:,1));
MaxRe = zeros(11,1);
for n = 1:11
Max = find((Ret(n,:) == max(Ret(n,:))),1,'first');
MaxRe(n,1) = Ret(n,Max);
end
ReMAX = max(MaxRe(:,1));
%% Calculation of Standard Deviation of each measure by the end
Vtmax = max(Vt(:,:));
Vymax = max(Vy(:,:));
Vxmax = max(Vx(:,:));
Emax = max(En(:,:));
Atp = Atp';
Altmax = max(Atp(:,:));
AngMax = max(AngA(:,:));
Vstd = std(Vtmax(:));
Vystd = std(Vymax(:));
Vxstd = std(Vxmax(:));
Enstd = std(Emax(:));
altstd = std(Altmax(:));
Angstd = std(AngMax(:));
nbstd = std(nb(:));
Restd = std(MinRe(:,1));
X = java_array('java.lang.String', 6);
X(1) = java.lang.String('Velocity');
X(2) = java.lang.String('Y_Velocity');
X(3) = java.lang.String('X_Velocity');
X(4) = java.lang.String('Energy');
X(5) = java.lang.String('Reynolds_Number');
X(6) = java.lang.String('nbp');
D = cell(X);
X = java_array('java.lang.String',2);
X(1) = java.lang.String('Altitude');
X(2) = java.lang.String('Angle_Of_Attack');
D2 = cell(X);
StandardDeviations =
table(Vstd,Vystd,Vxstd,Enstd,Restd,nbstd,'variablenames',D)
StandardDeviations2 = table(altstd,Angstd,'variablenames',D2)
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disp('Max Re');
disp(ReMAX);
disp('Min Re');
disp(ReMIN);
disp('Max Change in Landing Position');
disp(E_land);

Dr Aaron Bradshaw analysis of Soil Penetration
%AaronChk
hold off;
A = 20;%area sq in
D = zeros(9,2);
K = 0.65; %Compensation for light wt. penetrator and soft soil
N = 0.65;%dimentionless
S = [8;10]; %dimentionless
V = zeros(9,1);%feet/second
V = [1235;1202;1146;1051;974;911;816;745;690];
W = 18; %Wt of ball,mass slugs
R = [27;55;109;219;328;438;656;875;1094];
PH = [80.7;78.3;75.2;69.7;66.5;63.4;57.9;52.4;47.3];
for n=1:2
D(:,n) = 0.00178*S(n)*N*((W/A)^.7)*(V-100)*K;
Din = D*12;
end
Soil1 = S(1);
Soil2 = S(2);
table(W,A,Soil1,Soil2,N)
PDft1 = D(:,1);
PDft2 = D(:,2);
Din1 = D(:,1).*12;
Din2 = D(:,2).*12;
table(R,V,PDft1,PDft2, Din1,Din2,PH)
figure(1)
plot(R,Din1)
hold on;
plot(R,Din2)
plot(R,PH,'k+');
title('Penetration VS. Range');
xlabel('Range yards');
ylabel('Penitration inches');
legend('S= 8','S= 10','Historic data')
hold off;
figure(2)
plot(V,Din1)
hold on;
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plot(V,Din2)
plot(V,PH,'k+');
title('Penetration VS. Velocity');
xlabel('Velocity at impact ft/sec');
ylabel('Penitration inches');
legend('S= 8','S= 10','Historic data')
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